

# Margins for manoeuvre in the ENDC

*How small non-nuclear weapon states tried to use the Eighteen Nation  
Disarmament Committee (ENDC) to widen their position in international politics*



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# Abstract

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is considered the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. It was concluded by the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in 1968, which was also the last time disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation negotiations took place in a multilateral setting. Based on archival research and the concept of *margins for manoeuvre*, this research investigates the role of small non-nuclear weapon states in the multilateral framework of the ENDC. It shows that small states played an important role in the ENDC negotiations by actively contributing to the discussions and influencing the final draft of the NPT. Furthermore, it shows that small non-nuclear weapon states tried to use the ENDC as an instrument to enlarge their position in international politics. However, this research also demonstrates that from a broader perspective, their margins for manoeuvre were limited. Despite the expansion of the negotiation table, nuclear matters in the 1960s were still dominated by the two nuclear superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, this research shows how internal and external factors forced the ENDC members to adjust their initial objective from general and complete disarmament to nuclear non-proliferation. This affected intra-alliance dynamics and hence stimulated small states, among which Italy and Romania, to change their strategy by following a more independent and opposing course.

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# Introduction

Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons have not. [...] The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War. No nuclear war was fought between the United States and the Soviet Union, but generations lived with the knowledge that their world could be erased in a single flash of light.<sup>1</sup>

- President Barack Obama (5 April 2009)

On 5 April 2009, president Barack Obama promised that the United States would take concrete steps towards a nuclear-free world. Whilst the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 has halted the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, the threat of nuclear warfare is still prevalent in the twenty-first century. In fact, nuclear weapons have spread significantly throughout the world since the signing of the NPT. In 2017, the United States, for example, maintained about 200 nuclear gravity bombs in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey through NATO. It is part of NATO's policy to continue using these weapons as a deterrent.<sup>2</sup> Although it is not possible to predict the pace and extent of the expansion of nuclear weapons, it seems probable that there will be more nuclear weapons and more nuclear-armed states in the future. This demonstrates that while the end of the Cold War marked a certain end of the nuclear arms race between the superpowers, the amount of states possessing nuclear weapons has increased significantly in the late and post-Cold War era.

Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first century, various successful and less successful efforts have been made to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. Most of the time, the issue of nuclear arms control was considered an issue of the nuclear superpowers. Therefore, disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation negotiations in the Cold War predominantly took place between the United States and Soviet Union. However, these bilateral discussions often led to a deadlock. In the early 1960s, both nuclear-armed and non-nuclear armed states advocated for the inclusion of states that did not possess nuclear weapons in these negotiations. This led to the creation of the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee (TNDC) in 1960, which included the two superpowers and four of their respective allies. The United States was accompanied by Canada, France, Great Britain and Italy and the Soviet Union was joined by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania. In 1962, eight

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<sup>1</sup> Obama White House Archives, Remarks President Barack Obama Prague Delivered (5 April 2009), <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered> (last accessed on 30 May 2020).

<sup>2</sup> Todd S. Sechser, 'Nuclear Security: The Enduring Challenge of Nuclear Weapons', *Great Decisions* (2017), 105-114, 113.

non-aligned members were added, which led to the creation of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC). It is important to stress that all the nuclear-armed states of that time: France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States were represented in this committee. The efforts of this committee led to the realisation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 which the United Nations still considers the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.<sup>3</sup> This view is shared among a majority of historians.<sup>4</sup>

The NPT thus emerged from multilateral negotiations that included both nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). The fact that since its signing there have been no such multilateral negotiations raises questions about the importance of the inclusion of small, non-nuclear weapon, states. This research therefore aims to investigate the position and role of smaller states in the global disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime in the 1960s. Based on the concept of *margins for manoeuvre*, as formulated by historians Laurien Crump and Susanna Erlandsson,<sup>5</sup> I aim to investigate what role smaller states played within the ENDC and to what extent they managed to use the ENDC as an instrument to enlarge their position in international politics. Two members of the ENDC, namely Italy and Romania, serve as case studies to offer a thorough and at the same time comprehensive analysis. This research can be placed in the broader historiographical framework of New Cold War History that, among other things, attributes value to the role small states played in the Cold War framework. This research not only contributes to the understanding of the particular cases of Italy and Romania. It also analyses the role of small states in multilateral negotiation frameworks and especially those concerning nuclear matters.

This research has a second objective, as it also aims to illustrate whether or not the inclusion of NNWS, by means of a second ENDC, is favourable for future negotiations. This second objective can be linked to the challenges the NPT is currently facing and the urgency to start new negotiations. Reasons can be found in North Korea's withdrawal from the agreement in 2003, Donald Trump's America First outlook and its withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty, increased ultra-nationalism and insecure regimes worldwide. According to politicians, diplomats and policymakers, discernible changes in the policies of nuclear-armed states and a clear direction towards a world without nuclear

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<sup>3</sup> United Nations, Office for Disarmament Affairs, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/> (last accessed 15 July 2020).

<sup>4</sup> E.g. Roland Popp, Liviu Horovitz, and Andreas Wenger (eds.). *Negotiating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origins of the Nuclear Order* (London 2017), 1 and John Carlson, 'Is the NPT Still Relevant? - How to Progress the NPT's Disarmament Provisions', *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 97-113, 97.

<sup>5</sup> Laurien Crump and Susanna Erlandsson (eds.). *Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe: The Influence of Smaller Powers* (New York 2020).

weapons are needed.<sup>6</sup> Additionally, instead of undermining the efforts of NNWS, NWS should embrace the different discourse these states can bring to future negotiations on disarmament. Policymakers argue that these two strategies would be the most sustainable way to retain the NPT as a key instrument for global security.<sup>7</sup> Since the signing of the NPT there have been no multilateral negotiations on nuclear arms reduction and no negotiations seriously addressing how to achieve nuclear disarmament. There have been various bilateral attempts to reach agreements, but not all resulted in concrete treaties. An important milestone was the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which was signed in 1991 between the United States and Russia. Its successor agreement, START II, was signed in 1993, but never entered into force. Attempts were being made to negotiate START III, but ended up unsuccessful. Instead, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), also known as the Treaty of Moscow was signed in 2002. In 2010, the American president Barack Obama and the Russian president Dmitry Medvedev agreed on a New START, which is still valid but expires in 2021. Currently, there are no negotiations in prospect for a successor agreement. Whilst time is running out for a successor agreement of the New START, the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995. With a total of 191 signatories, it has become the most universal of all treaties. Its importance is also stressed by the fact that prior to the ENDC negotiations it was predicted that by the 1990s there would have been around 25-30 nuclear-armed states.<sup>8</sup> However, there are in fact 'only' eight in the present day. It can be said that the NPT has put a halt to, or at least has slowed down, the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Its reputation as cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime is therefore justified.

Based on these two objectives, this research will offer a new perspective on the role of small NNWS within the multilateral negotiation scheme on disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in the 1960s. It will reconsider the current view of small NNWS and demonstrate that these negotiations enabled these states to enlarge their margins for manoeuvre in international politics to a certain extent. The ENDC serves as an interesting case study to investigate for two main reasons. First, it offers a comprehensive perspective of multilateral negotiations on nuclear matters as the ENDC included a wide variety of members - large, small, nuclear and non-nuclear. Second, the ENDC is an interesting case study due to its objective. Nuclear matters have predominantly been investigated through the lens of its direct stakeholders, namely the nuclear-armed states. Opening up these negotiations to smaller NNWS enabled these states to actively contribute to a global agreement and thereby enlarge their position in international politics.

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<sup>6</sup> Alexander Kmentt, 'How Divergent Views on Nuclear Disarmament Threaten the NPT', *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 43, No. 10 (December 2013), 8-13, 12.

<sup>7</sup> Kmentt, 'How Divergent Views on Nuclear Disarmament Threaten the NPT', 13

<sup>8</sup> John Carlson, 'Is the NPT Still Relevant? - How to Progress the NPT's Disarmament Provisions', *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 97-113, 97.

The research is divided into four chapters. In the first chapter I will review present literature on the influence of small states in Cold War history. The second chapter sketches the historical context that provides the common thread of the circumstances surrounding the ENDC negotiations. This chapter also elaborates on the ENDC as a whole, as I aim to provide a basic understanding of the functioning of the committee and will, based on archival research, elaborate on its objectives, its aimed outcome and the dynamics between its members. This part will also include an analysis of internal and external factors that affected the ENDC negotiations. The second chapter thus serves as a foundation for the two case studies, which follow subsequently in the third and fourth chapter.

### **Historiography**

Present research on disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation negotiations in the 1960s appears to focus either on the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union or on the efforts of individual nations. Little research has been conducted on the role of small states within multilateral negotiation frameworks. This research focuses on the role of two smaller states from both sides of the Cold War spectrum, and therefore investigates nuclear matters from a unique perspective. Although there is a lot of literature available on disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation negotiations in the 1960s, the role of the ENDC appears to be underexposed. This questions the importance of the ENDC in this negotiation framework. However, this empirical research will demonstrate that the ENDC was an important platform and played a considerable role in the realisation of the NPT.

It is noteworthy that scholars that have included or referred to the ENDC in their research, appear to have diverging views on its role and significance. On the one hand, there are historians who have emphasised the eminent role of the ENDC by claiming that the ENDC was a very successful and important negotiation place.<sup>9</sup> Historian Roland Popp, for instance, argued that the ENDC turned into the most visible international forum for non-proliferation negotiations. He claims that it provided a platform for NNWS to present their demands on what the treaty should entail. With regard to these argumentations, it is important to make a distinction between the non-aligned non-nuclear members and the aligned non-nuclear members. Research suggests that the aligned members had a better negotiation position and that the non-aligned did not contribute much to the negotiations, at least not in the first few

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<sup>9</sup> Hal Brands, 'Non-Proliferation and the Dynamics of the Middle Cold War: The Superpowers, the MLF, and the NPT', *Cold War History*, Vol. 7, No. 3, (August 2007) 389–423.

negotiation years.<sup>10</sup> However, it has been suggested that the ENDC did offer them a platform to present their own denuclearisation initiatives.<sup>11</sup> With respect to the aligned members, historians have argued that both NATO and Warsaw Pact members had a relatively good bargaining position which enabled them to put considerable pressure on the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>12</sup> Even more strikingly, it has been suggested that as the negotiations continued and the pressure of the allies on the superpowers increased, the interests of both superpowers became more aligned.<sup>13</sup>

On the other hand, there are historians who are sceptical about the importance of the ENDC. Historians Peter Jones and Dimitris Bourantonis, for example, argue that while the ENDC was a successful forum for multilateral negotiations, it did not lead to concrete nuclear arms control measures and predominantly contributed to the quest for peace.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, it has been argued that the ENDC depended almost entirely on the two superpowers. Historians suggested that while it was agreed upon that the United Nations would remain the main agenda setter, the American and Soviet co-chairs took over the agenda from 1962 until the realisation of the NPT in 1968.<sup>15</sup> This raises questions about the extent to which the superpowers, which had requested the enlargement of the committee, were actually engaging the smaller nations in the negotiations. Was the ENDC just a facade, or a tool to get consensus on nuclear matters? Did the significant negotiations still take place on a bilateral level?

The approach of this research is based on the concept of *margins for manoeuvre*, a concept that historians Laurien Crump and Susanna Erlandsson have used in order to investigate the role and influence of smaller states within the framework of the Cold War. Their research suggests 'margins for manoeuvre as a common denominator that may help explain small state foreign policy behaviour, also providing a tool to discuss the interrelationship between system level, state level and individual level of influence on small state foreign policy'.<sup>16</sup> Their volume contains contributions by a variety of scholars all building an individual case study on a particular small state. One part of this volume approaches margins for

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<sup>10</sup> Alan F. Neidle, 'Peace-Keeping and Disarmament: A Report of the Discussions at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament', *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 57, No. 1 (January 1963), 46-72, 71.

<sup>11</sup> Roland Popp, 'The Long Road to the NPT: From Superpower Collusion to Global Compromise' in: Roland Popp (eds.). *Negotiating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origins of the Nuclear Order* (London 2017), 16.

<sup>12</sup> Brands, 'Non-Proliferation and the Dynamics of the Middle Cold War: The Superpowers, the MLF, and the NPT', 412.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibidem*, 412.

<sup>14</sup> Peter Jones and Dimitris Bourantonis, 'The United Nations and Nuclear Disarmament: a Case Study en Failure?', *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1990), 8.

<sup>15</sup> Spyros Blavoukos and Dimitris Bourantonis, 'Chairs as Policy Entrepreneurs in Multilateral Negotiations', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 2 (April 2011), 666-667 and Spyros Blavoukos and Dimitris Bourantonis. *Charing Multilateral Negotiations: The Case of the United Nations* (New York 2011).

<sup>16</sup> Crump and Erlandsson (eds.). *Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe*, 2.



manoeuvre through multilateralism. In this part, Crump, together with historian Angela Romano, poses the hypothesis that multilateralism offers small states the opportunity to either organise efforts on particular international issues or even assert their individual interests by using the multilateral mechanism as leverage over the superpower.<sup>17</sup> Based on a variety of case studies, it becomes evident that this hypothesis applies to all cases in their volume.

This research uses a different approach than is covered in the volume of Crump and Erlandsson, as their case studies on margins for manoeuvre in multilateralism focus on multilateral organisations, such as the Warsaw Pact, NATO and the CSCE. The ENDC, however, was a committee and not an organisation. The ENDC can be seen as a temporarily established committee with the aim to reach agreement on the issue of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. I hypothesise that there is a significant difference between multilateral organisations and multilateral committees with respect to stretching margins for manoeuvre. As committees are usually short-term oriented and focused on reaching one particular result, I believe that states would have less at stake within a committee and therefore would be able and willing to stretch their margins for manoeuvre to an even larger extent than they would in multilateral organisations.

## **Methodology**

Almost all minutes of the ENDC meetings have been digitised by the University of Michigan and are easily accessible.<sup>18</sup> These minutes provide a comprehensive overview of the negotiations. Present literature demonstrates that these minutes are crucial and completely under researched. By conducting thorough archival research of the ENDC minutes, I aim to investigate whether these states impacted the negotiations and to what extent they managed to change their position from satellite state to actual negotiation partner. It is important to stress that this research does not solely rely on the ENDC minutes. The minutes offer a macro-level perspective of the negotiations. To investigate the meta- and micro-level, namely the intra-alliance and national perspectives on nuclear matters of Italy and Romania, I will use sources made available by the Wilson Center Cold War History Project<sup>19</sup> and the Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security.<sup>20</sup> Due to the covid-19 situation, it was impossible to visit the physical archives in Italy. Therefore, I had to limit myself to the Italian sources that have been

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<sup>17</sup> Ibidem, 240.

<sup>18</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/encd/> (last accessed 6 July 2020).

<sup>19</sup> Wilson Center Digital Archive, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/> (last accessed 16 July 2020).

<sup>20</sup> Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (PHP), <http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/lor1.ethz.ch/index.html> (last accessed 16 July 2020).

made available by the Wilson Center. Nevertheless, these primary sources combined provide a comprehensive overview of the role of small states in the disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation negotiations in the 1960s. Besides these primary sources, this research builds on present literature on the following topics: disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation negotiations in the 1960s, intra-alliance dynamics and small states margins for manoeuvre in multilateral frameworks.

This research focuses on Italy and Romania in particular. These states serve as interesting cases for several reasons. First, they shed light on both sides of the Cold War spectrum, as Italy was a member of NATO and Romania of the Warsaw Pact. Second, both states have been perceived differently in current historiography. Whilst Italy is predominantly perceived as a state that obediently followed the policy of the United States, this research will demonstrate that Italy transformed into a maverick in the course of the negotiations. Romania, on the other hand, is in literature predominantly depicted as a maverick within and outside of the Warsaw Pact, whilst this research will demonstrate that Romania was much less of a maverick within the framework of the ENDC. This research will thus add nuance to their current image in historiography. Third, these particular countries have already been thoroughly investigated by a wide variety of historians, which can be used as a foundation for this empirical research. Although a lot of research on Romania and Italy on nuclear issues in a broader perspective has been conducted, the actual dynamics within the ENDC remain unexplored and are vital to understand how these countries used this specific framework to widen their position in international politics. Present literature provides a very interesting starting point to juxtapose and compare the role of these two states within this particular multilateral framework.

Based on the concept of margins for manoeuvre, this research investigates to what extent NNWS, and Italy and Romania in particular, used the ENDC as an instrument to enlarge their position in international politics. It will show how dynamics among the ENDC members changed after global political events. It will also demonstrate that the decisions made by the superpowers had an immense impact on the intra-alliance dynamics. Furthermore, it will become evident how small states used the committee to assert their national interests and how they would continue to do so until the very end of the negotiations, which corresponds to the hypothesis I posed on the margins for manoeuvre of small states within multilateral committees. Furthermore, it demonstrates how nuclear matters were concluded on the multilateral level in the 1960s. Lastly, this research contributes to the question in which setting future negotiations on nuclear matters can best take place and whether a second ENDC is favourable. Current international political issues, such as increased ultra-nationalism, insecure regimes and unpredictable leaders demonstrate the urgency for effective prospective negotiations.

## Literature review

Already during the Cold War, a lot of research was being conducted on disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Nowadays, Cold War History and the History of International Relations are among the most popular fields within historical research. The methodology within Cold War History has, however, changed drastically over the past centuries. Traditional Cold War historians have focused predominantly on the narrative of the two superpowers and the tensions between them. Besides the field of history, the Cold War is also a popular topic in other fields, such as security studies, international relations (IR) studies and political science. Most of the IR and political science studies focus on the leading (super)powers. As an example, the influential political scientist Kenneth N. Waltz argued that bigger nations deserved more scholarly attention because they could be seen as the 'shapers of the international system'.<sup>21</sup> Reflecting this approach, a lot of studies on the topic of the Cold War were based on the two main actors, namely the United States and the Soviet Union. Small states were primarily researched in respect to these superpowers, for example in the context of superpower strategies or alliance-politics.

Moreover, due to the lack of Eastern European sources, Cold War historiography concentrated heavily on the Western perspective. This changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, which led to the opening of the Soviet archives. This made a more comprehensive view on the Cold War possible and led to many new interpretations. Historian John Lewis Gaddis, for example, argued in his book *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (1997) that the Soviet Union was in a much better position and had much more power than was initially anticipated. Based on these results, Gaddis argued that the Soviet Union should be held accountable for the conflict.<sup>22</sup> Gaddis considered himself one of the pioneers of Cold War post-revisionism, a school which viewed the Cold War as something inevitable rather than caused by the United States or the Soviet Union. It seems striking that Gaddis considered himself a post-revisionist, as he blamed the Soviet Union for the conflict.

Historians have observed Gaddis' *We Now Know* as a traditional interpretation of the Cold War rather than a post-revisionist interpretation.<sup>23</sup> After numerous of such New Cold War interpretations, Cold War historian Melvyn P. Leffler rightfully raised the question 'what do we now know?'. He argues that whilst these publications offer fresh perspectives, new insights and provocative argumentation, they also are open to a wide variety of conclusions. With respect to Gaddis' *Now We Know*, Leffler argues that Gaddis successfully provided a new

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<sup>21</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz. *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove 1979).

<sup>22</sup> John Lewis Gaddis. *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford 1997).

<sup>23</sup> Melvyn P. Leffler, "The Cold War: What Do "We Now Know"?", *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 104, No. 2, 501-524, 501.

master narrative that can serve as a framework for the interpretation of new documents. However, he questions whether Gaddis's volume accurately sums up the trends in literature and effectively integrates them with existing literature.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, while Gaddis held the Soviet Union primarily responsible for the Cold War, he does not elaborate specifically on this matter throughout his research. In this way, Leffler argues, Gaddis' work in some ways falls short.<sup>25</sup>

In the 2000s there was another shift visible in Cold War historiography, which can be linked to the growing popularity of global history in the late twentieth century. Historians started to research the Cold War as a global event. Not only did they started to shift away from the traditional East versus West perspective, they also started to attribute value to the roles and positions of smaller nations. As an example, the Norwegian Odd Arne Westad has emphasised the effect the conflict had outside of Europe and North America. In many of his Cold War studies, Westad uncovered the long-term effects of the conflict on other continents, and thereby attributed significance to the positions and situations of smaller nations.<sup>26</sup> Consequently, this made dominant theories such as Waltz' theory that bigger nations deserved more scholarly attention because they could be seen as the 'shapers of the international system' less compelling.

These trends led historians to change their focus from the superpowers to the middle and smaller powers. Recent publications that focus on small state actors have proved that smaller states can bring significant contributions to world politics. One of the historians that emphasised the general importance of small states in Cold War politics is Tony Smith. In his article 'New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War' (2000) Smith argues that any history of the Cold War that neglects the role of smaller nations can be seen as incomplete.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, he argues that the governments of smaller states have played a principal role and changed the way in which the Cold War is perceived. Furthermore, Smith argues that the opening of the Soviet sources has moved historians both forward and backwards. It moved historians forward in the sense that it made a more comprehensive view of the Cold War possible. However, it moved historians backwards as he argued that these new sources can result in something that he refers to as 'orthodoxy plus archives.' For example, new archival material was used as an argument to blame the Soviet for the Cold War.<sup>28</sup> This 'putting new wine in old bottles' is evident in publications from historians such as John Lewis Gaddis and should be avoided according to Smith.

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<sup>24</sup> Leffler, "The Cold War: What Do "We Now Know"?", 506-507.

<sup>25</sup> Ibidem, 503.

<sup>26</sup> Odd Arne Westad. *The Cold War: A World History* (New York 2017).

