Memento Diplomacy in 19th Century Austro-Russian Relations: The Rift Between Realism & Mysticism in Metternich and Alexander I’s Alliance

Abstract

This thesis, titled Memento Diplomacy in 19th Century Austro-Russian Relations: The Rift Between Realism & Mysticism in Metternich and Alexander I’s Alliance, 1814-1825, introduces a novel analytical framework which explores how individual memory shaped 19th century diplomacy, challenging traditional systemic perspectives like Henry Kissinger’s A World Restored. Focusing on the Austro-Russian relations, it examines how Klemens von Metternich’s realistic memory of the 1789 French Revolution and Czar Alexander I’s mystical recollection of the 1812 Moscow burning, curated through memento diplomacy, drove diplomatic outcomes from the Vienna Congress to the stalemate results of the St. Petersburg Conferences. With a clear focus on the 1814-1825 timeline, from the beginning of the Vienna Congress, the final defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte and the death of Alexander I, this thesis will introduce a new analytical framework that is based on individual memory, challenging traditional narratives regarding international relations that ignore the notion of personal agency in diplomacy. With the addition of important background details from the Napoleonic Europe period, this thesis will present the narrative which drove these two individuals to shape Europe in a particular way, as to avoid the potential rise of another Napoleon and bring stability in a war-torn continent. Through primary sources and supported secondary bibliography, as well as scientific insights from the perspective of memory and psychology, this study traces the alliance’s formation, its peak at the Troppau and Laibach Congresses, and its fracture over the Greek Question, culminating in Alexander’s death in 1825. The thesis argues that memento diplomacy, which is the strategic use of personal traumatic experiences, enabled individual agency to shape the Concert of Europe, yet its reliance on the relationship between Metternich and Alexander led to its imminent collapse by 1853, as evidenced by the Crimean War. Offering an alternative to Kissinger’s realpolitik, this work invites historians to reconsider 19th century diplomacy through the lens of memory-driven individuality, proposing a paradigm shift in understanding international relations and the role of personal agency in diplomacy.