Margins for Manoeuvre in the ENDC: How small non-nuclear weapon states tried to use the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) to widen their position in international politics

Abstract

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is considered the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. It was concluded by the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in 1968, which was also the last time disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation negotiations took place in a multilateral setting. Based on archival research and the concept of margins for manoeuvre, this research investigates the role of small non-nuclear weapon states in the multilateral framework of the ENDC. It shows that small states played an important role in the ENDC negotiations by actively contributing to the discussions and influencing the final draft of the NPT. Furthermore, it shows that small non-nuclear weapon states tried to use the ENDC as an instrument to enlarge their position in international politics. However, this research also demonstrates that from a broader perspective, their margins for manoeuvre were limited. Despite the expansion of the negotiation table, nuclear matters in the 1960s were still dominated by the two nuclear superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, this research shows how internal and external factors forced the ENDC members to adjust their initial objective from general and complete disarmament to nuclear non-proliferation. This affected intra-alliance dynamics and hence stimulated small states, among which Italy and Romania, to change their strategy by following a more independent and opposing course.