<sup>27</sup> Tony Smith, 'New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War', *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Fall 2000), 568.

<sup>28</sup> Smith, 'New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War', 568.

This new approach of the Cold War in which the Cold War is seen as a global event rather than a bilateral conflict falls under the broader scheme of 'New Cold War History'. The 'start' of this school marked a certain end of the orthodox account of the Cold War and led to various interesting new findings that had hitherto been overlooked. One of which is the evident extent to which small states were able to influence international politics and thus contributed to the shaping of the Cold War.

### **Margins for manoeuvre**

Despite the increased interest in small states, historians Laurien Crump and Susanna Erlandsson argue that many New Cold War historians tend to focus on the traditional, and often popular, themes, such as European security and the concept of détente. In their volume *Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe: The Influence of Smaller Powers* (2019), Crump and Erlandsson aim to avoid this by using a wide variety of themes, all investigated from the perspective of smaller powers. Their volume suggests 'margins for manoeuvre as a common denominator that may help explain small state foreign policy behaviour, also providing a tool to discuss the interrelationship between system level, state level and individual level of influence on small state foreign policy'.<sup>29</sup> It covers more than the concept of power and leaves room for other strategies, such as resistance and defensive power. Crump and Erlandsson explicitly chose the wording 'smaller powers' instead of 'small powers', in order to avoid strict categories and particularly emphasise the difference between great powers and smaller powers.<sup>30</sup>

Their publication includes various examples of how small states were able to contribute to multilateral policy making and shows insights into the intra-alliance dynamics. As an example, it shows how Romania managed to enhance its margins for manoeuvre in the multilateral framework in the late 1950s, earning the international title of 'maverick'. It also demonstrates how Greece managed to become of great importance in the negotiations to reach an agreement on nuclear arms control in the 1980s by presenting itself as a peacemaker.<sup>31</sup> The strength of this volume lies in the fact that less successful attempts of small states in world politics are also included. As an example, they demonstrate how the Netherlands limited their margins for manoeuvre by overestimating their small power in the course of the European army negotiations in the early 1950s.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Crump and Erlandsson (eds.). *Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe*, 2.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibidem*, 2-3.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibidem*, 224.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibidem*, 38.

Together with Angela Romano, Laurien Crump posed an interesting hypothesis on margins for manoeuvre through multilateralism. They argue that multilateralism offered smaller states the opportunity to either organise efforts on particular international issues or even assert their individual interests by using the multilateral mechanism as leverage over the superpower.<sup>33</sup> They conclude that small states used multilateral fora as an instrument to widen their margins for manoeuvre. They managed to bolster foreign policies within the dichotomy Cold War framework, which led to drastic changes within the alliance-dynamics.<sup>34</sup> Crump and Romano demonstrate that their hypothesis applies to all cases presented in their volume. This conclusion is based on case studies focussing on seven different multilateral fora: the Warsaw Pact, NATO, the EEC/EPC, the Benelux, the NNA-group, the CSCE and the UN. The authors of these studies all conclude that smaller allies would have been much less powerful without these multilateral mechanisms.<sup>35</sup>

As briefly explained in the introduction of this research, I hypothesise that there is a significant difference between multilateral organisations and multilateral committees. Organisations are founded with long-term goals, which makes the preservation of a good relationship with its fellow members of vital importance for future cooperation. Within committees, states often work on one particular project, after which the committee would be dissolved or start working on another project. In this sense, it is reasonable to assume that states have more at stake within organisations than within committees. Therefore, I believe that states would be more likely to try to stretch their margins for manoeuvre within a committee than within an organisation. Based on this hypothesis, I believe that small NNWS, among which Italy and Romania, would actively try to stretch their margins for manoeuvre within the framework of the ENDC.

### **Nuclear non-proliferation historiography and the ENDC**

The 1960s can be seen as a crucial negotiation period within the broader non-proliferation regime. Most Cold War scholars share the view that during the 1960s the East-West relationship transformed from a hostile confrontation to an antagonistic cooperation.<sup>36</sup> The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 had brought the world close to a nuclear warfare. Consequently, many states agreed that a world without or with fewer nuclear weapons would be a much safer place. After October 1962, both superpowers made increased efforts to control the nuclear

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<sup>33</sup> Ibidem, 240.

<sup>34</sup> Ibidem, 20-24.

<sup>35</sup> Ibidem, 240.

<sup>36</sup> Gottfried Niedhart, 'East-West Conflict: Short Cold War and Long Détente An Essay on Terminology and Periodization' in: Bange Oliver (eds.). *The Long Détente: Changing Concepts of Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1950s–1980s* (Budapest 2017) 22.

arms race and halt the spread of nuclear weapons. The Cuban Missile Crisis had given the superpowers a major impetus to reinvigorate test ban talks on a multilateral level. The period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s is also seen as a time in which the stalemate between the superpowers was gradually disappearing. By 1965, Europe was growing out of the straightjacket that World War II had given it.<sup>37</sup>

Whilst the ENDC played an important part in the broader nuclear non-proliferation scheme, its absence in academic research seems noteworthy. This raises questions on the committee's relevance and significance within this framework. Historians that have included the ENDC in their research appear to have diverging views on its effectiveness and relevance. In *Negotiation the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origins of the Nuclear Order* (2017), historian Roland Popp aims to offer a new perspective of the negotiations that led to the NPT by looking at smaller nations, by means of case studies and inter-alliance dynamics. With this approach, Popp steps aside from the traditional research that focuses on the negotiations between the superpowers or the nuclear 'haves' and 'have-nots'.<sup>38</sup> According to Popp, the ENDC turned into the most visible international forum for non-proliferation negotiations. It became a platform on which NNWS succeeded in having their demands for a NPT heard. As an example, it provided an opportunity for non-aligned states to present denuclearisation initiatives, such as the initiatives of Latin American and African countries to install regional nuclear weapons free zones.<sup>39</sup> Whilst Popp stresses the importance of NNWS within the global non-proliferation regime and the ENDC in particular, he also points out that the most significant negotiations took place between the superpowers on a bilateral level, especially during the early years of the negotiations. The ENDC is therefore rarely referred to within his research.

Historian Dimitris Bourantonis argues that the ENDC depended almost entirely on the two superpowers. He argues that the more disarmament was treated as an East vs. West issue, the more the role of the superpowers increased.<sup>40</sup> In his research on the role of American and Soviet co-chairs of the ENDC, he demonstrates how the co-Chairs managed to take control over the agenda in the period 1962-1968, whilst the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) had welcomed the ENDC with the assumption that the United Nations would remain the principal negotiation agenda setter. Furthermore, Bourantonis argues that the ENDC mainly contributed to the quest for peace rather than to concrete nuclear arms control measures.<sup>41</sup> With this last claim, Bourantonis not only questions the ENDC as a

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<sup>37</sup> Poul Villaume and Odd Arne Westad (eds.). *Perforating the Iron Curtain: European Détente, Transatlantic Relations and the Cold War, 1965-1985* (Copenhagen 2010) 7.

<sup>38</sup> Ibidem, 16.

<sup>39</sup> Ibidem, 16.

<sup>40</sup> Dimitris Bourantonis, 'Democratization, Decentralization, and Disarmament at the United Nations, 1962-1978', *The International History Review*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (November 1993), 689-690.

<sup>41</sup> Jones and Bourantonis, 'The United Nations and Nuclear Disarmament: a Case Study en Failure?', 8.

successful negotiation place, but also questions the outcome of the committee, the NPT, as a successful product of the ENDC negotiations.

Another view on the ENDC is presented by historian Hal Brands. In his article 'Non-Proliferation and the Dynamics of the Middle Cold War: The Superpowers, the MLF, and the NPT', Brands argues that during the 1960s, both the United States and the Soviet Union struggled to manage their respective European alliances with respect to the nuclear non-proliferation negotiations.<sup>42</sup> According to Brands, the thorny issue of the Multilateral Force (MLF) proposal by Washington formed a serious roadblock throughout the negotiations.<sup>43</sup> With regard to the superpowers, Brands builds an interesting case by arguing that Washington's interests were much closer to Moscow than to the interests of its allies - and most probably also vice versa.<sup>44</sup> This corresponds with the non-proliferation paradox presented by historian Francis Gavis. He argued that, on the one hand, non-proliferation became a shared goal of the two Cold War enemies and therefore brought the two superpowers closer together. On the other hand, he argued that reaching agreement on a global non-proliferation policy was being pursued at the expense of the intra-alliance dynamics.<sup>45</sup> 'Within both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the imperatives of alliance unity and the limits of hegemonic influence enabled smaller powers to put considerable pressure on US and Soviet policy.'<sup>46</sup> Brands claims that both superpowers felt increased pressure to reach agreement on the NPT because smaller nations were pondering about building nuclear weapons themselves.<sup>47</sup>

### **The non-aligned members**

In a report from January 1963, scholar Alan F. Neidle argued that the non-aligned ENDC members did not contribute much to the negotiations, at least not at the start of the negotiations.<sup>48</sup> An article published in November 1965 by historian Joseph L. Noguee, however, suggests otherwise. According to Noguee, the involvement of the eight neutral states in the ENDC could be seen as the result of a growing influence among neutralists to influence United

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<sup>42</sup> Brands, 'Non-Proliferation and the Dynamics of the Middle Cold War: The Superpowers, the MLF, and the NPT', 389.

<sup>43</sup> Brands, 407.

<sup>44</sup> Ibidem, 402

<sup>45</sup> William Burr and David Rosenberg, 'Nuclear Competition in an Era of Stalemate, 1963-1975' in: Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad. *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* (Cambridge 2010), 396.

<sup>46</sup> Brands, 'Non-Proliferation and the Dynamics of the Middle Cold War: The Superpowers, the MLF, and the NPT', 412.

<sup>47</sup> Ibidem, 412.

<sup>48</sup> Neidle, 'Peace-Keeping and Disarmament: A Report of the Discussions at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament', 71.



Nations policy and halt the nuclear arms race.<sup>49</sup> Nogee noted that during the negotiations all eight neutralists reacted differently to the elements presented in the disarmament proposals made by the superpowers. Nevertheless, they all tried to preserve their neutral stance and tried not to express favouritism towards one of the two power blocs.<sup>50</sup>

Nogee even suggests that neutralists states had prevented the negotiations from collapsing on a few occasions. Although Nogee's article was published almost three years after Neidle's report, Nogee gives examples of the years 1961 and 1962. One example can be found in the fact that the neutralists states objected the Soviet Union's proposal to postpone the talks until 1963 due to the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. Whilst the conference was in recess during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Western pressures, supported by the neutralists, resulted in the fact that the committee resumed the negotiations in November.<sup>51</sup>

However, Nogee also suggests that the ENDC negotiations were 'the locus of genuine negotiations.'<sup>52</sup> The significant results, however, such as the 'hot line' and Partial Nuclear Test Ban agreements, had all been negotiated bilaterally or trilaterally - including Great Britain. In fact, when the Partial Nuclear Test Ban was adopted, no neutralist state was even present to symbolically sign on behalf of the non-aligned world. Nevertheless, Nogee does believe that the inclusion of the eight non-aligned within these negotiations were of added value. Not because of the pressure they were able put on the nuclear powers, but because they were part of the then 'sizable nonaligned world.'<sup>53</sup>

## Conclusion

It is evident that Cold War Historiography has changed drastically in the past centuries. The opening of the Soviet archives has led to renewed interpretations in which the focus expanded from the United States, the Soviet Union and the West in particular to the East, and eventually also to other parts of the world. Consequently, this not only led to a global view of the Cold War, but also to an increased interest in small states. These studies, of which the majority focused on the efforts of individual states, demonstrate the significant role of small states on both the regional and international level.

It has been suggested that the ENDC became an important international forum for non-proliferation negotiations on which NNWS could present their stance on disarmament and

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<sup>49</sup> Joseph L. Nogee, 'The Neutralist World and Disarmament Negotiations', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, (Nov., 1965), Vol. 362, *Nonalignment in Foreign Affairs* (November 1965), 71-80, 71.

<sup>50</sup> Nogee, 'The Neutralist World and Disarmament Negotiations', 71.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibidem*, 79.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibidem*, 79.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibidem*, 80.

nuclear non-proliferation. However, historians have been divided about the effectiveness and relevance of the ENDC. Whilst the ENDC negotiations led to the creation of the NPT, which is regarded as the cornerstone of the broader nuclear non-proliferation regime, some historians have argued that the ENDC was dominated almost entirely by the two superpowers. Some even argued that the ENDC mainly contributed to the quest for peace and that the significant negotiations took place on the bilateral level. However, there are also historians who have pointed out the capabilities of small states to enlarge their margins for manoeuvre to influence international politics. The historiographical gap is evident, as present research neglects the connection between small state efforts and the ENDC. The diverse perceptions of the significance of the ENDC and the role of small states offer an interesting starting point for this research. In the next chapter, a more comprehensive historical context will be sketched, which serves as a foundation for the subsequent case studies.

# Historical context

The Eighteen Nation Committee can be said to be a sort of cross-section of the present-day world. All three main groups of States are represented here: the socialist countries, the States belonging to the military blocs of the Western Powers, and the neutralist countries. The Committee also incorporates the interests of the various geographical regions in the world. Never before has there been a negotiating body for disarmament that was so fitted for the solution of the problem confronting it. The Committee is broad enough to be representative in the full sense of the word.<sup>54</sup>

- Mr. Gromyko, representative of the Soviet Union (15 March 1962)

Soviet minister of Foreign Affairs and representative to the ENDC, Andrei Gromyko, spoke these words during the second meeting of the ENDC on 15 March 1962. This statement implies that Gromyko firmly believed that the Committee's work could result into a treaty that would be accepted throughout the entire world. By arguing that there had never been a negotiation body before that was so fitted for the solution of the problem confronting it demonstrates that the Soviets considered the inclusion of NNWS of vital importance. It implies that they viewed the problem of disarmament a global matter, rather than a bilateral issue. Before the establishment of the ENDC, the Soviet Union had been advocating the expansion of the negotiation table by inviting other states to the discussions: big, small, nuclear and non-nuclear. The Western members had also been in favour of expanding the negotiation table. As an example, Canadian representative Mr. Green argued that the eight new non-aligned members would play a valuable role in avoiding a stalemate, which he believes had happened so often in past negotiations. Furthermore, according to Green, the eight non-aligned would also be able to bring a fresh perspective to the table.<sup>55</sup>

The objective of this chapter is twofold. First, it serves as a historical context by elaborating on the conditions leading up to the establishment of the ENDC. This forms an important foundation for the second objective, which is the aim to provide a basic understanding of the functioning of the ENDC and the role of small states within the committee. It analyses the initial aims and envisioned outcomes of the members as well as the circumstances that influenced the negotiations. It helps to understand what conditions affected

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<sup>54</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 2 (15 March 1962), 6 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>55</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 4 (19 March 1962), 12 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

small states' margins for manoeuvre. By combining archival research with present literature on the ENDC, this chapter forms an important basis for the subsequent two case studies.

### **The Cold War spectrum**

The Cold War introduced a new dynamic to international politics. Never before in the history of warfare had there been the capacity to eradicate states entirely without committing mass casualties on both sides. This total annihilation was now possible through the use of just one nuclear bomb. With this great power came the paradox of 'strategic stability'. Nuclear states had the capacity to eradicate each other, but knowing that if one state decided to use nuclear warheads the other would act in turn and bring about the destruction of both. This created a parity of power and destruction. The policy of strategic stability became an important political strategy for both superpowers. The awareness of this mutually assured destruction would serve as a basis for what historian John Lewis Gaddis called 'the Long Peace'.<sup>56</sup>

Through the realisation of being on the verge of total destruction of each other and the rest of the world, the two superpowers sought to reach a global treaty on general and complete disarmament. However, years of conflict and animosity between the United States and the Soviet Union prevented them from succeeding. Gavis' paradox of Cold War non-proliferation demonstrated that whilst non-proliferation brought the two superpowers together, it was being pursued at the expense of the superpowers' close allies.<sup>57</sup>

Cold War Western Europe was based on two pillars. One was the collaboration within NATO, which was dominated by the military cooperation with the United States. The second was economic and political cooperation. Since 1944, the United States had become the most important military power in Western Europe. While the dominant position of the United States was very clear, both the Americans and Western Europeans did not try to make NATO a democratic alliance in which all members were equally powerful. In fact, besides the security NATO provided the Western Europeans, the most important aspect of NATO was the access to (buy) weapons.

Since the early 1950s, two major issues started to dominate the intra-alliance politics. One of which was the issue of West Germany. When the Korean War broke out in 1950, the Americans called for a rearmament of West Germany, which had joined NATO in 1955. Most European states, traumatised by the horrors of Nazi Germany in the Second World War, resisted this proposal.<sup>58</sup> Another major issue emerged in the framework of the command of

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<sup>56</sup> William Burr and David Rosenberg, 'Nuclear Competition in an Era of Stalemate, 1963-1975' in: Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad. *The Cambridge History of the Cold War* (Cambridge 2010) 395.

<sup>57</sup> Burr and Rosenberg, 'Nuclear Competition in an Era of Stalemate, 1963-1975', 396.

<sup>58</sup> Odd Arne Westad. *The Cold War: A World History* (Hachette Book Group 2017), 213.

nuclear weapons. In 1954, based on the experiences of the Korean War, NATO decided that it was allowed to use nuclear weapons in case a non-nuclear Soviet state would attack a Western European state. This doctrine of 'massive retaliation' mainly served as a deterrence, but also meant a recognition of the nuclear capability of the Soviets.<sup>59</sup>

In the course of the Cold War, nuclear cooperation became more of a pressing issue within the NATO alliance. In 1952, Great Britain became a nuclear power and in 1960, France successfully executed its first nuclear test. A clear division appeared among political leaders in both the United States and Western Europe arguing in favour and against nuclear cooperation in Europe. The fear that West Germany would turn its nuclear ambitions into practice still formed a roadblock in this debate.<sup>60</sup> Within three decades after the NATO was established, the United States, Great Britain, France and West Germany had all reached opposite positions with respect to nuclearisation. Great Britain and France had become nuclear-armed states, which fed the aspiration of other European states to also build an independent nuclear arsenal. At the same time, the United States coerced West Germany to let go of its nuclear ambitions. The uncertainty of reaching a global agreement on non-proliferation and the growing nuclear aspirations among European states caused tensions within the Western alliance.

The establishment of a European front in the form of NATO had urged the Soviet leaders to expand the integration process of the Eastern European states. In 1955, six years after the establishment of NATO, the Warsaw Pact was founded as a reaction to West Germany entering NATO. The fact that the Warsaw Pact was founded five days after West Germany's accession to NATO, gave the Soviet alliance the stigmatisation of 'cardboard castle.'<sup>61</sup>

Moscow had already acquired its first nuclear weapon in 1949. For over a decade, it was the only nuclear power in the Eastern bloc. The People's Republic of China (PRC) also had clear aspirations to become a nuclear power. In 1955, the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) was established. The Soviet Union was facing a dilemma with regard to the PRC's nuclear ambitions. On the one hand, the Soviets wanted to improve their relationship with the PRC in order to form a united front against the Western bloc, especially with regard to the American aggression in Vietnam. On the other hand, the Kremlin considered a nuclear PRC a serious threat. Fearing of being accused by the PRC of collaboration with the United States, Moscow decided not to mediate between Washington and Hanoi and

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<sup>59</sup> Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro, 'NATO and Nuclear Proliferation, 1949–1968' in: Ian Shapiro and Adam Tooze (eds.). *Charter of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Together with Scholarly Commentaries and Essential Historical Documents* (New Haven 2018), 196.

<sup>60</sup> Westad. *The Cold War: A World History*, 214.

<sup>61</sup> Crump, 'Nonproliferation Under Pressure: The Nuclear Debate Within the Warsaw Pact, 1965–1968', 99.

allowed other Warsaw Pact members to initiate these negotiations.<sup>62</sup> This decision would have a drastic impact on the intra-alliance dynamics within the Warsaw Pact. Small NNWS, such as Poland and Romania seized this opportunity to enhance relations with the PRC and increase their influence in world politics. Meanwhile, the doctrinal divergences between the Soviets and the Chinese drove a wedge between the two states, leading to the Sino-Soviet split. For an entire decade, from 1956 to 1966, the two powers decided to break all political relations. This further enabled small Warsaw Pact members to expand their influence in international politics without interference from the Soviet Union from the late 1950s onwards.

### **Multilateral disarmament efforts pre-ENDC**

Multilateral attempts to control nuclear proliferation had already been made right after the end of the Second World War. During the very first meeting of the UN General Assembly in January 1946, the United States submitted a proposal in which they advocated UN control of all plutonium and uranium-235 facilities - which enabled states to develop nuclear weapons themselves.<sup>63</sup> This plan became known as the 'Baruch Plan'. The Soviets opposed the Baruch plan, as they feared this would result in the establishment of an American nuclear monopoly. Subsequently, the Soviets proposed their own, similar, plan. This so called 'Gromyko Plan', named after their Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, ensured the Soviet Union the destruction of stockpiles before agreeing to an international supervisory scheme with respect to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>64</sup> In addition, the Gromyko Plan made it impossible for the United States to get a nuclear monopoly. Whilst these proposals demonstrate the willingness of both superpowers to reach agreement on non-proliferation at an early stage within the Cold War, it in fact meant the start of the nuclear arms race.

No concrete multilateral treaties were being ratified until the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963. In fact, a new disarmament plan announced by the Soviet prime minister Nikolai Bulganin in 1956 was rejected and portrayed as propaganda by the United States. A less ambitious plan, which Bulganin proposed later, did, in fact, lead to a nonaggression pact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO.<sup>65</sup> When looking at the broader non-proliferation regime of the Cold War, however, it becomes evident that real progress would emerge in the 1960s. The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 and the PRC's nuclear status in 1964 would form the real incentives for both NWS and NNWS to speed up the disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation negotiations.

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<sup>62</sup> Laurien Crump. *The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered: International Relations in Eastern Europe, 1955-1969* (New York 2015), 174.

<sup>63</sup> Burr and Rosenberg, 'Nuclear Competition in an Era of Stalemate, 1963-1975', 397

<sup>64</sup> Ibidem, 397.

<sup>65</sup> Ibidem, 399.

The realisation of being on the verge of total destruction formed the main reason for the United States and the Soviet Union to seek for a way to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. Another important motive was the fear of a nuclear domino effect. Both superpowers considered the PRC the biggest threat, as it had evident nuclear capabilities and aspirations.<sup>66</sup> The Chinese threat stimulated both superpowers to consult their allies on their stance on non-proliferation, and eventually, also non-aligned states. In the course of the 1960s, the increasing nuclear ambitions of NNWS would slowly start to dominate the negotiations, which in turn accelerated and intensified the negotiation process.

Not only NWS, but also NNWS wanted to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. Some of these states even actively participate in the multilateral non-proliferation negotiations by presenting their own resolutions and drafts to the United Nations. One example is the Rapacki Plan, presented to the UN General Assembly on 2 October 1957 by the Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki. This proposal encompassed the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Europe. Although the members of the Warsaw Pact welcomed this plan, the NATO members opposed it because they feared that it would affect the balance of power in Europe. Despite several modifications, Rapacki never succeeded in ratification. Three years later, another plan was presented to the UN General Assembly. In 1961, the Irish Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Aiken proposed a UN resolution for the 'Prevention of the Wider Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons.' This resolution proposed a ban on the spread of nuclear technologies and prohibited countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. Although the Irish resolution was adopted unanimously and would prove to have played an important role in the global non-proliferation regime in the 1960s, its success did not happen overnight. Especially the NATO members were divided about the Irish Resolution. While Canada, Denmark, Iceland and Norway supported the resolution, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States initially opposed it.

On the same day the Irish resolution was adopted a parallel Swedish resolution was also adopted. The Undén Plan, named after the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, changed the scope of non-proliferation negotiations by focussing on NNWS. The Undén Plan encouraged non-nuclear powers to organise themselves in nuclear-free clubs. Part of this plan was that these clubs would also refuse to host any nuclear weapons in their state of any of the nuclear powers. The Americans opposed this plan and urged its NATO allies to do the same - of which most of them did.<sup>67</sup> The Soviet Bloc, on the other hand, voted in favour. The Swedish proposal was in line with the Rapacki Plan of 1957, for which the Soviets had voted in favour as well. The other Warsaw Pact members united themselves behind the position of

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<sup>66</sup> Crump. *The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered: International Relations in Eastern Europe, 1955-1969*, 173.

<sup>67</sup> Popp, 'The Long Road to the NPT: From Superpower Collusion to Global Compromise', 13.

the Soviet Union, which demonstrated the unity of both alliances. The multilateral negotiations with respect to nuclear non-proliferation in the late 1950s and early 1960s demonstrate a clear distinction between the standpoints of the Western bloc and the Eastern bloc. It also shows that the non-nuclear allies of the superpowers, to a large extent, aligned with the standpoints of their respective superpower. The non-aligned states, such as Ireland and Sweden, brought their own proposals to the United Nations, in order to secure a safer, nuclear free, Europe.

According to historians, prospects for effective global nuclear non-proliferation policies began to improve in the 1960s. Four main developments were at the root of these changes. First, the development of nuclear weapons and the danger associated with them gained anti-nuclear groups more popularity throughout the world. These groups varied from grassroots associations to NGO's and the Non-Aligned Movement.<sup>68</sup> The main activities of these societal actors, however, were mainly directly aimed against the existing nuclear weapons and the environmental consequences of nuclear testing. They were, to a lesser extent, advocating against the development of nuclear weapons, probably because this was a rather theoretical and less tangible threat.<sup>69</sup> Second, the Cuban Missile Crisis gave an impetus to governments to increase efforts to control the nuclear arms race and halt the spread of nuclear weapons. Many agreed that a world without or with fewer nuclear weapons would be much safer. Third, nuclear states feared that if proliferation would not be halted, more and more states would be interested in possessing nuclear weapons.<sup>70</sup> The fourth and most important reason was geopolitical. In 1960, there were four nuclear powers: The United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France. These powers felt threatened by the nuclear ambitions of other states - West Germany and the PRC in particular. If either of these countries would become a nuclear state, the stability of Europe and East Asia would be threatened, which would affect the geopolitical position of the United States and the Soviet Union.<sup>71</sup>

### **Nuclear ambitions**

The Soviet Union and the United States had different perspectives on the nuclear ambitions of smaller states, especially those of the PRC and West Germany. The Soviets had initially been actively supporting the nuclear ambitions of the PRC in the 1950s. This positive attitude changed drastically in the mid 1950s. This was caused by internal mistrusts and doctrinal divergences in the wake of Joseph Stalin's death in 1953, which led to the Sino-Soviet split. Consequently, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev ordered all Soviet advisers to withdraw from

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<sup>68</sup> Burr and Rosenberg, 'Nuclear Competition in an Era of Stalemate, 1963-1975', 400.

<sup>69</sup> Popp, 'The Long Road to the NPT: From Superpower Collusion to Global Compromise', 12.

<sup>70</sup> Burr and Rosenberg, 'Nuclear Competition in an Era of Stalemate, 1963-1975', 400.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibidem*, 401.



the PRC in July 1960. The nuclear ambitions of the PRC remained and even expanded, which put its relationship with the Soviet Union at risk and eventually led to an internal crisis of the Warsaw Pact.<sup>72</sup> Within the Warsaw Pact, Romania was one of the few members with clear nuclear aspirations. The Soviet Union, however, had been hesitant about sharing nuclear technology information with its allies. Nevertheless, Moscow decided to help Bucharest in building the foundation for a nuclear programme in 1955 based on the idea of 'ideological solidarity',<sup>73</sup> which will be elaborated on further in the chapter on Romania.

In the 1950s, the United States had shown significant support for its allies to become a NWS. It established an Anglo-American nuclear alliance and seriously considered a similar arrangement with France.<sup>74</sup> Other European states also showed interest in building a nuclear arsenal or having access to one. In order to satisfy the nuclear needs of its allies, the United States proposed several nuclear-sharing schemes, which already started under the Eisenhower administration in the early 1950s. Eisenhower had been advocating a policy of nuclear sharing, including transferring physical control over American nuclear weapons to its allies in Europe. An example was the Multilateral Framework (MLF), a collective NATO force that included the sharing of a fleet of ballistic missiles and nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, manned by international NATO crews.

The MLF played an important role for the Italians. Historian Leopoldo Nuti argued that the Italians were so focused on the realisation of a nuclear sharing scheme, that all their initiatives to the ENDC were conceived with the aim to give flexibility to any disarmament measures the ENDC would eventually adopt.<sup>75</sup> The MLF that would become one of the main points of discussion during the non-proliferation negotiations. The Kremlin pressured Washington by stating it had to choose between the NPT and the MLF and demanded them to renounce nuclear sharing as a precondition to the treaty.<sup>76</sup> The MLF not only affected the negotiations between the superpowers, but also caused political struggles within the NATO alliance.

### **Understanding the ENDC**

The ENDC formation was carefully established and included an equal number of representatives from NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and a group of representatives from non-

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<sup>72</sup> Popp, 'The Long Road to the NPT: From Superpower Collusion to Global Compromise', 11.

<sup>73</sup> Eliza Gheorghe, 'Atomic Maverick: Romania's Negotiations for Nuclear Technology, 1964–1970', *Cold War History*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 373-392, 375.

<sup>74</sup> Popp, 'The Long Road to the NPT: From Superpower Collusion to Global Compromise', 11.

<sup>75</sup> Nuti, "'A Turning Point in Postwar Foreign Policy": Italy and the NPT negotiations, 1967-1969', 80.

<sup>76</sup> Brands, 'Non-Proliferation and the Dynamics of the Middle Cold War: The Superpowers, the MLF, and the NPT', 407.

aligned states. The 5-5-8 composition demonstrates the importance of allies. It implies that the United States was expecting support from its NATO allies and the Soviet Union from its fellow Warsaw Pact members. The initiative to establish this came from the superpowers themselves as a way to 'complete disarmament under effective international control.'<sup>77</sup> This implies that complete disarmament was the primary objective of the committee. The UN General Assembly welcomed the autonomous negotiation body on 21 December 1961 through resolution 1722 (XVI) under the assumption that the Assembly would remain the principal negotiation setter.<sup>78</sup> This means that the ENDC could be seen as a multilateral negotiation body under aegis of the United Nations. It included the original members of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament (TNDC), which had begun its work in March 1960, consisting of five representatives from the Western Bloc: Canada, France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States, and five representatives from the Eastern Bloc: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union. With resolution 1722, eight non-aligned members, namely Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic (UAR) were added. The reason to add these states can be traced back to the idea that there should be equality among states. The superpowers believed that the newly independent states, which had emerged due to decolonialisation, should be able to be part of this negotiation body.<sup>79</sup> Involving these states can also be seen as a strategic way to realise a treaty that would be accepted by a majority of states and therefore become of global importance.

The ENDC members started their meetings mid-March 1962. Throughout the entire negotiation period, each delegation was represented by four representatives, who were in principle present at every meeting. While the overall composition of the delegations remained the same, the internal composition of these delegations faced some changes now and then. The first meetings revolved around practicalities, such as the frequency and timing of the meetings, and aspired goals, which all members could present in a general statement. During these meetings, it was being stressed quite frequently that the creation of the ENDC was the result of the initiatives of the United States and the Soviet Union. It therefore comes as no surprise that, in their general statements, both superpowers expressed their trust in a good outcome. They emphasised the carefully considered 5-5-8 composition and the importance of small states, both aligned and non-aligned. Mr. Gromyko believed that 'within less than two

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<sup>77</sup> Michael J. Sullivan III, 'Conference at the Crossroads: Future Prospects for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament', *International Organization*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Spring, 1975), 393.

<sup>78</sup> Spyros Blavoukos and Dimitris Bourantonis, 'Chairs as Policy Entrepreneurs in Multilateral Negotiations', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 2 (April 2011), 666.

<sup>79</sup> Dimitris Bourantonis. *The United Nations and the Quest for Nuclear Disarmament* (Aldershot 1993), 65.

years, all the means of delivering nuclear weapons would vanish from the face of the earth,<sup>80</sup> which demonstrates his confidence in a successful outcome. This view was shared with other members. The Czechoslovakian representative, for example, believed that the Committee could already submit a satisfactory report to the appropriate bodies of the United Nations by the 1st of June of that year - within three months.<sup>81</sup>

What seems striking in the general statements of all nations is not only their expressed confidence in a successful and rapid outcome, but also the important reputation they believed the ENDC had throughout the entire world. For example, Mr. Green, representative from Canada stated: 'From all over the world today, the eyes and the thoughts of peoples are focussed on this Conference,'<sup>82</sup> a sentence that was repeated by the representative of the United Kingdom.<sup>83</sup> Mr. Zorin, representative of the Soviet Union, argued that it would be most desirable that the work should result in definite and specific advances, as 'the whole world is now following the work of our Committee'.<sup>84</sup> These statements suggest that the members of the ENDC, both East and West representatives, had high expectations of what could derive from the work of the ENDC, at least in the early days. Whilst these statements were undoubtedly also meant as a certain exercise in public relations, they still suggest the high expectations of all members.

One of the representatives of that time, Canadian diplomat Eedson Burns, published an article in 1969 in which he reflected on the negotiations and prospects of the non-proliferation treaty. Throughout this article, Burns emphasises the prominent role of the superpowers within the negotiations. Furthermore, Burns also shows that the allies did not necessarily share the same views as their respective superpower. Especially the NATO members were divided about what restrictions a non-proliferation treaty should entail. He argues that the reason the discussions were protracting until 1965 had to do with the fact the United States was trying to sell the multilateral force (MLF) to their European allies until that time. According to Burns, the ENDC negotiations began to improve only after Johnson decided to cease these efforts.<sup>85</sup>

Burns also reflects on the standpoints of the Warsaw Pact allies, who he believed were much more in agreement about their aimed outcome of the committee. He refers to the shared

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<sup>80</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 2 (15 March 1962), 9 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ndc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>81</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 10 (27 March 1962), 26 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ndc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>82</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 4 (19 March 1962), 20 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ndc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>83</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 5 (20 March 1962), 13 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ndc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>84</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 11 (29 March 1962), 6 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/ndc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>85</sup> Burns, 'The Nonproliferation Treaty: Its Negotiation and Prospects', 792.

position of the Soviet Union and its allies that the treaty should contain 'provisions which would forbid nations not yet having nuclear weapons to acquire ownership of them, to share in their control with nuclear powers, to take part in planning for their use, and to have 'disposition' of or 'access' to them.'<sup>86</sup> This implies that he believed that the Warsaw Pact members were forming a much more united front in comparison to their NATO counterpart, as they had similar views on what the Committee's work should result in. Whilst the Warsaw Pact members stressed their fear of a potential nuclear West Germany, Burns questioned whether the Soviet Union really feared this, or merely pretended to be afraid of it.<sup>87</sup> It is important to keep in mind that Burns was a representative of the NATO alliance and therefore his view of the Warsaw Pact as a united front is not totally objective. He had only seen the Warsaw Pact from the outside, whilst he had experienced NATO from the inside. Therefore, one should be careful of adopting this 'image of unity' to describe the Warsaw Pact alliance-dynamics, especially as other research on the Warsaw Pact alliance-dynamics in the 1960s suggests otherwise.<sup>88</sup> As an example, recent literature suggests that Romania became a maverick in the Warsaw Pact as of the second half of the 1960s, which caused friction between the allies.<sup>89</sup> Therefore, speaking from hindsight, the idea of 'Warsaw Pact unity' in the 1960s is rather obsolete.

### **The role of the non-nuclear allies**

When investigating the role of the non-nuclear aligned states in the first phase of the ENDC negotiations, it becomes evident that there is a significant difference between the attitude of Warsaw Pact members and NATO members. Archival material suggests that the Warsaw Pact members had a stronger tendency to defend the proposals presented by their respective superpower than their Western counterparts. Italy, however, appears to be an exception to the rule. In comparison to other NATO allies, Italy takes a much stronger stance against the proposals presented by the Soviet Union and in favour of those presented by the Americans. As an example, with regard to the two drafts presented by the superpowers, the Canadian representative predominantly emphasised the difference in structure between the two drafts,

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<sup>86</sup> Ibidem, 790.

<sup>87</sup> Ibidem, 791-792.

<sup>88</sup> E.g. Laurien Crump. *The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered: International Relations in Eastern Europe, 1955-1969* (New York 2015); Laurien Crump, "Nonproliferation Under Pressure: The Nuclear Debate Within the Warsaw Pact, 1965-1968", in: Popp, Roland, Horovitz, Liviu, and Wenger, Andreas (eds.). *Negotiating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origins of the Nuclear Order* (London 2017).

<sup>89</sup> E.g. Eliza Gheorghe, 'Atomic Maverick: Romania's Negotiations for Nuclear Technology, 1964–1970', *Cold War History*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 373-392 and Corina Mavrodin, 'Denuclearisation and Regional Cooperation: Romania's Tactical Approaches to Escaping Bloc Rigidities' in: Crump, Laurien and Erlandsson, Susanna (eds.). *Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe: The Influence of Smaller Powers* (New York 2020).

but not explicitly favoured one draft over the other.<sup>90</sup> Italian representative, Mr. Segni, on the other hand, immediately reinforced the visions and the draft presented by the United States:

The Italian Government has already associated itself with the United States proposals for general and complete disarmament, in the drafting of which we collaborated actively, together with our other allies. As the Italian delegation will explain in greater detail later, there is in these proposals an honest and fair basis for agreement. They are fully in line with the principles laid down in the Joint Statement.<sup>91</sup>

- Mr. Segni, representative of Italy (16 March 1962)

In the same meeting, Mr. Segni even stressed that the Italian delegation had actively participated in the drafting of the United States proposals and therefore believed this draft could serve as a basis for agreement that was honest and fair for all members.<sup>92</sup> This demonstrates Italy's strong pro-American and pro-NATO stance in the initial negotiations.

In contrast to Italy, which had a very pro-Western attitude throughout most of the meetings, Romania appeared to take a less persisting role. In fact, Romania took a more mediating role, a role with which it was familiar, as will be explained in the chapter on Romania. The Romanians evaluated the drafts handed in by both superpowers more in terms of similarities instead of favouring one over the other, just like the Canadians did.<sup>93</sup> They also emphasised their belief that an agreement could already be reached within a short period of time:

[...] the Romanian delegation fully agrees with article 1 of the Soviet draft treaty. We have also studied the United States proposals of 25 September 1961. [...] the Soviet draft treaty takes into account the point of view expressed in the United States programme. The fact that the provisions of article 1 fully correspond to the joint United States-Soviet statement [...] opens up the perspective that that article can be readily accepted by the Conference.<sup>94</sup>

- Mr. Macovescu, representative of Romania (30 March 1963)

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<sup>90</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 4 (19 March 1962), 14 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/encd/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>91</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 3 (16 March 1962), 12 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/encd/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>92</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 3 (16 March 1962), 12 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/encd/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>93</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 4 (19 March 1962), 14 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/encd/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>94</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 12 (30 March 1963), 27 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/encd/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

It is evident that whilst Romania was taking a mediating role, it was also behaving as an exemplary Soviet ally, at least in the early years of the ENDC. This corresponds with present literature on Romania's pro-Soviet stance in the first half of the 1960s. As Romania was trying to gain nuclear technology from the Soviets already since the 1950s, this does not seem surprising. However, we do know that Romania was also slowly enhancing relations with Western states around that same time.

### **The non-aligned members**

Literature suggests that the non-aligned members contributed very little to the negotiations, at least at the start of the negotiations.<sup>95</sup> This view corresponds to the ENDC minutes. Whilst many non-aligned nations expressed their gratitude to the superpowers for being involved in these multilateral meetings, they did not mention any concrete plans or envisioned outcome in their general statements - as their aligned counterparts did. Their attitude is, thus, far more neutral. They do, however, recognise the importance of their presence in the Committee. The representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Fawzi, for example, argued the following:

Our understanding [...] of the role of the eight new members of this Committee is that they, by joining the other members in this noble though arduous task, have become members of a team of eighteen who should play together in mutual understanding and according to the rules of the game. [...] that each member of this Committee presents its views during our discussions as a contribution to the common fund out of which the whole Committee can together draw material for agreed solutions. Such, in brief outline, is my Government's concept of the role of the eight new countries, which, I wish to add, are not a bloc and not even a group.<sup>96</sup>

- Mr. Fawzi, representative of the United Arab Republic (15 March 1962)

What becomes clear from the statement made by Mr. Fawzi is that he believes it is the role of the eight new members, which he explicitly not considers to be a bloc of non-aligned nations, to contribute to the common fund after which the whole Committee can decide on agreement.

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<sup>95</sup> Alan F. Neidle, 'Peace-Keeping and Disarmament: A Report of the Discussions at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament', *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 57, No. 1 (January 1963), 46-72, 71 and Joseph L. Noguee, 'The Neutralist World and Disarmament Negotiations', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, (Nov., 1965), Vol. 362, *Nonalignment in Foreign Affairs* (November 1965), 71-80, 71.

<sup>96</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 6 (15 March 1962), 9-10 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/encdc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

However, he does not concretise how the whole Committee can ‘together draw material for agreed solutions’, which makes his statement rather ambiguous. Nevertheless, this statement does imply that the eight non-aligned were open to negotiate, mediate and compromise. Furthermore, this statement suggests that the eight non-aligned members maintained a relatively passive and neutral attitude, which corresponds with Neidle’s report and Noguee’s article, as explained in the literature review.

Nevertheless, the ENDC minutes also demonstrate that the ENDC was an important platform on which non-aligned states were able to stretch their margins for manoeuvre to a certain extent. The representative of Nigeria, Mr. Wachuku, stated that ‘As everybody here knows, there is one subject that is of particular interest to Africa: the denuclearisation of Africa. In other words, when the co-Chairmen draw up the list, they should include that subject so that we will be able to take a position on it when it is discussed.’<sup>97</sup> This implies that agenda-setting was not limited to the two superpowers, but that all ENDC members were able to contribute to what would be discussed. This indicates a certain room for manoeuvre for small states.

### **The ENDC’s objectives**

Is not the vitality of this idea shown by the fact that following upon its unanimous approval by the Fourteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Sixteenth Session, held last autumn, instructed the Eighteen Nation Committee especially set up for this purpose, to work out an agreement on general and complete disarmament?<sup>98</sup>

- Mr. Gromyko, representative of the Soviet Union (15 March 1962)

During the second meeting of the ENDC on 15 March 1962, Mr. Gromyko emphasised the purpose for which the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee had been established, namely to work out an agreement on general and complete disarmament. In the meetings that followed, all members were able to present a general statement, after which the actual discussions would start. The United States and the Soviet Union seized this opportunity to also already present a draft version for a treaty, which would lead to the first round of discussions. These first few meetings, therefore, provide insight into the aimed outcome according to all members. At first glance, it seems like all members had similar views on what

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<sup>97</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 10 (27 March 1962), 32 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>98</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 2 (15 March 1962), 5 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

the outcome of the negotiations should look like. Evidently, these views corresponded with Resolution 1722, which had led to the establishment of the Committee.

However, when looking more closely at the general statements, it becomes apparent that members presented their aimed outcome in various ways. There is a clear difference visible between the Warsaw Pact, NATO and non-aligned members. These differences not only emphasise the East versus West distinction at the beginning of the negotiations, it also demonstrates that, when looking at the role of small nations, it is crucial to make a clear distinction between the aligned and non-aligned members of the ENDC. What is most noteworthy is that some members presented more concrete ideas than others. As an example, Mr. Gromyko argued that, 'the work [should] lead to the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament'<sup>99</sup>, a view that was shared by other Warsaw Pact members. The Polish representative stated that 'what is needed is a radical solution that would immobilise all weapons of mass destruction and consequently render them useless. [...] The principal objective, of course, is and remains general and complete disarmament.'<sup>100</sup>

The Western bloc, on the other hand, made far less specific statements about the objectives of the Committee. The United States believed that 'what is needed is immediate reduction and eventual elimination of all the national armaments and armed forces required for making war. What is required most urgently is to stop the nuclear arms race. [...] To fulfil this first objective, the initial aim of the Conference should be to consolidate and expand the areas of agreement and to reconcile the differences between the United States and Soviet disarmament plans.'<sup>101</sup> It is evident that the United States and the Soviet Union had different views on what the Committee's work should result in. Whilst the Soviet Union is very clear in the outcome it envisioned, the United States was far less clear and seems to avoid words like 'general and complete disarmament.' This difference can be explained in two ways. First, the Soviet Union had always been more in favour of extreme solutions. Throughout the 1950s, the Soviet Union had made various attempts at non-aggression treaties. Second, the Soviet Union was the only nuclear-armed state within its power bloc. On the Western part, there were already three nuclear-armed states, the United States, Great Britain and France. This nuclear 'advantage' of the Western Powers made the objective of disarmament more pressing for the Soviet Union.

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<sup>99</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 2 (15 March 1962), 6 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/encd/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>100</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 6 (21 March 1962), 6-9 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/encd/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>101</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 2 (15 March 1962), 17-20 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/encd/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).



### Limited margins for manoeuvre

Whilst the ENDC was established with the aim to reach agreement on disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation on a multilateral level, including nuclear, non-nuclear, aligned and non-aligned states, the members agreed on an establishment of a sub-committee of nuclear powers. It was a representative of Brazil who initiated the idea of creating a sub-committee in which the two superpowers could work out 'the agreement',<sup>102</sup> as proposed in the Joint Statement, bilaterally.<sup>103</sup> However, it was the Romanian delegation that specified this request by proposing the appointment of a sub-committee of all current nuclear powers.<sup>104</sup> Over a short period of time, all members supported the creation of a sub-committee as well as having informal talks, which made the role and tasks of the other ENDC members in the 'Committee of the Whole'<sup>105</sup> rather unclear.

The Romanian argued that 'should France not send a representative, the representatives of the first three Powers would meet and begin negotiations with a view to solving the problem of the final discontinuance of nuclear tests.'<sup>106</sup> The Swedish delegation supported that proposal by arguing that bilateral negotiations between the great Powers were necessary for making important and complex proposals, and needed to be given reasonable time to negotiate these.<sup>107</sup> Although this implies that the idea of a sub-committee emerged from the smaller nations, it goes without saying that there is a possibility that this idea did in fact not derive from these particular nations. One must bear in mind that there could have been informal talks among representatives, within and outside of the power blocs, in which delegations could have lobbied for the establishment of sub-committees or other issues. This is important to keep in mind in regard to all statements presented in the ENDC.

The Canadian delegation also showed support for the establishment of a sub-committee and the implementation of informal talks. However, it also urged the superpowers to hand in reports on these informal talks to the rest of the ENDC members.<sup>108</sup> While the Canadian representatives supported the establishment of a sub-committee, they reminded their fellow ENDC members of the fact that 'the two great Powers on various other occasions have failed to agree; that is one of the reasons it is necessary to have these disarmament

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<sup>102</sup> An agreement which leads to general and complete disarmament.

<sup>103</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 3 (16 March 1962), 5 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>104</sup> The Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and France.

<sup>105</sup> A name that was used to refer to the ENDC in general due to the emergence of sub-committees.

<sup>106</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 5 (20 March 1962), 19 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>107</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 5 (20 March 1962), 20 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>108</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 4 (19 March 1962), 17 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

conferences.<sup>109</sup> This once again raises questions about the role and influence of NNWS in the 'Committee of the Whole.'

Whilst the United States representatives wanted to 'pursue the primary objective of elaborating agreement on general and complete disarmament'<sup>110</sup>, they agree that the establishment of a sub-committee to work out particular categories to reach agreement on is desirable.<sup>111</sup> They also urged their Soviet colleagues to agree to such a method.<sup>112</sup> Mr. Zorin, representative of the Soviet Union, agreed and suggested that they should, as they were the main authors of the documents, try to complete the drafting of the first document - the preamble - as rapidly as possible. He added that the remarks made by other delegations would be taken into account. Mr. Zorin expected that this could already be completed in the upcoming days - thus already in the beginning of April 1962.<sup>113</sup> The establishment of a sub-committee of nuclear states questions the importance of small NNWS. It suggests that the most significant meetings took place bilaterally or trilaterally, including Great Britain. France did not actively participate in the negotiations.

### **Successes and setbacks**

One of the first achievements in the context of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation agreements in the 1960s was the Limited Test-Ban Treaty. It was concluded in August 1963 by Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The proposal for this treaty had already been presented on 13 April 1959 by President Eisenhower, but got rejected by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. Over two years later, on 3 September 1961, President J.F. Kennedy made a second attempt, but got blocked again by the Soviet Union. In August 1962, it was first brought to the attention of the ENDC by United States representative Mr. Dean.<sup>114</sup> However, the ENDC did not play an active role in its realisation. This demonstrates that the first major achievement in nuclear non-proliferation was realised on a trilateral level.

Whilst the Limited Test-Ban Treaty marked an important success in the broader framework of nuclear non-proliferation, the ENDC had been reaching several deadlocks. As

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<sup>109</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 7 (22 March 1962), 11 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/nddc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>110</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 10 (27 March 1962), 12 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/nddc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>111</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 10 (27 March 1962), 13 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/nddc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>112</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 11 (29 March 1962), 14 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/nddc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>113</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 10 (27 March 1962), 37 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/nddc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>114</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 75 (27 August 1962), 12 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/nddc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

explained before, there were two main roadblocks that prevented the ENDC from succeeding. The first was the fear that West Germany and the PRC would become nuclear states, which could lead to a nuclear domino effect throughout Europe and the rest of the world. The second roadblock, which was to a certain extent related to the first one, concerned the aspirations of the Western bloc to establish a nuclear sharing scheme, the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF). The Eastern bloc was strongly against the creation of such a sharing scheme, as it considered it a certain form of nuclear proliferation. At some point, the Soviets even threatened that if the United States would implement the MLF, the Soviet Union would respond in kind by providing its allies with nuclear weapons.

The issue of the MLF often resulted into a deadlock, after which the ENDC members would vote in favour of taking a recess. The ENDC minutes demonstrate that after a recess, the ENDC members would stress that they were ready to resume the negotiations in good spirits. As an example, on 21 January 1964, after a five-month recess, Mr. Cavaletti argues:

Each time the Disarmament Conference resumes after a recess, general interest in it revives, and hopes and expectations become focused on Geneva. I think that today, for a number of reasons, the interest and hope of the whole world are concentrated on us more than ever.<sup>115</sup>

- Mr. Cavaletti, representative of Italy (21 January 1964)

Most members used these breaks to have bilateral and informal talks and seek to reach agreements on particular sub-topics. In September 1964, half a year after the committee had taken a recess, the issue of the MLF once again appeared to be a reason for the committee members to take a recess. Mr. Cavaletti had once again justified the establishment of a nuclear sharing scheme, to the dismay of the Warsaw Pact countries:

The representative of Italy tried once again this morning to justify the creation of the NATO multilateral force. We have already pointed out several times that such attempts are unconvincing and futile. Therefore, I should like to deal with only one argument to which the representative of Italy has reverted once again.<sup>116</sup>

- Mr. Klusak, representative of Czechoslovakia (3 September 1964)

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<sup>115</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 157 (21 January 1964), 26 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>116</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 213 (3 September 1964), 59 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

This deadlock led to another recess, which took until July 1965. In the middle of the recess, on 16 October 1964, the PRC successfully launched its first nuclear test. This made the nuclear question a more pressing topic for both superpowers. The Americans were now facing two nuclear socialist powers. The Soviets, for their part, had grown so much apart from the Chinese in the preceding years due to the Sino-Soviet split. The PRC's nuclear status made a nuclear war in the Socialist world now possible.<sup>117</sup> The reality of a nuclear PRC gave an impetus to the superpowers to reach an agreement sooner rather than later. This led them to consult their allies and the other non-nuclear ENDC members. By involving them more actively in the discussions, small states were given a much more influential role in the committee.

### **Changing objectives**

Whilst the initial objective of the ENDC had been general and complete disarmament, the work of the committee never led to such a treaty. It would 'only' result in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Although the importance of the NPT is evident, the treaty did not correspond with what the ENDC members initially envisioned, namely a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The Non-Proliferation Treaty would prohibit all members from acquiring or developing new nuclear weapons. A treaty on general and complete disarmament would not only mean the prohibition of acquiring or developing these weapons, but also the reduction or total dismantling of existing nuclear weapons possessed by the great powers. Although the NPT does include an article on disarmament, it is by no means the treaty on general and complete disarmament that its members envisioned. In that sense, the NPT corresponded more to the aimed outcome presented by the United States as it put an immediate halt to the nuclear arms race, with which it paved the way for further agreements. The NPT could therefore best be seen as an important stepping stone in the larger process of nuclear disarmament.

The difference between the initial objective and eventual outcome indicate that a shift of paradigm taken place somewhere during the negotiations. In his research, Roland Popp refers to a meeting that took place between the United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in March 1962. During this meeting, they initiated discussions on a separate non-proliferation agreement following the Irish Resolution, which entailed a ban on the spread of nuclear technologies and prohibited countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. Whilst progress hereafter was limited, the Soviets supported the aim of establishing a global agreement on non-proliferation.<sup>118</sup> This implies that the idea of a global

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<sup>117</sup> Crump, "Nonproliferation Under Pressure: The Nuclear Debate Within the Warsaw Pact, 1965-1968", 102.

<sup>118</sup> Popp, 'The Long Road to the NPT: From Superpower Collusion to Global Compromise', 14.

non-proliferation treaty was already present in early 1962, but emerged from bilateral negotiations, rather than multilateral negotiations. In fact, it would take until 10 August 1965 before the term 'non-proliferation treaty' was first mentioned in the ENDC negotiations. During this meeting, Swedish representative Mrs. Myrdal argued that '[...] for the efficiency of the measures envisaged to prevent nations presently non-nuclear from 'going nuclear', the value of a comprehensive test ban seems to be at a fair par with a non-proliferation treaty, at least as far as non-aligned countries are concerned.'<sup>119</sup> This implies that the non-aligned member Sweden was open for reaching an agreement on non-proliferation.

It is highly interesting to note that whilst the NPT is predominantly seen as a result of the efforts made by the members of the ENDC, its origins laid in bilateral negotiations between the two superpowers. The timing for the members to bring the NPT to the ENDC negotiations seems highly interesting, as the PRC had just successfully executed its first test. This made the conclusion of a treaty more pressing. That not all members were enthusiastic about this sudden change of focus on non-proliferation is also very evident. As an example, on 15 February 1966, the Indian representative, Mr. Trivedi, stressed that 'while we are dealing with a non-proliferation treaty we must deal with the problem of reduction and eventual elimination of the nuclear menace as well'.<sup>120</sup> During this same meeting, Mr. Trivedi argues that it is the PRC's 'arrogant refusal [...] to subscribe to this [Limited Test Ban] treaty has brought us to this sorry state of affairs today.'<sup>121</sup> Whilst many states initially seemed reluctant to agree on a non-proliferation treaty, as they feared it would go at the expense of a global disarmament treaty, it becomes evident that in the upcoming meetings, more states were starting to see the necessity of a NPT. Most of their argumentation is connected to the threat of the PRC. Mr. Abera, representative of Ethiopia, for example, refers to the PRC as the 'Unknown Sphinx among the pyramids of the Nuclear Powers'.<sup>122</sup> In order to ensure the security of nations, he believed, it is necessary to agree on a non-proliferation treaty.<sup>123</sup> This vision is shared amongst other states. Mr. Husain, representative of India stressed that 'this concern [...] only further emphasizes the urgency of early and effective implementation of measures of nuclear disarmament [and] further underlines the need [...] for an acceptable and balanced non-

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<sup>119</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 222 (10 August 1965), 14 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>120</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 240 (15 February 1966), 18 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>121</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 240 (15 February 1966), 18 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>122</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 242 (22 February 1966), 22 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020)

<sup>123</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 242 (22 February 1966), 22 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020)

proliferation treaty to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon Powers, including China.<sup>124</sup> It is noteworthy that the non-aligned states were to a lesser extent resisting the changing objective to a non-proliferation treaty. This can be linked to the idea that non-aligned felt more threatened by the emergence of a nuclear PRC than the NATO and Warsaw Pact allies.

Whilst the initial objective of the committee was still general and complete disarmament, its members started to realise that this objective was at that time out of reach considering the number of roadblocks blocking the way for an agreement. Fearing a nuclear domino effect, time was running out for an agreement that at least prevented the emergence of new nuclear-armed states. From this perspective, the Non-Proliferation Agreement was seen as a compromise. Not all members were in favour of this shift of focus. Both Italy and Romania opposed the NPT in the shape it came to have. Italy's objection was predominantly based on the fact that it excluded the possibility for a nuclear sharing scheme. For Romania, the NPT would ensure a 'nuclear monopoly'. This would restrain the Romanians from becoming an important actor in international politics by either becoming a nuclear-armed state itself or by establishing a world in which there would be no nuclear-armed states anymore.

### **Struggling to conclude**

In the course of the ENDC, the superpowers faced a plethora of problems that led them to speed up the negotiations and caused the positions of the superpowers to slowly synchronise their standpoints. Besides NATO's plans to establish a nuclear sharing scheme and the fear of the emergence of new nuclear powers, the superpowers experienced increased pressure from the non-aligned nations as of mid-1966. The superpowers noted this increasing interest with concern, especially when the eight non-aligned members announced that they were considering presenting an alternative draft.<sup>125</sup> In order to reach a conclusion and to appease the Soviets, the United States terminated their plans for a nuclear sharing scheme in December 1966. The Western non-nuclear allies were perplexed by this decision and started to use the ENDC as a framework to defend their national interests. Several European states, among which Italy, decided to follow a more independent course. Around the same time, there was a technological breakthrough in uranium enrichment, which enabled NNWS to easily develop their own nuclear weapons. This was particularly disadvantageous for the United States. Some Western states, namely Great Britain, Northern Ireland, the Netherlands and

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<sup>124</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 370 (27 February 1968), 12-13 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>125</sup> Popp, 'The Long Road to the NPT: From Superpower Collusion to Global Compromise', 20.

West Germany decided to join forces apart from the United States and NATO. Their collaboration led to the Treaty of Almelo on 4 March 1970, which encompassed the cooperation in the production of enriched uranium.<sup>126</sup>

Another problem emerged in the years 1967-1968. After the superpowers had agreed on the basic provisions for the NPT, both the United States and the Soviet Union received criticism from their allies. The main criticism came from Italy and West Germany, which expressed concern on the European clause. This clause encompassed the prospect of a federated Europe in the future.<sup>127</sup> The issue of the EURATOM safeguards led to another crisis, especially for the relationship between the United States and its allies. When West German Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger accused the Americans of lack of consultations with its allies and publicly spoke of a Soviet-American 'nuclear complicity', he put the relation of the NATO allies at risk. The NPT was eventually signed by over 50 states on 1 July 1968. Some states had been so reluctant to the NPT that they decided not to sign it. Italy, for example, did not sign the NPT until half a year later, on 28 January 1969. Furthermore, Italy waited over five years to ratify the treaty. This can be linked to their opposition to the NPT in the shape it came to have in 1968 and their ambitions to change the treaty.

It is impossible to determine whether the NPT would have looked differently if NNWS had not been included in the negotiations. The central point of the NPT is the assurance of all nuclear-armed states not to transfer any nuclear weapons. At the same time, it restricts all NNWS from receiving nuclear weapons.<sup>128</sup> These are the first two articles of the treaty. Based on a memo from the Italian ambassador to the United Kingdom of 30 June 1976, it appears that not all states interpreted these articles in a similar way. This memo demonstrates that the British government had a disagreement about the Italian interpretation of the first two articles, with respect to peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE).<sup>129</sup> Not only does this demonstrate that some articles in the treaty left room for interpretation, it also shows that Italy apparently had diverging views on what PNE's contained.

## Conclusion

The possibility of total annihilation through the use of a nuclear bomb introduced a new dynamic to international relations. The policy of strategic stability became an important strategy for both superpowers, but also fed the ambition of other states to build their own

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<sup>126</sup> Nuti, "A Turning Point in Postwar Foreign Policy": Italy and the NPT negotiations, 1967-1969', 85.

<sup>127</sup> Popp, 'The Long Road to the NPT: From Superpower Collusion to Global Compromise', 22

<sup>128</sup> United Nations, Office for Disarmament Affairs, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/> (last accessed 15 July 2020).

<sup>129</sup> MAE cable on Italian Ratification of the NPT (30 June 1976), <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/187999> (last accessed 16 July 2020).



nuclear arsenal. Already right after the Second World War, attempts to control the spread of nuclear weapons had been made. Most of these took place bilaterally between the two direct stakeholders, the United States and the Soviet Union. These bilateral attempts, however, often resulted in a deadlock. This contributed to the quest of involving NNWS in the negotiations.

Before the 1960s, a number of proposals had been presented to the UN General Assembly by individual NNWS. However, not all of them succeeded in ratification. The Polish 'Rapacki Plan' of 1957, for example, was opposed by NATO members as they feared an imbalance of power in Europe. The Irish Resolution and the Swedish 'Únden Plan', however, were adopted unanimously in 1961. Whilst these two examples demonstrate the first steps towards a global non-proliferation agreement and a nuclear free Europe, real progress would only emerge in the course of the 1960s. The emergence of anti-nuclear groups, the scare of the Cuban missile crisis, the fear for a domino effect of nuclear weapon states, especially of West Germany and the PRC, and the associated threat of a drastic geopolitical power shift fed the urgency to reach a global agreement on this matter.

The pressing quest for nuclear disarmament measures led to the establishment of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in 1962 in which big, small, nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states were represented. Whilst literature suggested a marginal role for the non-aligned within the negotiations, a thorough investigation of the ENDC minutes have demonstrated that it offered a platform for them to stretch their margins for manoeuvre to a certain extent. The minutes showed how a representative of Nigeria was able to put the denuclearisation of Africa on the agenda, which implies that agenda-setting was not limited to the two superpowers. However, the establishment of a sub-committee, in which the two superpowers could work out the agreement bilaterally first, raises questions about the multilateral character of the committee. This sub-committee suggests that the significant negotiations took place bilaterally and makes the tasks and roles of other states increasingly unclear.

All members initially shared the aim to realise a treaty on general and complete disarmament. However, this was never realised. Throughout the negotiations, a number of internal and external issues prevented the committee from realising its objective. Various roadblocks such as NATO's plans for a nuclear sharing scheme and the threat of West Germany becoming a nuclear state dominated the negotiations for a long time. Furthermore, there were also external issues that affected the negotiations. The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War, which took place outside of the ENDC negotiations, made the quest for disarmament more pressing and caused conflicting interests among its members. Lastly, the PRC's nuclear status in 1964 would form a real incentive for the committee to adjust its objective.



Whilst the plan for a non-proliferation treaty emerged from bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in early 1962, it was first introduced in the ENDC after the PRC had become a nuclear-armed state in October 1964. The ENDC members felt that time was running out for an agreement that at least prevented a nuclear domino effect. The superpowers considered a Non-Proliferation Agreement the best solution considering the circumstances. Most NNWS, however, argued that the initial objective of the committee should not be overturned. The superpowers faced a dilemma as they needed their allies' support to conclude the NPT. By consulting their allies and actively engaging them in the negotiations, the superpowers paved the way for them to widen their margins for manoeuvre within the committee.

# Italy

In our opinion, the central problem of the negotiations entrusted to our Conference, namely general and complete disarmament, has remained for too long in the background.<sup>130</sup>

- Mr. Zagari, representative of Italy (25 March 1969)

On 25 March 1969, almost a year after the NPT was finalised and signed by over 50 states, Italian representative Mr. Zagari expressed his regret on the outcome of the negotiations. Whilst Italy, for a long time, had aligned themselves with the Americans and followed the policies of the United States throughout the ENDC negotiations, it did eventually not agree with the committee's final outcome.

This chapter investigates to what extent Italy used the ENDC as an instrument to widen its margins for manoeuvre to become an important player in world politics. It starts with an analysis of Italy's relations with the United States, its position within NATO and the level of its nuclear abilities and aspirations. It will demonstrate how Italy's role and attitude changes over the course of the negotiations by publicly seeking for other allies after decisions made by the United States.

## **Becoming a fully-fledged NATO member**

The Second World War had an intense effect on Italian foreign policy. Throughout the 1940s, the Italian government had been divided on the direction of Italy's international political future. The result of this political division created two camps, one in favour of the Western bloc, the other against the Western bloc. Even after Italy joined NATO in 1949, some prominent Italian political figures resisted being an ally of the Western bloc. Socialist politician Pietro Nenni even declared that Italy's NATO membership had made Italy into 'an aircraft carrier of imperialism'.<sup>131</sup>

From the start of the Cold War, Italian politicians became more aware of the increasing power of the Americans and experienced the perks of capitalism. The Italian people began to grow rich and, as historian Leopoldo Nuti argued, 'experienced the most prosperous years of their history'.<sup>132</sup> This was also a major influence as to why politicians who were initially

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<sup>130</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 397 (25 March 1969), 17 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>131</sup> R. J. B. Bosworth. *Italy and the Wider World 1860-1960* (Routledge 1996) 55.

<sup>132</sup> Bosworth. *Italy and the Wider World 1860-1960*, 55.

anti-Western did not make a significant effort to push Italy towards the Soviets. Their initial aims to build a good relationship with the Soviet Union had most probably quickly been forgotten after Italy joined NATO.

In the post-war years, Italian diplomats learned that in order to become of importance in the international system, it was necessary to play an active role in the main Western organisations that were established under the US - such as NATO. The first few decades after the Second World War, Italy's stance on nuclear weapon was dominated by the foreign policy of the United States and the internal NATO relations. Rome, therefore, maintained a close relationship with Washington. Not only did Washington guarantee Italy's external security, it also promoted one of Italy's aspirations, which was a federalist version of European integration.<sup>133</sup> At the same time, Italy also tried to enhance relations with other Western European states.<sup>134</sup>

After its defeat in the Second World War, Italy's policy was mainly based on the ambition to become an important actor in international politics. In the 1950s, due to the nuclearisation of the US, and therefore NATO as well, Italy's position became threatened. The ambition to become a nuclear power grew among European states. Italy came to the realisation that states possessing nuclear weapons would be the *de facto* decision makers for the future policy of NATO. This was a major threat to Italy's international position.<sup>135</sup> One of the European states that had clear nuclear ambitions was France. In the period 1957-1958, France had considered the development of nuclear weapons together with Italy and West Germany. However, France decided to realise its nuclear aspirations on its own, and succeeded in 1960.<sup>136</sup> The Italians, on the other hand, decided not to build a nuclear arsenal of their own, at least not for another decade. Nevertheless, Italy felt threatened by the fact that France was now a nuclear power. In December 1957, Italian President Giovanni Gronchi stated: 'Our goal is disarmament, but as long as we do not get there, we have the duty to adequately defend ourselves.'<sup>137</sup> This implies that the Italians kept the option open to become a nuclear state. The fear of being relegated a second-class status within the Western alliance resulted in the fact that Italy actively started to bolster its relations with the United States. This

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<sup>133</sup> Leopoldo Nuti, "'A Turning Point in Postwar Foreign Policy': Italy and the NPT negotiations, 1967-1969', in: Roland Popp (eds). *Negotiating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origins of the Nuclear Order* (London 2017) 78.

<sup>134</sup> Nuti, Leopoldo, 'Italy as a Hedging State? The Problematic Ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty', in: Elisabetta Bini, Igor Londero (eds). *Nuclear Italy. An International History of Italian Nuclear Policies during the Cold War* (Trieste 2017), 120.

<sup>135</sup> Nuti, "'A Turning Point in Postwar Foreign Policy': Italy and the NPT negotiations, 1967-1969', 78.

<sup>136</sup> Debs and Monteiro, 'NATO and Nuclear Proliferation, 1949-1968', 199.

<sup>137</sup> Nuti, 'Italy as a Hedging State? The Problematic Ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty', 121.

even resulted in the fact that it eagerly accepted the deployment of American intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) on Italian soil.<sup>138</sup>

There is some debate among historians on whether or not Italy had the ambitions to become a nuclear power in the 1960s. Historian Paola Foradori argues that hosting US tactical nuclear weapons in the late 1950s was Italy's 'acceptable path to the bomb and the associated political status.' Foradori suggests that whilst Italy was in every way - economically, technically and scientifically - capable of creating its own nuclear weapons, it did not have the ambition to pursue a national nuclear weapons program.<sup>139</sup> Other historians, however, argue that Italy did in fact have nuclear ambitions, but never put them into practice. Roland Popp, for example, argues that the British and French examples had triggered others, such as the West Germans and Italians, to build their own independent nuclear deterrent.<sup>140</sup> Various studies from Leopoldo Nuti demonstrate that the Italian National Committee for Nuclear Energy (CNEN) became of increased importance in the 1960s and even interfered in international politics.<sup>141</sup> Nuti argues that the Italian government sped up their activities in the CNEN around the same time their relationship with the United States started to crumble. Nuti considered this mainly coincidental. This seems striking, considering the growing interest among NNWS to become a nuclear power in the 1960s.

Whether or not Italy had nuclear ambitions, the notion that other states perceived Italy as having nuclear capabilities and aspirations played an important role in the political decisions made by other states. As an example, it is evident that, as early as the beginning of the 1960s, the United States believed that Italy had nuclear aspirations. This conclusion can be linked to the fact the Americans proposed a multilateral nuclear sharing scheme within NATO as a way to satisfy the nuclear needs of their allies. As the initial plan for this sharing scheme was already being discussed on a multilateral level in early 1963,<sup>142</sup> the United States must have perceived Italy as having nuclear aspirations in the 1960s. However, it would take until the early 1970s for the Italians to start building their own nuclear weapons programme. In 1971, the Italians launched their ballistic missile programme 'Alfa'. This, however, did not result in

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<sup>138</sup> Matthew Evangelista, 'Atomic Ambivalence: Italy's Evolving Attitude toward Nuclear Weapons', in: Giampiero Giacomello and Bertjan Verbeek. *Italy's Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century: The New Assertiveness of an Aspiring Middle Power* (Plymouth 2011), 120.

<sup>139</sup> Paola Foradori, 'Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Italy: Striking a Balance between Disarmament Aspirations and Alliance Obligations', *The Nonproliferation Review* (February 2012), 13-29, 15.

<sup>140</sup> Popp, 'The Long Road to the NPT: From Superpower Collusion to Global Compromise', 12.

<sup>141</sup> Leopoldo Nuti, "'A Turning Point in Postwar Foreign Policy": Italy and the NPT negotiations, 1967-1969', in: Roland Popp (eds). *Negotiating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origins of the Nuclear Order* (London 2017) and Leopoldo Nuti, 'Italy as a Hedging State? The Problematic Ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty', in: Elisabetta Bini, Igor Londero (eds). *Nuclear Italy. An International History of Italian Nuclear Policies during the Cold War* (Trieste 2017).

<sup>142</sup> First mentioning of 'multilateral force' in ENDC archives was on February 12th, 1963 by Mr. Godber, representative of the United Kingdom.

the establishment of a nuclear arsenal and the programme was terminated entirely in 1975, when Italy signed the NPT.

Whilst Italy did not have its own nuclear deterrent in the 1960s, it did host American nukes on Italian soil. Historians have been debating Italy's motives behind the acceptance of this offer. Foradori argues that by hosting American nukes, Italy reaffirmed its pro-Western stance and willingness to become of significant value within the alliance. Additionally, in case of an actual nuclear war, Italy would be able to play an active role in the crucial decision making, in comparison to its non-hosting allies.<sup>143</sup> Historian Matthew Evangelista adds that while Italy produced some of the pioneers in nuclear physics, it never developed a national nuclear arsenal. Hosting American nukes, he believes, was a way to preserve a 'seat at the table' on nuclear policy.<sup>144</sup>

Historian Jan Melissen, however, believed that Italy's willingness to host these nukes derived from financial motivations. The fact that Italy pioneered in hosting American nukes on national soil, demonstrates Italy's desire for the establishment of a nuclear sharing scheme. Melissen argues that Italy hosted these American nukes in order to receive maximum financial support from the United States. This, he believes, played a far more important role than political control.<sup>145</sup> While there is no clear evidence that financial support did not play a role in the accommodation of American nukes, it seems inevitable that enhancing Italy-United States relations and political prestige played a key role in this decision.

### **Relations between Italy and the United States**

As of the late 1950s, Italy decided to further bolster its relations with the United States and NATO. Whether the Italians attached value to the financial support gained from the Americans or not, the political security cannot be downplayed and was potentially even more important. The acceptance of American nuclear weapons on Italian soil between 1955 and 1959 evolved into a deployment pattern that served as the basis for Italy's nuclear policy for the next decade.<sup>146</sup> First and foremost, the purpose of these weapons was to deter possible Warsaw Pact troops from initiating a nuclear strike. This policy of 'strategic stability' played an important role in American foreign policy. These would also slow down the increasing hostile tensions and would enable Italy to fully mobilise its armed forces.<sup>147</sup> In the years 1959-1960, the United

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<sup>143</sup> Foradori, 'Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Italy: Striking a Balance between Disarmament Aspirations and Alliance Obligations', 15.

<sup>144</sup> Evangelista, 'Atomic Ambivalence: Italy's Evolving Attitude toward Nuclear Weapons', 115.

<sup>145</sup> Jan Melissen, 'Nuclearizing NATO, 1957-1959: The 'Anglo-Saxons', Nuclear Sharing and the Fourth Country Problem', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (July 1994), 253-275, 264.

<sup>146</sup> Nuti, "'A Turning Point in Postwar Foreign Policy": Italy and the NPT negotiations, 1967-1969', 78.

<sup>147</sup> Foradori, 'Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Italy: Striking a Balance between Disarmament Aspirations and Alliance Obligations', 14.

States also deployed Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Italy as part of a modernisation project of the American nuclear forces led by the Eisenhower administration. This 'double-key' system of shared control of these particular nuclear weapons by the United States and the host country, was brought to an end after the Cuban Missile Crisis. This meant that the Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles were already being dismantled in late 1962.<sup>148</sup>

Besides affirming its pro-Western stance and dedication to NATO, Italy had another important reason to host American nuclear weapons on its territory. It believed that a strong alliance with the United States and a strong NATO would lead to a nuclear sharing scheme that would be beneficial for all Western European allies not possessing nuclear weapons. When the United States proposed the NATO Multilateral Force (MLF), a nuclear sharing scheme for all NATO members, Italy immediately expressed its support. It even started to play an important role in the turbulent MLF negotiations that persisted from 1963 to 1966, of which most took place within the ENDC. Italy had always been very sensitive to the ranking of their country in the international system.<sup>149</sup> The Italians believed that a nuclear sharing scheme was also important for them to become part of the core decision-making group within the Western alliance. Hosting the American nukes, therefore, can be seen as a way of the Italians to increase their margins for manoeuvre in the Western alliance.

### **The issue of the MLF**

As explained in the historical context, Italy took a consistent stance in the first years of the negotiations. It clearly supported the United States' proposals and participated in various debates, of which the MLF debate is the most evident one. On 8 March 1963, Italian representative Mr. Cavaletti took a clear stance in favour of the multilateral sharing scheme:

The ideas of the Western Powers on the multilateral force have already been explained. [...] The object of this force, the creation of which is at present under examination, is quite the opposite of that which the delegations of the socialist countries are trying to attribute to it. One of its purposes is to prevent effectively the spread of nuclear weapons.<sup>150</sup>

- Mr. Cavaletti, representative of Italy (8 March 1963)

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<sup>148</sup> Foradori, 14.

<sup>149</sup> Nuti, 'Italy as a Hedging State? The Problematic Ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty', 119.

<sup>150</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 106 (8 March 1963), 6 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endsc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

Mr. Cavaletti defends the MLF as it refers to it as a policy that effectively prevents the spread of nuclear weapons. It would continue to defend the MLF in the subsequent years. As Italy had been improving its relationship with the United States since the end of the Cold War until the mid 1960s, the evident pro-Western stance in the beginning of the negotiations does not come as a surprise. While Italy was one of the main advocates of a nuclear sharing scheme, the United States had to accept the Soviet point of view that the dissemination of nuclear weapons within NATO by means of a nuclear sharing scheme, was a form of proliferation and therefore felt pressured to terminate the plans in late 1966. This termination also had to do with the fact that the PRC had become a nuclear-armed state, which made the issue of non-proliferation more pressing. Considering the contradiction of agreeing on a nuclear sharing scheme in the broader ambitions to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, this outcome, speaking from hindsight, does not seem surprising.

One would expect Italy to change its strategy after the United States terminated the MLF plans - based on Nuti's theory that Italy was so focused on the establishment of a nuclear sharing scheme that all their initiatives to the ENDC were conceived with the aim to give flexibility to any disarmament measures the ENDC would eventually adopt.<sup>151</sup> One of the first signs of Italian resistance against the United States becomes apparent in the Italian response to the United States' Non-Proliferation proposal. On 28 February 1966, around 10 months before the United States would terminate the plans for the MLF, the director of the Italian National Committee for Nuclear Energy<sup>152</sup> (CNEN), Achille Albonetti, sent a memo to the Italian ministry of Industry and Commerce in which he expressed his concerns on the new draft made by the United States:

[...] 3. In general, the new draft treaty is more detailed with regard to the obligations, which aggravate the position of States which do not have nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, the discrimination to the disadvantage of these States is widened, as will be seen later, in the control sector of the International Agency for Atomic Energy (art.3).<sup>153</sup>

- Achille Albonetti, director of the CNEN (28 February 1966)

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<sup>151</sup> Nuti, "A Turning Point in Postwar Foreign Policy": Italy and the NPT negotiations, 1967-1969', 80.

<sup>152</sup> Il Comitato Nazionale per l'Energia Nucleare.

<sup>153</sup> "3. In via generale, il nuovo progetto di trattato è più dettagliato per quanto riguarda gli obblighi che aggravano la posizione degli Stati che non dispongono di armi nucleari. Inoltre, la discriminazione a svantaggio di tali Stati si amplia, come si vedrà più innanzi, al settore dei controlli dell'Agenzia Internazionale per la Energia Atomica (art. 3)." Wilson Center Digital Archive, Memo by A. Albonetti to GA on US NPT Proposal (28 February 1968), <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/188015> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

It seems striking that a representative from CNEN would interfere with a draft non-proliferation treaty for two reasons. First, Albonetti was not a representative to the ENDC. Second, he was not mentioned in any of the debates. The CNEN was established in 1960 with the aim to promote the development of nuclear energy in Italy. This memo implies that the CNEN was, to a certain extent, involved in state affairs. Furthermore, this memo demonstrates that the CNEN believed that the new American draft endangered the position of non-nuclear weapons states already before the Americans terminated the MLF plan.

In December 1966, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who was also a representative at the ENDC meetings, presented a new preliminary draft of the first two articles of the NPT to Egidio Ortona, the Secretary General of the Italian Foreign Ministry. Ortona was perplexed by the fact that Rusks' new draft excluded the possibility of any nuclear sharing scheme.<sup>154</sup> In the following months, Italy decided to follow a more independent course. Within the ENDC, it took a more opposing stand. Tensions between the two states arose when the US insisted Italy to define its position and change its stalling strategy.<sup>155</sup>

Between August 1966 and February 1967, no ENDC meetings took place, as the members had decided to take a recess. The first meeting after this recess took place on the 21st of February 1967. Two months before, the United States had informed Italy that it would exclude the possibility for a nuclear sharing scheme in their new draft. During this meeting Mr. Roshchin, representative of the Soviet Union, explicitly stated the following:

During the time which has elapsed since the close of the last session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, a number of meetings and talks have taken place between Soviet statesmen and the statesmen of certain Western countries, including countries that are participating in the work of the Committee: the United Kingdom, Italy and Canada.<sup>156</sup>

- Mr. Roshchin, representative of the Soviet Union (21 February 1967)

This implies that Italy had had bilateral conversations with the Soviet Union during the recess. Mr. Roshchin remained quite general on the topics that were discussed during that meeting, but mentioned they discussed important questions concerning disarmament and the safeguarding of international security. The fact that Mr. Roshchin brought their bilateral meetings up during the ENDC negotiations, raises questions about the awareness of the

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<sup>154</sup> Nuti, "A Turning Point in Postwar Foreign Policy": Italy and the NPT negotiations, 1967-1969', 81.

<sup>155</sup> Ibidem, 82.

<sup>156</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 287 (21 February 1967), 13 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).



United States on this matter. It might have been a way of the Soviet Union to openly raise doubts about the strong NATO alliance. In the upcoming meetings, Italy was surprisingly quiet and does not contribute much to the meetings, in comparison to the meetings before December 1966. It also did not respond to the statement made by Mr. Roshchin.

As of early February 1967, the Italian government made attempts to define the Italian position on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation, as was being requested by the United States. The Italian officials concluded that Italy should support a treaty for a limited time period, at least until the nuclear states would agree on a reduction of their nuclear arms. Italy feared that while the new treaty would try to stabilise the tensions between the superpowers, this would go at the expense of the smaller NNWS. Furthermore, Italy felt threatened by France, which became nuclear hegemon inside continental Europe.<sup>157</sup> These concerns led to a tense bilateral crisis between Italy and the United States. The bilateral negotiations were temporarily being stalled after the United States rejected Italy's suggestions to the American draft.

However, on the 20th of February 1967, Italian president Giuseppe Saragat stressed that reaching agreement on nuclear non-proliferation would be of vital importance to the Italian Supreme Defence Council. He warned his colleagues that Italy, due to its geopolitical position, should fear all its surrounding nuclear neighbours: France, the Soviet Union and states that had clear nuclear ambitions, such as Egypt and Israel.<sup>158</sup> While this caused a heated debate within the Italian government, the Italians eventually chose to keep negotiating, but also to take a critical stance against the draft presented by the United States. As the multilateral negotiations continued, Washington and Rome kept having frequent bilateral meetings during which Rome stressed that it could not accept that Italy, as leading industrial power, would be given 'a position of inferiority to Mediterranean countries of a lesser industrial capacity.'<sup>159</sup> Washington, on the other hand, would raise doubts about Italy's ultimate intentions with respect to the broader non-proliferation scheme.<sup>160</sup>

It is noteworthy that after the long recess, Italy stopped actively emphasizing the efforts made by the United States in the ENDC meetings. In fact, it only referred to the tasks and the work of 'the committee' and urges the committee to draft a treaty without delay. On the 28th of February 1967, Mr. Cavalletti argues:

Nonproliferation, the halting of underground nuclear tests, the cut-off and the freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles are measures that we have debated a long time, making some progress and clarifying problems and positions. This Committee has

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<sup>157</sup> Nuti, "A Turning Point in Postwar Foreign Policy": Italy and the NPT negotiations, 1967-1969', 82.

<sup>158</sup> Ibidem, 83.

<sup>159</sup> Ibidem, 84.

<sup>160</sup> Ibidem, 84.

tried indefatigably to bring them together. Numerous aspects of the problem, such as nuclear sharing within alliances, the European clause, the balance of commitments and security guarantees, have been examined thoroughly but the differences have not been overcome. [...] The Committee should draft without delay a genuine, just and effective non-proliferation treaty which will meet the peoples' desires.<sup>161</sup>

- Mr. Cavalletti, representative of Italy (28 February 1967)

This implies that Italy still believed that a global treaty that applied to both NWS and NNWS was of vital importance. It implies that Italy feared and opposed the emergence of new nuclear states and, still, did not have any nuclear ambitions of itself. Therefore, the statement by Mr. Cavalletti mostly demonstrates that Italy was scared of the nuclear capabilities and activities of other states. Furthermore, Mr. Cavalletti emphasised Italy's proposal for a counterpart measure in the case NNWS renunciate the agreement and build or possess nuclear weapons nevertheless.<sup>162</sup> During that same meeting, Mr. Cavaletti mentions something else interesting:

Each country must remain free to develop its industrial facilities, through the use of all forms of atomic energy. In this connexion we note with sympathetic interest the decisions adopted recently by our Latin-American friends in establishing a nuclear-free continent. We even believe that peaceful nuclear co-operation on an organized international basis should gain new impetus and make available to all peoples the advantages secured through science. I hope that we all agree on the need to acknowledge and to meet these.<sup>163</sup>

- Mr. Cavaletti, representative of Italy (28 February 1967)

It is interesting to note that Mr. Cavalletti stresses that every country should 'remain free to develop its industrial facilities through the use of all forms of atomic energy.' This implies that he enabled NNWS to continue exploring their nuclear potentials. Potentially even more strikingly, Italy explicitly expresses support for 'peaceful nuclear co-operation on an organised international basis'. Considering the fact that Italy was one of the main proponents of the establishment of a nuclear sharing scheme in Western Europe and the fact that it resented the United States' decision to terminate this plan, this can be seen as a way of Italy to find

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<sup>161</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 289 (28 February 1967), 5-6 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/encdc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>162</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 289 (28 February 1967), 7 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/encdc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>163</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 289 (28 February 1967), 8 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/encdc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

other allies on this matter. Italy clearly takes a different track by presenting its willingness to establish nuclear co-operations with other, not necessarily Western, states. Furthermore, when looking at the statements made by Mr. Cavalletti, it seems that while the Italians remained positive on the potential outcomes of the committee. However, their choice of wording has changed significantly after United States terminated the MLF. As an example, they mainly speak about the work of 'the committee' rather than stressing the importance of the United States. Furthermore, the Italians do not necessarily seem to align with the proposals submitted by the United States anymore.

Whilst there is no sign of close Italian-American relations on the multilateral level in the first months of 1967, present research demonstrates that the two states were having various bilateral meetings in order to restore their close relationship. Research suggests that the Americans realised they had to meet the Italians halfway after they had disappointed them by terminating the possibility of a nuclear sharing scheme. Therefore, in April 1967, the United States decided to accept some of the Italian requests as a way to compromise. They guaranteed a steady supply of nuclear fuel and granted the request for international safeguards. These acts of reconciliation were appreciated by the Italian officials, who at the same time had drawn more toward their European partners.<sup>164</sup> This is also visible in the minutes of the ENDC of that time. That the relations have been improved becomes apparent in the minutes from the meeting on 15 June 1967:

I should like to refer particularly to the tone of our debate. Despite international difficulties, the exchange of views has taken place in a completely relaxed and, in several respects, improved atmosphere. [...] the active participation of the representatives of the non-nuclear countries have, in our opinion, a very particular usefulness at the present time -- a time which, as is pointed out by the representative of Mexico [...] could be decisive for the solution of the problem of non-proliferation. [...] The Italian delegation earnestly expresses the hope that it will be possible for the two co-Chairmen to submit a joint draft treaty very shortly, and that that draft will prove to be in accordance with everyone's legitimate expectations and with the needs of security and peace.<sup>165</sup>

- Mr. Cavalletti, representative of Italy (15 June 1967)

The tone of the statements made in the June meeting differs from the statements made in the February meeting. This meeting demonstrates that Italy believed the internal atmosphere of

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<sup>164</sup> Nuti, "A Turning Point in Postwar Foreign Policy": Italy and the NPT negotiations, 1967-1969', 87.

<sup>165</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 305 (15 June 1967), 4-6 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

the committee had been improved and that a treaty could be established soon. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the Italians turned more towards the NNWS than they did before. In one of the April meetings, it had stressed the importance to create a 'united Europe' for NNWS.<sup>166</sup> During this meeting, Italy explicitly emphasised the importance of NNWS in this committee and used the remark made by Mexico to point that out. That the Italians all of a sudden started to participate in the debates again in June 1967 and spoke so positive about its work, should be seen as the result of the improved bilateral relations and the fact that the Americans decided to meet the Italians halfway. However, its shifted attention from the United States to other, non-nuclear, members, such as Mexico, seems remarkable.

Whilst the ENDC minutes imply that Italy was still in favour of reaching a global agreement on nuclear non-proliferation, literature suggests that Italy was developing interest in building its own nuclear arsenal mid-1967. According to Nuti, the CNEN became more prominent in the international discussions on nuclear energy and weapons. In June 1967, the CNEN expressed its interest in the long-term procurement of uranium supplies and in the participation in international nuclear projects. Albonetti argued that a creation of a European separation plant could elevate the nuclear status of Europe and bridge the gap between Europe and the United States. Albonetti even hinted that 'such a nuclear Europe could develop its own weapons and use them as leverage to obtain the disarmament of the other nuclear powers.'<sup>167</sup> This statement implies that Italy was interested in developing a national nuclear programme. It is possible that the Italian government was following another course than the CNEN, but research suggests that the CNEN was interfering more in state affairs, which implies that Italy had a growing ambition to become a nuclear armed-state itself in the course of the 1960s.

### **Becoming a maverick**

There was a growing interest in enrichment technology among European states in the 1960s. Its implications for the future NPT did not go unseen by the Italian officials. For example, in April 1967, an internal memo from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned that the current NPT draft would contain a serious control on Italian initiatives to implement these enrichment technologies.<sup>168</sup> This corresponds with what Mr. Cavalletti stated in the meeting of 28 February

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<sup>166</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 289 (28 February 1967), 9 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>167</sup> Nuti, 'Italy as a Hedging State? The Problematic Ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty', 124.

<sup>168</sup> Nuti, "'A Turning Point in Postwar Foreign Policy": Italy and the NPT negotiations, 1967-1969', 87.

1967 'that it would be inadmissible for a non-proliferation treaty to delay or hamper scientific, technical or social progress in NNWS'.<sup>169</sup>

In the months that followed, Italy discussed the agreement with its fellow Western NNWS. Nuti argues that the Italians appeared to have a similar hatred towards the agreement as their West German counterparts. From a tactical point of view, the Italians suggested that, rather than forming a common front, both states should present their opinions separately.<sup>170</sup> The fact that West Germany was not a member of the ENDC did not stop the two states from continuing their close cooperation. In fact, they consulted other states in this opposition as well, such as Japan and India. According to Nuti, who investigated the bilateral conversations between Italy and these two respective countries, these conversations indicate that Italy intended to modify the content of the NPT, rather than postponing or rejecting it.<sup>171</sup> Nuti also argues that until the signing of the NPT in January 1969, the Italian government made various efforts to convince the Johnson administration to modify their draft treaty.<sup>172</sup> At the same time, the Italian government sped up their activities in the CNEN. According to Nuti, these activities had little to do with the NPT, as some of these initiatives might also have taken place if there had been no treaty at all. Although Nuti believes that this was rather coincidental,<sup>173</sup> it does imply that Italy developed clear aspirations to play a significant role in nuclear affairs. In fact, Italy initiated nuclear co-operations, such as joint enrichment plants, with other European nations. It approached the British, among others, who found themselves in a cross fire and decided not to cooperate fearing this could damage the Anglo-American relations.<sup>174</sup> This coincidence, as Nuti describes it, therefore, seems quite remarkable.

In June 1967, the United States presented a new draft to the members of the Atlantic Council, who all agreed that this draft should be used at the next ENDC meeting. During the ENDC meeting thereafter, Italian representative Mr. Fanfani surprised all of its allies by openly presenting a whole list of remarks and requests on this American draft, including the request that nuclear states would pledge to transfer nuclear fuel to NNWS for a special price - which would not be acceptable for the United States. A few days later, the Italians would bring up a new demand, which entailed more flexibility in the treaty, either by adjusting its duration or by introducing a 'satisfactory' procedure for future amendments.<sup>175</sup> As this list of remarks and requests came as a complete surprise, this suggests that the Italians had not mentioned this to the United States earlier. It implies that the Italians used the ENDC as a place to openly

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<sup>169</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 289 (28 February 1967), 8 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>170</sup> Nuti, "A Turning Point in Postwar Foreign Policy": Italy and the NPT negotiations, 1967-1969', 88.

<sup>171</sup> Ibidem, 89.

<sup>172</sup> Nuti, 'Italy as a Hedging State? The Problematic Ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty', 121.

<sup>173</sup> Ibidem, 122.

<sup>174</sup> Ibidem, 129.

<sup>175</sup> Nuti, "A Turning Point in Postwar Foreign Policy": Italy and the NPT negotiations, 1967-1969', 89.

demonstrate their objection of the NPT. It shows that the Italians used the ENDC as an instrument to openly present their objection.

In August 1967, the two co-Chairmen had submitted a draft treaty to the ENDC meeting. After first openly supporting a rapid conclusion of the NPT and thanking both Moscow and Washington for all their efforts, the Italians, once again, presented an entire list of complaints and demands with respect to this draft, to the dismay of the American representative Rusk – who argued that the US had already accommodated some Italian request and was unsure about how many more it could accept. One of the main problems of the Italians encompassed the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which, according to representative Mr. Caracciolo should be ‘encouraged and safeguarded since its place is in the context of the ever-growing technological gap [between nuclear and NNWS].’<sup>176</sup> Furthermore, Mr. Caracciolo introduces a new article that leaves the door open for possible future amendments and complains about the fact that not all of the Italian suggestions have been adopted:

Nevertheless, it seems to me that some of our suggestions have not yet found a place in the text of the treaty. That applies to non-discrimination between the two categories of signatory countries, and to the problem of the security of the non-nuclear countries on which depends a more general adherence to the treaty. [...] Quite obviously, however, the drafting of this text presented a number of difficulties. This is shown by the fact that the co-Chairmen have not yet succeeded in formulating article III on international controls. [...] Indeed, if the difficulty of finding a satisfactory formula would prevent rapid progress in the negotiations, the decision to defer this difficulty might perhaps facilitate the conclusion of a treaty.<sup>177</sup>

- Mr. Caracciolo, representative of Italy (29 August 1967)

Once again, the Italian delegation referred to the importance of a European unity and emphasised the importance of a treaty for the NNWS. It is also noteworthy that Mr. Caracciolo proposes to defer the negotiations in case a satisfactory conclusion would not be reached. This implies that it was willing to prolong the negotiations even further, whilst the topic of disarmament was so pressing.

Apparently, Italy was one of the few delegations to criticise the draft that had just been presented by the two co-Chairmen. The representative to the United Kingdom, Mr. Mulley, for

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<sup>176</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 326 (29 August 1967), 10 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/encdc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>177</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 326 (29 August 1967), 10 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/encdc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

example, responds to the statement made by Mr. Caracciolo by arguing that a treaty that permits the 'unrestricted use of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes would contain a serious loop-hole, as it could fatally undermine its stability.'<sup>178</sup> This demonstrates that the British did not believe a peaceful nuclear co-operation, as suggested by the Italians, would be possible nor desirable.

By the end of 1967, the United States presented a new draft in which various Italian requests were adopted, such as the inclusion of a pledge for further disarmament negotiations and the limitation of safeguards of nuclear fuel.<sup>179</sup> While the Italians were not entirely convinced by the new American draft, a debate in the Italian Senate urged the Italian delegation to reach a conclusion of the NPT negotiations sooner rather than later. Although most representatives, among which the United Kingdom, seem satisfied about the draft presented by the two co-Chairmen, the objections made by some members led to another deadlock. In December 1967, the members decided it would send an interim report to the UN General Assembly instead of a draft treaty. The long list of objections presented by Italians definitely contributed to this delay.

In the subsequent meetings, the Italian delegation continued presenting new amendments to the negotiation table and, strikingly enough, used statements made by other delegations to underpin its arguments. This led to frustration among other members, such as the Polish and Canadian representatives. The Polish representative, Mr. Blusztajn, for example, questioned the documents the Italian delegation used in their presentation to the ENDC and states 'I do not know whether or not the document listed [...] has relevance to the history of our discussion.'<sup>180</sup> Furthermore, the Canadian representative Mr. Burns argues:

It strikes me that the representative of Italy, in making this selection, has included references to statements made by various delegations in this Committee and by delegations which dealt with the same subject in the General Assembly. These references go back some months, or even years, as the representative of Poland has pointed out; and it may be that the positions which were taken up by delegations, for instance by my delegation, here and in the General Assembly have since been modified because of the development of the treaty drafts and the various amendments to them. Therefore I feel that, before a list such as that proposed by the representative of Italy were to be attached to the report or included among any documents accompanying the report, the references to statements expressing the positions of

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<sup>178</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 326 (29 August 1967), 16 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/encdc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>179</sup> Nuti, "A Turning Point in Postwar Foreign Policy": Italy and the NPT negotiations, 1967-1969', 89.

<sup>180</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 374 (6 March 1968), 14 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/encdc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).



delegations on the various aspects of the non-proliferation treaty should be checked by those delegations themselves, and the drafting committee should be informed whether the statements referred to really represent their final positions on the matters in question.<sup>181</sup>

- Mr. Burns, representative of Canada (6 March 1968)

This statement raises questions about Italy's sincerity in wanting to reach an agreement as soon as possible. It seems like the Italian contributions were delaying the negotiations rather than speeding them up. It also demonstrates that other delegations were opposing the behaviour of the Italian delegation.

Nuti draws two conclusions from Italy's behaviour during the NPT negotiations. First, he argues that the Italians deeply resented the NPT, as the result was not in their favour. The NPT not only blocked their ambition to become a significant player in world politics, it also marked an end to one of their deepest aspirations, which was a federalist version of European integration.<sup>182</sup> This view corresponds with the ENDC minutes, as Italy started proposing all sorts of amendments and suggestions, which delayed the negotiation process. Second, Nuti doubts whether Italy negotiated in good faith or simply tried to buy time, hoping that the NPT would eventually die. Nuti admits that such a conclusion cannot be drawn from the evidence he presents. I believe it is unlikely that the Italians hoped the NPT would eventually die. It was hoping it could make it more based on their terms, as it lost its value since the MLF was terminated. It is evident that Italy used the ENDC to stretch its margins for manoeuvre, as it surprised its allies by presenting the list of remarks and requests on the American draft. However, it is evident that Italy stretched its margins for manoeuvre too far. This corresponds with my hypothesis that states would try to stretch their margins for manoeuvre more within committees than within organisation. The fact that it did sign the treaty half a year later, demonstrates that it did see the added value of a Non-Proliferation Treaty to a certain extent. Nevertheless, it postponed the actual ratification for over five years.

On 20 September 1968, over two months after the NPT was finalised, the Italian ministry of external affairs expressed Italy's aims to further work on the issues of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in a memorandum.<sup>183</sup> The ministry stressed that it would continue to 'diminish and correct' the consequences that arose from the Non-Proliferation Treaty for

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<sup>181</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 374 (6 March 1968), 14 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>182</sup> Nuti, "A Turning Point in Postwar Foreign Policy": Italy and the NPT negotiations, 1967-1969", 92.

<sup>183</sup> Wilson Center Digital Archive, MAE memorandum, 'Conference of non-nuclear countries' (20 September 1968), <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/188001> (last accessed 16 July 2020).



NNWS'.<sup>184</sup> This demonstrates that the Italians were still aiming on changing the content of the NPT in favour of NNWS, including that of themselves, even after the NPT had already been finalised.

That the Italians kept trying to change the content of the NPT even throughout the 1970s derives from a report the Italian delegation sent to the Conference on Disarmament (CCD), the successor negotiation body of the ENDC, on 20 September 1974. The report reflected on the impact of India's first successful nuclear test earlier that year. Whilst India called its activities 'peaceful nuclear explosions,' the Italians considered these nuclear activities a serious violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Consequently, Italy questioned the credibility of the treaty. Instead of only rejecting the Indian actions, the Italians suggested to update the treaty. They presented three proposals, which can all be linked to Italy's position on disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in the 1960s. The first suggestion was the improvement of the current regime of the distribution of the benefits of nuclear technology to countries. This implied the possibility to share nuclear technology among nations, which can be linked to Italy's aspiration to have a nuclear sharing scheme with NATO. The second suggestion implied a liberalisation of the current discipline of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which would make it possible for the Italians to also start carrying out nuclear tests. The third suggestion encompassed the strengthening of the coordination and clarification of the current nuclear control system, which implied a more strict control on nuclear tests.<sup>185</sup> This potentially even meant stricter sanctions for states that would carry out nuclear tests, like India. It is evident that the Italians considered India's nuclear test a serious violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Whilst the Italians had signed the NPT in 1969, the suggestions they made to update the treaty still correspond to the Italian position in the late 1960s. It implies that the Italians were still trying to change the NPT in a way to make it more beneficial for them.

Although Italy had signed the NPT in 1969, it kept postponing the ratification for more than five years. In fact, on 3 July 1974, a few months after the Indian nuclear test, the chief of the Italian Defence Staff<sup>186</sup> suggested to even further postpone ratification.<sup>187</sup> This had to do with the destabilising effects generated by the Indian tests. This implies that the Italians were still not satisfied with the shape the NPT came to have. It is likely the Italian proposals of 1974

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<sup>184</sup> '[...] in modo da diminuire e correggere le conseguenze pregiudizievoli che dal trattato stesso discendo nei confronti dei paesi non nucleari.' Wilson Center Digital Archive, MAE memorandum, 'Conference of non-nuclear countries' (20 September 1968), <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/188001> (last accessed 16 July 2020).

<sup>185</sup> MAE report on Indian Nuclear Explosion (2 September 1974), <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/188008> (last accessed 16 July 2020).

<sup>186</sup> Il Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa

<sup>187</sup> Wilson Center Digital Archive, Note from CSMD to MD on Italian Ratification of the NPT (4 July 1974), <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/187997> (last accessed 16 July 2020).

did not make it to the NPT. Nevertheless, the Italians did decide to ratify the treaty almost a year later, in May 1975.

As briefly mentioned in the historical context, there was a disagreement in the British government in 1976 on the Italian interpretation of the first two articles of the NPT. The Italian ambassador explicitly referred to the Italian interpretation on 'peaceful nuclear explosions'.<sup>188</sup> This indicates that the Italians were having diverging views on the regulations of PNE's. As this memo dates from 1976, this can be linked to the Indian peaceful nuclear explosions of 1974. Italy wanted to update the NPT based on these Indian nuclear tests. In the case the Italians not succeeded in updating the NPT, it is reasonable to assume that it led the Italians to reconsider the first two articles. Whilst this cannot be determined in full certainty, it does demonstrate the Italian ongoing efforts to change the NPT throughout the 1970s.

## Conclusion

In the post-war years, the Italians managed to build a strong relationship with the United States. The Italians had aspirations to become an important actor in international politics. In order to succeed, they believed a good relationship with the Americans and NATO was essential. While they did not try to build a nuclear arsenal of their own, the Italians eagerly accepted the deployment of American nukes on Italian soil. Hosting these bombs was a matter of prestige and an 'acceptable path to the bomb'. It does not come as a surprise that Italy took a very strong pro-Western stance at the beginning of the ENDC negotiations. In comparison to other NATO members, the Italians aligned themselves far more explicitly with the proposals presented by the United States and actively participated in certain debates - especially those regarding the establishment of a nuclear sharing scheme.

Until late 1966, their contributions to the committee are very clear and pro-United States. The turning point took place in December 1966, when the Americans terminated the plans for a nuclear sharing scheme. The Italians most probably knew a treaty was nearby, especially because the Americans sacrificed the MLF in order to meet the Soviets halfway. The minutes demonstrated that Italy was surprisingly silent during the initial negotiations. Furthermore, Italy did no longer stress the importance of the efforts made by the United States and speaks more in terms of 'the committee'.

After the termination of the MLF, the Italians had to find other ways to create a treaty that would be as appealing for them as possible, since it had little to lose at this point. This view is based on the theory that committees are a more convenient to use as a tool to stretch

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<sup>188</sup> MAE cable on Italian Ratification of the NPT (30 June 1976), <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/187999> (last accessed 16 July 2020).

margins for manoeuvre than organisations, which I elaborated on in the introduction of this research. The Italians changed their focus from the Western bloc, and the United States in particular, to its fellow NNWS. The Italians enhanced their relationship with West Germany and other states with clear nuclear ambitions, including Japan, and India and the Soviet Union. At the same time, it explored ways to start nuclear sharing cooperations with other ENDC members. Furthermore, the CNEN increased its activities and its director flirted with the idea of building a national nuclear programme. With this strategy, the Italians went against their American ally, which put the American-Italian relations to the test. The Americans, for their part, sought a way to keep the NATO together after they disappointed their allies by terminating the MLF. Knowing that Italy had the ability to build a nuclear weapon, and had potentially developed the ambition to do so, urged the Americans to speed up the negotiations. Italy knew the United States wanted the Italians on board and therefore that it could get the United States to accommodate some of the Italian requests within the final draft.

This research has demonstrated that Italy became a maverick within the ENDC negotiations. It adopted a strategy of continuously implementing amendments and suggestions, with which they hoped to postpone the negotiations. The ENDC members depicted Italy more and more as a maverick and argued that it made inaccurate references to statements made by other delegations. This resulted in the fact that they concluded the NPT without the Italians. Opposing the final draft and starting its own nuclear weapons programme can be seen as Italy's last attempt to have its way. It stretched its margins for manoeuvre too far, as it could not prevent the NPT from happening. Eventually, the Italians did sign the treaty and thereby also terminated their national nuclear programme. Nevertheless, it took over five years for the Italians to ratify the NPT. Archival research has also demonstrated that after the conclusion of the NPT, the Italians kept trying to change the NPT in a way that made it more beneficial for them. Whilst Italy tried to use the ENDC as a way to prevent the NPT from happening, it proved unsuccessful. Italy's room for manoeuvre in the ENDC therefore appeared to be rather limited. Italy's resistance against the NPT did slow down the negotiations to a certain extent, but it did not succeed in preventing the NPT from happening.

# Romania

I do not wish to seem overdramatic, but I can only conclude from the information that is available to me as Secretary-General that the Members of the United Nations have perhaps ten years left in which to subordinate their ancient quarrels and launch a global partnership to curb the arms race, to improve the human environment, to defuse the population explosion, and to supply the required momentum to world development efforts.<sup>189</sup>

- Mr. Ecobesco, representative of Romania (20 May 1969)

On 20 May 1969, almost a year after the NPT was concluded, Romanian representative Ecobesco warned its fellow ENDC members that there were perhaps ten years left to launch a global partnership that could halt the nuclear arms race. Whilst the NPT was agreed upon by almost all ENDC members, this statement implies that Romania was not satisfied with the outcome of the Committee's work. Although it strongly opposed the NPT in the form it came to have, Romania did eventually decide to sign the treaty when it first opened up for signature on 1 July 1968.

Similar to the chapter on Italy, this chapter serves as a case study on the role of Romania in the 1960s disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation negotiations. Based on present literature and archival research of the ENDC and the Warsaw Pact, it aims to shed light on Romania's position within the ENDC negotiations. It includes an overview of Romania's bilateral relations with other states, such as the Soviet Union and the PRC, since the end of the Second World War. Understanding these relations are of vital importance in order to understand Romania's position and role within the multilateral framework of the ENDC. Romania's national politics will be included to a certain extent, but are of secondary importance considering the focus of this research. Similar to the Italian case study, it includes a thorough investigation of the ENDC minutes.

## Struggles in the Soviet Camp

After the Second World War, the socialist countries transformed significantly due to an accumulation of political events. The Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and the subsequent Soviet invasion in Hungary had changed the dynamics between the socialist great powers - the Soviet

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<sup>189</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 412 (20 May 1969), 15 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

Union, the PRC and Yugoslavia. All socialist powers had to reinvent their position within the Socialist Camp and did so in different ways. Moscow, for instance, chose to reinforce its campaign of 'peaceful co-existence' in order to consolidate its prominent position within the camp, but also to restore its image in global politics.<sup>190</sup> The political tensions among the socialist great powers put their alliance to the test and led them to be mainly concerned with preserving their own image and place in international politics. This enabled small socialist states, among which Romania, to widen their margins for manoeuvre in regional and global politics.

Historians who have investigated the role of Romania in the Cold War generally agree on the depiction of Romania as a maverick within the socialist camp, and sometimes even on the international level.<sup>191</sup> As an example, historian Laurien Crump has demonstrated in various publications how Romania began to follow a more independent course. It considered the Warsaw Pact an obstacle for Romania's autonomy and therefore started to increasingly distance itself from the Soviet alliance. There are four examples that demonstrate how Romania succeeded in that already during the early 1960s. First, Romania resisted the Soviet attempts to designate Romania as the provider of raw materials within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). Second, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Romania declared itself 'neutral' in case the conflict would result in an actual war between the Soviet Union and the United States. Third, Romania refused to take sides in the Sino-Soviet split and thereby it succeeded in maintaining a good relationship with both socialist great powers.<sup>192</sup> Fourth, Romania's 'Declaration of Independence from Moscow' of April 1964 demonstrated its start of a more independent course. This declaration was based on the principles of equality, independence and non-interference in internal affairs.<sup>193</sup>

The tensions between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia rose when the two powers disagreed on Belgrade's membership to the Balkan Pact. Khrushchev feared that Tito would bring Yugoslavia more towards the West, as it had certain ties with NATO through Greece and Turkey. Khrushchev tried to find a way to influence the making of this regional alliance, but his adversarial relationship with Tito restrained Khrushchev from success. Within this hostile political climate, Romania positioned itself as a mediator of the socialist great powers and build

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<sup>190</sup> Mavrodin, 'Denuclearisation and Regional Cooperation', 198.

<sup>191</sup> E.g. Eliza Gheorghe, 'Atomic Maverick: Romania's Negotiations for Nuclear Technology, 1964–1970', *Cold War History*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 373-392 and Corina Mavrodin, 'Denuclearisation and Regional Cooperation: Romania's Tactical Approaches to Escaping Bloc Rigidities' in: Crump, Laurien and Erlandsson, Susanna (eds.). *Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe: The Influence of Smaller Powers* (New York 2020).

<sup>192</sup> Laurien Crump, 'Nonproliferation Under Pressure: The Nuclear Debate Within the Warsaw Pact, 1965-1968', in: Popp, Roland, Horovitz, Liviu, and Wenger, Andreas (eds.). *Negotiating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origins of the Nuclear Order* (London 2017), 100-101.

<sup>193</sup> Elena Dragomir, 'The Perceived Threat of Hegemonism in Romania During the Second Détente', *Cold War History*, Vol, 12, No. 1 (February 2012), 111-134, 123.

a foundation on which it enabled itself to stretch its margins for manoeuvre in international politics. The Romanian leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, stepped up to formally mediate the Balkan Conference. There are several reasons why Bucharest fit this task perfectly. First, it was on good terms with both socialist great powers. On the one hand, Romania had been supportive of the Soviet invasion in Hungary and therefore gained political credits from Khrushchev. On the other hand, it managed to preserve a good relationship with Yugoslavia - with whom most Warsaw Pact members were not on good terms.<sup>194</sup> Second, being a relatively small, and therefore non-threatening ally, Bucharest was considered worthy to serve as a mediator for this particular case. Third, Romania already had a good reputation due to its previous small-country cooperation in the region. Already in 1888, it had proposed a plan for a Balkan Federation in 1888, which made Romania a suitable actor to settle this particular dispute.<sup>195</sup>

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union also conflicted with the other major socialist power, the PRC. The main reason for this conflict lied in doctrinal divergences of caused by their different interpretations of Marxism-Leninism. Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinisation and peaceful coexistence contradicted Mao's radical view of socialism and caused a wedge between the two. This led to the Sino-Soviet split, a period during which all political ties were broken. This lasted from 1956-1966. Nevertheless, and tragically ironically, Khrushchev considered the international position of the socialist bloc quite promising. In the autumn of 1959 Khrushchev had a fruitful meeting with American president Dwight. D. Eisenhower after which he believed a disarmament treaty was within reach and 'peaceful' coexistence' with the Americans was possible.<sup>196</sup> This demonstrates that in the late 1950s, the Soviets were predominantly working on their own national image in the international context - within the Socialist Camp, but also worldwide.

Khrushchev's different ideological course and his rapprochement with the United States led to an estrangement from the PRC.<sup>197</sup> The hostility between the two socialist great powers enabled smaller socialist states, such as Romania, to explore their own possible relations with the PRC. Whilst Romania was already acting as a mediator among the socialist great powers on continental Europe, by mediating the Balkan Conference, it was also enhancing its relationship with The PRC. Because the PRC had relatively good ties with Romania, but conflicted interests with Yugoslavia, the PRC pressured Gheorghiu-Dej to break all ties with Tito. Striving to bring the Balkan initiative into practice, the Romanians convinced the Chinese that political ties with Yugoslavia were strategically beneficial, also for the PRC's

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<sup>194</sup> Mavrodin, 'Denuclearisation and Regional Cooperation', 190.

<sup>195</sup> Ibidem, 191-192.

<sup>196</sup> Crump. *The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered: International Relations in Eastern Europe, 1955-1969*, 58.

<sup>197</sup> Ibidem, 58.

sake. Romania therefore managed to secure both Soviet and Chinese support to realise his Balkan initiative, which contributed significantly to its reputation in world politics in the late 1950s.<sup>198</sup>

Whilst Romania had successfully enlarged its margins for manoeuvre on a regional level in the 1950s, it widened its focus to the international political field as of the 1960s. Its first significant contribution to the multilateral level was in 1960. A few years prior, in 1957 and 1959, the Romanians had proposed the so called 'Stoica Plan' or 'Balkan Understanding' to the regional level. The Stoica Plan encompassed the creation of a nuclear-free 'zone of peace' in the Balkans. According to historian Corina Mavrodin, this plan was launched from a position of weakness and obscurity, as Bucharest was still under a lot of Soviet influence at that time.<sup>199</sup> The plan failed twice on a regional level, which led Bucharest to take the proposal up a level and brought it forward during the UN General Assembly on 20 September 1960. Mavrodin argues that the initiative for the Balkan Conference was the ideal opportunity to bring Romania out of obscurity and consolidate its presence on the international level.<sup>200</sup>

During this UN General Assembly, Gheorghiu-Dej was accompanied by Khrushchev. According to Mavrodin, Romania's debut on the world stage can be seen as a carefully orchestrated promotion of the 'peaceful co-existence' campaign made by Moscow.<sup>201</sup> While the Stoica Plan never came into effect, it contributed significantly to Romania's international reputation in the 1960s. Not only did it help Romania to substantially increase its image on the regional level, its debut in world politics provided a perfect opportunity to gain visibility and recognition in international politics and thus further enhance its margins for manoeuvre. Furthermore, Romania could not have picked a better timing to bring the Stoica Plan to the United Nations. It was the first ever proposal concerning regional denuclearisation.<sup>202</sup> Considering the increased arms race, reaching a peak in 1962 with the Cuban Missile Crisis, Bucharest set an example for other similar proposals to be brought to the multilateral negotiation table in the years that followed.

Based on the above, it is evident that in the years prior to the start of the ENDC negotiations Romania had already widened its margins for manoeuvre on the regional level, within the Socialist Camp, but also to a certain extent on the multilateral level. It can be noted that when the ENDC negotiations started in 1961, the Romanians had a head start in comparison to other NNWS. Its reputation and the leverage it had over the Soviet Union would appear to be useful within the negotiations.

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<sup>198</sup> Mavrodin, 'Denuclearisation and Regional Cooperation', 193.

<sup>199</sup> Ibidem, 187.

<sup>200</sup> Ibidem, 187.

<sup>201</sup> Ibidem, 198.

<sup>202</sup> Ibidem, 201.

## Flirting with the enemy

Historians have signalled a change in Romania's foreign policy after its Declaration of Independence in April 1964. Whilst it has been widely argued that Romania became anti-Soviet after 1964, historian Elena Dragomir argues against the depiction of Romania's foreign policy as anti-Soviet. Based on thorough archival research, Dragomir argues that this shift was based on Romania's anti-hegemonic perceptions, rather than anti-Soviet perceptions as such.<sup>203</sup> Regardless of Romania's anti-Soviet course, it is evident that Romania's political strategy did not limit itself to the socialist bloc. According to Romanian historian Eliza Gheorghe, Romania started to move more towards Western States throughout the 1960s. She argues that new archival research has shown how Romania managed to obtain nuclear assistance from the United States and Canada, while continuing cooperation with the Soviet Union.<sup>204</sup> These collaborations are very important to keep in mind throughout this research, as these were established while the same states were trying to reach agreement on nuclear arms reductions through the ENDC.

The West considered Romania's growing importance in the multilateral sphere a threat. As of early 1964, the United States had identified Romania as a country which had the potential to go nuclear. Gheorghe argues that Romania's shift towards the West gained momentum in the second half of the 1960s. This had to do with Romania's increasing ambition to become a nuclear power, or at least keep their nuclear options open. In the 1950s, it already sought for ways to gain knowledge on nuclear technology in order to start building its own nuclear energy plants. Being a satellite state of the Soviet Union, Bucharest first directed itself towards the Soviet superpower. Moscow, however, was hesitant about sharing its findings in nuclear technology with its allies. Based on the idea of 'ideological solidarity', Bucharest managed to persuade Moscow to help it build the foundation for its nuclear programme in 1955 by, among other things, installing a nuclear research reactor just outside of Bucharest.<sup>205</sup> This further fed Romania's ambition to develop a national nuclear weapons programme. For this purpose, Romania remained on good terms with the Soviet Union. In January 1962, Moscow promised to supply Bucharest with nuclear-tipped missiles. However, Moscow changed its mind after the Cuban Missile Crisis, to the aggravation of Bucharest. The Romanians kept pressing the Soviets to supply them with nuclear weapons, but the Soviets held their ground. In fact, they became reluctant to share any nuclear technology with the Romanians. Nevertheless, the Soviets did not break their 1955 nuclear cooperation

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<sup>203</sup> Dragomir, 'The Perceived Threat of Hegemonism in Romania During the Second Détente', 111.

<sup>204</sup> Gheorghe, 'How to Become a Customer: Lessons from the Nuclear Negotiations between the U.S., Canada and Romania in the 1960s', 7.

<sup>205</sup> Gheorghe, 'Atomic Maverick: Romania's Negotiations for Nuclear Technology, 1964–1970', 375.



agreement with the Romanians and kept delivering equipment and technology, although often deliberately delayed.<sup>206</sup>

Moscow's reluctance to share nuclear technology with the Bucharest, pushed the Romanians towards the willing Western counterparts. On 7 September 1966, Romanian leader Nicolae Ceaușescu complained that the Soviets were 'too secretive about things: energy plants, missiles, the A-bomb!'<sup>207</sup> In fact, Ceaușescu openly pointed out to the Soviets that it was entering into negotiations on nuclear technology with other states who did not keep their technology a secret, such as West Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain. At the same time, Western states depicted Romania's interest in nuclear technology as a way to express their independent foreign policy.<sup>208</sup>

Between 1963 and 1968, Romania negotiated on nuclear technology with both East and West powers, without making concrete concessions with any of them. According to Gheorghe, Romania had the ambition to own a natural uranium reactor like the French and Canadians had. This corresponds with Ceaușescu's desire to keep the nuclear option open. The Americans were convinced that Romania was 'different' than other Eastern European states. Considering Romania's expressed desire to enhance relations with the United States, the Americans were positive in making a deal on nuclear technology with the Romanians.<sup>209</sup>

However, Romania's 'shopping around', as the Canadians referred to it, led to confusion among the Western powers. It would be impossible for them to tell what next step would be undertaken by Bucharest. Nevertheless, it did not stop the United States from exploring nuclear technology sharing possibilities with them. On 11 August 1965, American Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who was also a member of the ENDC, took the proposal for a deal with the Romanians to the American government, which responded with hesitation. Not only would this affect private American nuclear firms to cancel a deal with the Romanians, they also feared that it would lead to competition from Western European countries.<sup>210</sup> Furthermore, there was a possibility that Romania would use this nuclear technology to develop their own nuclear weapons, which would be problematic considering the disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation negotiations that took place around the same time.

As Washington did not suspect how contrived the anti-Soviet maverick really was, it continued to negotiate a nuclear cooperation agreement with Romania in the 1960s. The Americans believed that Bucharest could be useful to advance their economic and political interests and therefore eventually decided to do business with them. In November 1968, the United States even committed itself to providing Romania with sensitive nuclear technology,

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<sup>206</sup> Ibidem, 376.

<sup>207</sup> Ibidem, 376

<sup>208</sup> Ibidem, 376.

<sup>209</sup> Ibidem, 397.

<sup>210</sup> Ibidem, 380.

including a nuclear research reactor and training for Romanian nuclear scientists.<sup>211</sup> This demonstrates that even after the NPT was finalised, Romania managed to enhance its nuclear technology ties with the Americans. In fact, when Richard Nixon took over the American presidency in January 1969, the American-Romanian relations intensified. When Nixon's Secretary of State, Mr. Rogers, argued that the NPT enforced the United States to pursue nuclear arms reductions, Nixon rejected this and would continue to increase the incentives and opportunities for nuclear proliferation during its entire administration.<sup>212</sup> This demonstrates that even after the NPT was finalised, Romania managed to enhance its nuclear technology ties with the Americans. This also shows that it had enlarged its significance in international politics.

### **Romania within the ENDC**

As briefly explained in the historical context, Romania was behaving as an exemplary Soviet ally at the initial years of the negotiations. At the same time, Romania was taking a certain mediating role. Literature suggests that the Romanians were pivoting more towards the West in the course of the negotiations. One would assume that after the Soviet Union changed its mind over providing the Romanians with nuclear-tipped missiles, they would also slowly start to distance themselves from the Soviet objectives. However, archival research suggests that Romania was still very much aligning itself with the standpoints of the Soviet Union. As an example, in September 1964, Romanian representative Mr. Dumitrescu emphasises 'the undeniable fact that the Soviet proposals are based specifically on the desire to bring about a rapprochement of the present positions in the interest of peace and international security [which] cannot be said [about the] Western partners.'<sup>213</sup> Although the Romanians had taken a more independent course since April 1964, its loyalty to the Soviet Union and its alignment to the Soviet standpoints is still evident even after that time. This corresponds with Dragomir's theory that Romania's new perceptions were not necessarily anti-Soviet, but rather anti-hegemonic. As an example, the Romanian delegation emphasised its opposition to the NATO plans to create a multilateral sharing scheme in March 1966,<sup>214</sup> which was the most important roadblock for the Soviets during the ENDC negotiations.

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<sup>211</sup> Ibidem, 388.

<sup>212</sup> Francis J. Gavin. *Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age* (New York 2011), 118.

<sup>213</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 213 (3 September 1964), 46 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>214</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 251 (24 March 1966), 15 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

Another interesting observation that becomes evident in the ENDC minutes is the fact that Romania kept referring to the committee's initial objective to realise a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Whilst the objectives of the committee changed from general and complete disarmament to non-proliferation, as explained in the historical context, the Romanian delegation kept referring to this objective until the very last moment of the negotiations. It is highly interesting to note that this shift took place around late 1965, right after the PRC had become a nuclear power. On 26 April 1966, Mr. Dumitrescu complains about the limited progress that has been made and seeks to reconcile everyone's envisioned outcome of the Committee's work:

I think it is unnecessary to recall that after four years of negotiations no progress has been made in this direction. It is obvious that if we had really entered into substantial negotiations on general and complete disarmament, on nuclear disarmament, many problems which now seem to us insoluble would have been solved in accordance with the interests of peace and of real security for all. We are not alone in taking this view, it is shared by many others.<sup>215</sup>

- Mr. Dumitrescu, representative of Romania (26 April 1966)

Mr. Dumitrescu is right about the fact that his view is shared by others. It is noteworthy that it appeared to be especially the non-aligned that resisted this shift of focus and therefore attempted to get everyone in accordance on the Committee's outcome again. The aligned states appear to take a much less persistent stance, which is also demonstrated in the historical context.

According to Crump, the NPT negotiations had a similar effect on the Warsaw Pact as it had on NATO.<sup>216</sup> That is to say, it forced the superpowers to consult their allies on the nuclear question. This seems striking for the Warsaw Pact, as it was usually Moscow making the important decisions for the entire alliance. Several developments, such as the Vietnam War and the European Security Conference, had had an immense emancipatory effect on the Warsaw Pact. It is particularly striking that this emancipatory effect even included nuclear matters. Two Warsaw Pact members appeared to be mostly concerned about the initial negotiations. Poland and East Germany had demonstrated great interest in preventing the MLF from happening and both attempted Khrushchev from agreeing on a treaty that was not strict on nuclear sharing schemes. As East Germany was not a part of the ENDC, it wanted to

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<sup>215</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 259 (26 April 1966), 20 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endsc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>216</sup> Crump, "Nonproliferation Under Pressure": The Nuclear Debate Within the Warsaw Pact, 1965-1968', 109.

raise the matter on a regional level, by means of organising a meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee (PCC). Romania, which feared that that East German leader Walter Ulbricht would use these meetings to pursue his political interest, successfully prevented the PCC from taking place between July 1963 and January 1965.<sup>217</sup>

In January 1965, the Romanians had agreed on a PCC meeting again. This time, however, it took place in a completely different setting. For the first time, a PCC meeting was initiated by a non-Soviet Warsaw Pact member and took place elsewhere than Moscow, namely in Warsaw. This paved the way for the Romanians to host the next two PCC meetings in Bucharest in July 1966 and March 1968, of which the latter focused on the issue of the NPT.<sup>218</sup> At this point, all members were in favour of the NPT, except from Romania which, by that time, had earned the reputation of 'independent maverick'. This reputation went beyond the Socialist camp as Romania had enhanced its relationships with many more, socialist and capitalist, powers throughout the 1960s.

### **A nuclear PRC**

After the PRC became a nuclear power, nuclear non-proliferation became a more pressing topic for both Washington and Moscow. Fearing of a domino-effect of nuclear states, Moscow finally started to take its allies' concerns over the NATO nuclear sharing scheme serious and therefore took a more consistent stance against Washington on this matter. The fact that the Kremlin took nuclear matters more seriously provided a window of opportunity for East Germany, which, together with Poland, was one of the Warsaw Pact members that was most feared by the possibility of a nuclear West Germany. Ulbricht seized this opportunity and linked the discussion on non-proliferation to the MLF.<sup>219</sup>

As the Sino-Soviet relations exacerbated, the Sino-Romanian relations intensified. During a meeting of the deputy foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact in December 1964, the Romanians decided to take a different stance by raising and defending a topic introduced by the PRC that encompassed the general prohibition and total destruction of nuclear arms. By taking this risky stance it demonstrated to the Chinese that it was willing to do them a service - hoping they would do them a favour in return.<sup>220</sup>

The news that the PRC had become a nuclear power in October 1964 became the main topic during the Warsaw Pacts Political Consultative Committee (PCC) meeting in

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<sup>217</sup> Ibidem, 109.

<sup>218</sup> Ibidem, 110.

<sup>219</sup> Crump, 'Nonproliferation Under Pressure: The Nuclear Debate Within the Warsaw Pact, 1965-1968', 102-103.

<sup>220</sup> Crump. *The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered: International Relations in Eastern Europe, 1955-1969*, 175.

January 1965. Right before this meeting, Romania had had an informal meeting with Ulbricht, who wanted to use this meeting as a way to discuss the issue of the MLF. The Romanians warned them they would continue to side with the PRC.<sup>221</sup> Both states were thus on complete opposite ends with regard to nuclear matters at the start of these negotiations, which put Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in a difficult position. While he strongly supported the proposal made by Ulbricht, he hoped to enhance its relationship with the PRC. Romanian leader Gheorghiu-Dej completely ignored Ulbricht's proposal on non-proliferation and praised the PRC for its successful nuclear tests. The Romanian foreign minister Corneliu Manescu, who was also a representative to the ENDC, warned Gheorghiu-Dej that a non-proliferation treaty would lead to a nuclear 'monopoly' of the existing nuclear powers.<sup>222</sup> This statement is particularly interesting as Romania was keeping its options to become a nuclear-armed state open. Romania's opposition of East Germany's proposal was despised by the other Warsaw Pact members and led to a stalemate within the alliance. The PCC meeting also did not lead to an agreement on a non-proliferation treaty. However, during a final meeting of first secretaries, Gheorghiu-Dej agreed to a compromise formulated by the Polish representative Władysław Gomułka that entailed the argument that the MLF meant a form of proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>223</sup>

As mentioned in the historical context, the fact that the PRC successfully launched its first nuclear test in October 1964 gave an impetus to the ENDC members to reach an agreement to at least halt the spread of nuclear weapons. It caused a shift in the ENDC that changed the Committee's focus from general and complete disarmament to non-proliferation. Romania was one of the states that took a very persistent stance against the idea of a Non-Proliferation Treaty and kept referring to the Committee's initial objective. On 17 May 1965, Romanian representative Mr. Dumitrescu emphasised this objective once again, and argued that all socialist countries advocated the 'general prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons.'<sup>224</sup> In this statement, Dumitrescu explicitly refers to the Soviet Union and the PRC. It seems striking that the PRC would be advocating this, as it had launched its first nuclear test just six months before this statement. This raises questions about the Sino-Romanian relations. Was Romania not aware of the PRC's nuclear aspirations, or was this a way to demonstrate its loyalty to the Soviet Union or indicate a sense of 'socialist unity'? As explained before, Romania aimed to build and preserve good relations in all sorts of places, including

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<sup>221</sup> Crump, 'Nonproliferation Under Pressure: The Nuclear Debate Within the Warsaw Pact, 1965-1968', 103.

<sup>222</sup> Ibidem, 104

<sup>223</sup> Ibidem, 104

<sup>224</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 224 (17 August 1965), 23 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endsc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

the PRC and the United States. As the PRC was not a part of the committee, it seems most probable that this claim was used as a way to reaffirm its alliance to the Soviets.

## Vietnam

Whilst the Vietnam War already started in November 1955, the conflict began to escalate in the second half of the 1960s. It goes without saying that the conflict intensified the hostile relationship between the Cold War antagonists. This also had an effect on the states that were involved in the conflict to a lesser extent, such as the NATO and Warsaw Pact allies. Romania was one of the primary supporters of communist North Vietnam and supplied them politically, economically and militarily. At the same time, as explained before in this chapter, the Romanians were enhancing their bilateral relationship with the Americans.

Their relationship with the Americans did not limit itself to economic advantages and nuclear technology. In fact, the Americans decided to bring their relationship up a level by asking them for a diplomatic favour. On 14 October 1965, American representative Dean Rusk approached the Romanians whether they were willing to fulfil a mediating role within the escalating conflict in Vietnam.<sup>225</sup> This was fairly problematic for the Romanians, as they had been providing the North Vietnamese with political, economic and military assistance, which included heavy weaponry. The Romanians knew that the Americans would halt any nuclear technology transfers to states supporting North Vietnam. By becoming a mediator it would not be seen as an ally of North Vietnam. Therefore, Bucharest decided to intervene as a mediator again, this time between the Americans and the Vietnamese. By stepping up for this task, Romania would enhance its relations with the United States, it would also enhance their international status.<sup>226</sup> That Washington appreciated the Romanian mediation derives from the fact that they started to refer to the Romanians as 'packers', named after the American football team the Green Bay Packers.<sup>227</sup> However, whilst being a mediator, the Romanians kept assisting the North Vietnamese economically and militarily. Within a decade, the Romanians managed to expand their international political influence exponentially. Throughout the 1960s, it managed to facilitate between Beijing, Bucharest, Hanoi, Moscow and Washington.

The American-Romanian relationship reached an important peak in April 1968, when American representative Dean Rusk urged the American National Security Council to pass a West-East trade bill, which paved the way for a Romanian nuclear deal. Whilst the Romanians

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<sup>225</sup> Gheorghe, 'Atomic Maverick: Romania's Negotiations for Nuclear Technology, 1964–1970', 380, 381.

<sup>226</sup> *Ibidem*, 382.

<sup>227</sup> *Ibidem*, 386.

continued to support Vietnam economically and militarily, American officials stressed the fact that they were impressed by the way Romania was handling the situation in Vietnam. Nuclear negotiations between the two countries therefore also became more concrete.<sup>228</sup> Although the situation in Vietnam seemed to bring the United States and Romania closer together, it became an important issue within the ENDC negotiations. It was considered a roadblock in the way towards a successful treaty. In July 1966 the Romanian delegation stressed:

[...] it is impossible for us to consider our work and think of the prospects of the discussions without stressing most earnestly and with a full sense of responsibility the negative influence on our Committee of the continuation and escalation of the war which the United States is waging in Vietnam. [...] All United States military forces and other foreign interventionist troops must be withdrawn from South Vietnam [...] [The Romanian Prime Minister wishes to address] our warm message of fraternal solidarity, and to express our admiration for the courage and valour with which they are resisting the aggressors. [...] as long as the United States aggression in Vietnam continues, it is difficult to conceive that real progress can be made in accomplishing the tasks which have been assigned to us.<sup>229</sup>

- Mr. Dumitrescu, representative of Romania (5 July 1966)

At this time, Romania was already fulfilling a mediating role in Vietnam. This statement demonstrates that the Romanian delegation openly protested 'once again against the continuation and intensification of United States aggression in Vietnam.' They argued that 'the Vietnamese people alone have the right to decide the destiny and future of their country.'<sup>230</sup> It goes without saying that Romania could in fact act as a mediator in the conflict at the one end and reject the American military forces in Vietnam at the other. However, it does demonstrate that Romania was not afraid of openly attacking the American aggression in Vietnam on the multilateral level, while it also tried to obtain nuclear technology assistance from them at the same time. It can be seen as a way to demonstrate their loyalty towards the Eastern bloc, and the Soviet Union in particular - which also supported the North Vietnamese.

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<sup>228</sup> Ibidem, 387.

<sup>229</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 270 (5 July 1966), 20-22 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/encd/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>230</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 259 (26 April 1966), 20 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/encd/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

## The conclusion of the NPT

The first observation that must be made is that our negotiations have not led to the adoption of effective disarmament measures. Thanks to the negotiations that have taken place in the recent years it has proved possible to achieve some agreements [...] However [...] those agreements do not affect in the slightest the arms race nor the ever-increasing accumulation of weapons in military arsenals, nor the danger they represent for the Peace of the world.<sup>231</sup>

- Mr. Ecobesco, representative of Romania (20 May 1969)

As the efforts of the committee did not result in its initial objective, namely a treaty on general and complete disarmament, Romania's disappointment does not come as a surprise. On 20 May 1969, almost a year after the NPT was finalised, Mr. Ecobesco once again stressed the fact that the NPT was not a disarmament treaty and therefore did not halt the nuclear arms race. Throughout the entire course of the negotiations, Romania had been actively trying to prevent the creation of a nuclear 'monopoly' of certain states.<sup>232</sup> On 9 April 1968, less than three months before the NPT would be concluded, Brezhnev had given a speech at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in which he argued the following:

It is not necessary here to dwell on other Romanian amendments. It is enough to say that they are in the final account directed at sabotaging the conclusion of the treaty on nuclear non-proliferation. [...] At the Sofia meeting all delegations called upon the Romanians to put forward a coordinated position and to complete the task of concluding the treaty in the nearest future. However, the Romanian comrades refused to coordinate their actions and immediately introduced their amendments to the Eighteen Nations Committee. A situation arose where the Romanian actions threatened to ruin any solution. This would mean that the countries of the Warsaw Pact cannot jointly define a position even on such an important question as nuclear non-proliferation.<sup>233</sup>

- Leonid Brezhnev (9 April 1968)

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<sup>231</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 412 (20 May 1969), 12 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

<sup>232</sup> Gheorghe, 'Atomic Maverick: Romania's Negotiations for Nuclear Technology, 1964–1970', 380.

<sup>233</sup> Wilson Center Digital Archive, Excerpts from Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev's Speech at the April 1968 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/177818.pdf?v=2e21afd43f00caeedb07a5fb76d5501f> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).



Brezhnev refers to the variety of amendments that Romania tried to implement throughout the last meetings before the finalisation of the NPT. This speech demonstrates that Romania was seen as an outsider, an 'independent maverick', within the Warsaw Pact. Months before the finalisation of the NPT, the Soviet Union had been trying to present a common draft treaty together with its allies. However, it was confronted by Romania's strong opposition. Polish representative Władysław Gomułka accused the Romanians of deliberately linking the issue of nuclear non-proliferation to proposals they know would be unacceptable as a way to block the NPT. By opposing the Soviet position, it was able to maintain its image of 'independent maverick', with which it also enabled itself to enhance relations with Western powers as well.<sup>234</sup>

Although Brezhnev's statement implies that Romania was the only opponent of the NPT, ENDC archival material suggests that other Warsaw Pact members were also disappointed in the committee's outcome. As an example, the Czechoslovakian representative Mr. Lahoda expressed 'the conviction of the Czechoslovak delegation that we have not yet exhausted all possibilities as regards, for instance, reaching an agreement on banning the use of nuclear weapons.'<sup>235</sup> This statement is much less radical than that of Romania, but it does demonstrate that the NPT was not seen as the ultimate satisfactory result. Whilst Romania was not in favour of a non-proliferation treaty, it did in fact sign the treaty when it first opened up for signature on 1 July 1968. Just like the Italians, the Romanians turned against the character the treaty came to have by proposing a wide variety of amendments until the very last moment. The changing circumstances, such as the emergence of a nuclear PRC and the escalating conflict in Vietnam, had led the ENDC members to adjust the Committee's objective. An agreement on general and complete disarmament would be too far out of reach. The many roadblocks prevented the ENDC from success. Its members realised time was running out and an agreement had to be reached to prevent a nuclear domino effect. Romania's persistent stance on still reaching agreement on a general and complete disarmament treaty failed and Romania had to accept the Committee's result.

In a conversation between East German leader Ulbricht and Soviet Ambassador Abrassimov to Eastern Germany on 13 February 1968, it becomes clear that Romania took a contradictory stance against the draft treaty presented by the Soviet Union to the ENDC. Romania's rejection of the Soviet draft came as a surprise to the Warsaw Pact members. Ulbricht and Abrassimov argued that prior to the presentation of the draft to the ENDC, Romania had apparently not raised any objections. They also argued that the Romanian stance was in contradiction to the thoughts expressed in the Romanian letter, 'which also

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<sup>234</sup> Gheorghe, 'Atomic Maverick: Romania's Negotiations for Nuclear Technology, 1964–1970', 381.

<sup>235</sup> University of Michigan Digital Library, The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee Transcripts, Session 412 (20 May 1969), 5 <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/endc/> (last accessed on 6 July 2020).

found expression in the Romanian-Italian communiqué.<sup>236</sup> Whilst there is no evidence of an official Romanian-Italian communiqué in 1968, this suggests that the Romanians and Italians had had bilateral discussions on the issues of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Considering the fact that both states were rejecting the NPT, forming a united front by issuing a communiqué against the treaty does not seem unlikely. It implies that NNWS, from both the Eastern and Western bloc were uniting themselves against the treaty that had been suggested by the superpowers. This raises the assumption that NNWS were not only aligning themselves to a far lesser extent to the standpoints of their superpower, they were also actively uniting themselves with other NNWS, regardless of their power bloc.

Romania's rejection of the Soviet draft in February 1968 was not well received by other Warsaw Pact members. On 9 March 1968, Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia published a joint statement in the Soviet newspaper Pravda. In this statement they declared their support for this draft urge the ENDC to approve the Soviet draft on the set date, namely 15 March 1968.<sup>237</sup> Whilst this statement was most probably representing the actual positions of these Warsaw Pact members with regard to the Soviet draft, its publication in Pravda was undoubtedly also meant as a certain exercise in public relations. Nevertheless, it can be seen as a way for the Warsaw Pact members to demonstrate a certain unity in the discussions on nuclear matters.

## Conclusion

During the early years of the ENDC negotiations, Romania acted as a trustworthy Soviet ally. The promises of the Soviet Union to help build Romania's foundation for its nuclear programme in 1955 and to provide Bucharest with nuclear-tipped missiles in January 1962 demonstrates their close alliance and cooperation in the early 1960s. After Moscow changed its mind over the latter promise, Bucharest sought other ways to feed its nuclear ambitions. The United States, which were far more willing than the Soviet Union to share nuclear technology with other states, took over this providing role. Throughout the 1960s, the American-Romanian relations on nuclear technology sharing intensified significantly.

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<sup>236</sup> Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (PHP), Memorandum of Conversation between the East German Head of State (Walter Ulbricht) and the Soviet GDR Ambassador (Pyotr Abrasimov) on the Romanian Proposal to Summon the PCC (13 February 1968), <http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/lory1.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic2d91.html?lng=en&id=18000&navinfo=14465> (last accessed on 16 July 2020).

<sup>237</sup> Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (PHP), Statement Supporting Soviet Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty (9 March 1968), <http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/lory1.ethz.ch/collections/colltopicf26d.html?lng=en&id=17974&navinfo=14465> (last accessed 16 July 2020).

Washington's assurance on nuclear technology provision led Romania to slowly shift away from the Soviet Union. Romania did the Americans a diplomatic favour by mediating in the Vietnam War. At the same time, however, Romania had not given up on its relationship with the Soviet Union entirely, which is reflected in the ENDC minutes in two ways. First, its public rejection of the American aggression in Vietnam implies an impression of socialist unity. It seems probable that the American-Romanian relations were so strong, that statements against American aggression in Vietnam could do no harm. If this special bilateral relationship between Romania and the United States was secretive, in the sense that the Soviet Union did not know about it, no one could guess from these negotiations that a relationship as such existed. However, this view cannot be determined with full certainty. The second example that demonstrates the impression of socialist unity derives from Romania's statement that all socialist states, including the PRC, advocated the 'general prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons.'

Although Romania had a very pro-Soviet stance throughout most of the negotiations, its reputation of independent maverick within the committee cannot be denied. Its surprising contradictory stance against the Soviet Union draft in February 1968 demonstrates its independent and resistant course. Romania was one of the few states that kept advocating the initial objective of the committee, namely a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Whilst the pressing circumstances forced the members to agree on a treaty that prevented a nuclear domino effect as soon as possible, the Romanians disagreed. Their objection had to do with Romania's ambition to become an important actor in international politics. It is reasonable to assume that Romania either wanted to be one of the nuclear-armed states, or wanted to establish a world in which there were no nuclear-armed states anymore. This position could be realised in two ways. The first was the realisation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. This treaty would bring the superpowers on the same level as non-nuclear-armed Romania, which is why the Romanians kept emphasising this objective until the very end of the negotiations. The second option was to become a nuclear-armed state itself. It kept its nuclear options open by 'fraternizing' with the enemy, the United States, which had demonstrated more willingness to provide Romania with information on nuclear technology than the Soviet Union. The fact that the relationship between the United States and Romania in terms of nuclear matters improved even after the conclusion of the NPT, once more confirms Romania's political ambitions. It demonstrates that Romania's political position remained relevant, even when the NPT turned out against their favour. It shows that Romania was able to stretch its margins for manoeuvre in international politics despite the conclusion of the NPT.

For the Romanians, a treaty on Non-Proliferation would restrain them from their ambition to become an important actor in international politics. It halted the further spread of

nuclear weapons and created a nuclear monopoly for certain states. Despite its surprising contradictory stance, Romania did not succeed in preventing the NPT from happening. It is evident that Romania tried to use the ENDC as a way to ensure an equal relationship with the nuclear states and thereby stretch its margins for manoeuvre, but did not succeed as the NPT was concluded anyway.

# Conclusion

This research has demonstrated that small NNWS played an important role in the ENDC negotiations. It has also shown that NNWS tried to use the ENDC as an instrument to enlarge their position in international politics. The concept of margins for manoeuvre, as formulated by historians Crump and Erlandsson, has proved to be useful to investigate the role of small states in multilateral frameworks. However, this research has demonstrated that from a broader perspective, the margins for manoeuvre of small states within the ENDC were limited. In fact, it can be concluded that Italy and Romania both overestimated their capabilities to stretch their margins for manoeuvre. This conclusion is based on two main arguments. First and foremost, the superpowers managed to finalise the NPT despite the resistance of some small states, among which Italy and Romania. This can be linked to the second argument, which is based on the conclusion that in the 1960s, nuclear matters remained dominated by the two superpowers. Despite the enlargement of the negotiation table, by means of the ENDC, the pressing topic of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation remained predominantly controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the ENDC can still be seen as an important multilateral platform on which NNWS were able to present their own initiatives on nuclear matters and criticise other initiatives, with which they were able to influence the final draft of the NPT to a certain extent. This indicates that their role in the negotiations should not be completely underestimated.

At the start of the negotiations, all ENDC members expressed their faith in a successful and prompt treaty on general and complete disarmament, the main objective of the committee. However, a variety of internal and external issues prevented the ENDC from realising its envisioned treaty and forced its members to adjust the objective. Internal issues such as NATO's plan to establish a nuclear sharing scheme with its allies and the fear of a nuclear domino effect dominated the negotiations for a long time. The committee also faced external issues, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, which affected the intra-alliance dynamics and made the quest for disarmament even more pressing.

The fact that the term 'non-proliferation treaty' was first mentioned within the ENDC in August 1965 demonstrates that it was not a product of the ENDC. The plan for this treaty emerged from trilateral negotiations, between the United States, Soviet Union and Great Britain, based on the Irish Resolution of 1961. The archival research conducted in this project has shown that the introduction of the NPT within the ENDC was not well-received by the NNWS, which feared that the NPT would come at the expense of a global disarmament treaty. In the course of time, however, most states started to see the necessity of the NPT. Most of them linked this necessity to the threat of a nuclear PRC. That not all states shared this change

of view became apparent in the case studies on Italy and Romania, which both opposed the NPT until the very end of the negotiations.

Italy had become a fully-fledged NATO member in the post-war years. It pioneered in hosting American nukes, which can be seen as a way of the Italians to increase their margins for manoeuvre in the Western alliance. Furthermore, it aligned with the statements made by the United States throughout most of the negotiations. Their eagerness rooted in NATO's plan to establish a nuclear sharing scheme, which was their most 'acceptable path to the bomb.' It is highly likely that Italy did not have clear nuclear aspirations, whilst it did have all the resources to build a nuclear arsenal. This changed after December 1966, when the Americans terminated their MLF plans. Throughout the first negotiations after this termination, the Italians were rather quiet and did not actively support the proposals and drafts handed in by the United States. In fact, it transformed itself from a fully-fledged NATO member to a certain independent maverick. The Italians had to find other ways to make a treaty appealing for them, as all their initiatives to the ENDC were conceived with the aim to give flexibility to any disarmament measures the ENDC would adopt.

The termination of the MLF triggered the Italians to look for other ways to get access to nuclear technology. The Italian National Committee for Nuclear Energy sped up its nuclear activities around the same time the bilateral relationship with the United States started to crumble. In contrast to Nuti's theory, it seems highly unlikely that this was coincidental. Outside of the ENDC meetings, Italy enhanced its relations with other states with clear nuclear ambitions, such as Japan, India and the Soviet Union. Within the ENDC meetings, Italy adopted a wholly different strategy by continuously implementing amendments and suggestions, to the dismay of the Americans who, at the same time, knew they needed to accommodate certain Italian requests to get them on board on the NPT conclusion. Delaying and opposing the conclusion of the NPT can be seen as Italy's last attempt to have its way. Although it opposed the treaty until the very last voting, Italy did eventually sign the treaty half a year later. This demonstrates the fact that Italy did see the added value of a treaty on non-proliferation. Nevertheless, it kept postponing the actual ratification and continued its efforts of changing the content of the NPT throughout the 1970s.

The case study on Romania also demonstrates clear small state capabilities to stretch margins for manoeuvre in the multilateral framework. Before the establishment of the ENDC, Romania had managed to enhance relations with the Soviet Union, the PRC and Yugoslavia, which were all having increasingly hostile relations with each other. In the late 1950s, it had already had gotten an international reputation of independent maverick. At the start of the negotiations, Romania's strategy encompassed fulfilling the role it was assigned to have, namely a representative of the Warsaw Pact. Considering the Soviet-Romanian bilateral relations in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, during which Moscow helped Romania with

building a foundation for its own nuclear programme, this pro-Soviet stance during the initial negotiations does not come as a surprise. Meanwhile, it also took a certain mediating role within the negotiations. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, Moscow terminated part of its nuclear support to Romania, after which Romania decided to look for other ways to feed its nuclear ambitions. The Americans, who were much more willing in sharing nuclear technology, took over this providing role. This marked the start of intense American-Romanian relations which would continue even after the signing of the NPT. Whilst it slowly shifted away from the Soviet Union, Romania continued to enhance its relations with the United States and the PRC. At some point, Romania would even accommodate an American request to fulfil a mediating role in Vietnam.

Romania not only had clear nuclear ambitions, it also had the ambition to become an important actor in international politics. This position could be realised in two ways. It could either become a NWS itself, or establish a world without any nuclear powers. Becoming a NWS could be established by enhancing relations with nuclear-armed states that were willing to share nuclear technology, such as the United States. A nuclear-free world could be established by realising a treaty on general and complete disarmament. This theory seems very compelling, as archival research demonstrated that Romania kept advocating a general and complete disarmament treaty, although the majority of the committee had adjusted the objective from disarmament to non-proliferation. Furthermore, the fact that Romania was able to stretch its margins for manoeuvre despite the conclusion of the NPT and continued cooperation with the United States demonstrates that its political position remained relevant.

With respect to alliance dynamics, this research has demonstrated that in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, intra-alliance dynamics were heavily affected by disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation negotiations. Washington's termination of the MLF caused friction and opposition within NATO. Moscow's reluctance to share nuclear technology with its allies and its problematic relationship with the other socialist great powers caused tensions between the Warsaw Pact members. The cracks in both power blocs, in combination with external pressure, such as the PRC's nuclear status, paved the way for small NNWS to try to stretch their margins for manoeuvre.

This research has also contributed to the current historiographical debate on nuclear matters in the multilateral negotiation scheme. The majority of present literature considers the Cuban Missile Crisis as the main incentive for states, and the ENDC members in particular, to speed up the negotiations on disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. However, this archival research has demonstrated that the PRC's nuclear status in 1964 formed the real incentive for the committee to adjust its objective and focus on non-proliferation rather than disarmament. This research has therefore demonstrated that the role of the PRC has often been underestimated in historiography on nuclear matters.

This research has demonstrated that whilst the margins for manoeuvre of Italy and Romania were limited, small states played a significant role in the ENDC negotiations. However, this does not mean that the inclusion of small NNWS is favourable for future negotiations. On the one hand, including such states is favourable as it is easier to reach consensus when more states are able to directly contribute to the negotiations. On the other hand, as this research has shown, it has become evident that states have a tendency to pursue their own national political agenda, which affects the negotiations and can delay the negotiation process. Moreover, considering the present-day situation in which Trump has made his opposition against such multilateral negotiation schemes clear by his America First outlook and its withdrawal from the INF, a second ENDC would most probably not even come into being.



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