The making of the Japanese intelligence community. An analysis of different factors in the establishment and development of the Japanese intelligence community: a case study of the Cabinet Intelligence Research Office and the Public Security Intelligence Agency

Abstract

This paper analyses different factors in the establishment and development of the Japanese intelligence community, hereby focussing on the Cabinet Information Research Office (CIRO) and the Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA). It adopts the theoretical framework as proposed by Brad Williams (2013), in which three factors are put forward: (1) alliance politics with the United States, (2) sectionalism and domestic bureaucratic politics and (3) the norm of antimilitarism. By giving a general overview of the establishment and development of the Japanese intelligence community from 1945 to 2018 and analysing the three factors for both the period of establishment (1945-1954) and the period of reforms (1954-2018) of the CIRO and the PSIA, it explores the following question: How can the post-World War II establishment and development of the CIRO and the PSIA be explained? The analysis shows that sectionalism and domestic bureaucratic politics have had the strongest influence on the establishment and development of both the CIRO and the PSIA. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida played a crucial role in the establishment of the two agencies, where sectionalism has been the most important factor in the development. The norm of militarism has had barely any influence on both the establishment and the development of the two agencies. The United States played a major role in the establishment of both, but since the influence is negligible. This paper argues for the exploration of a fourth factor, currently called “responsiveness”. It hopes to add to the writing of the history of postwar Japanese intelligence, as well as to strengthen the theoretical basis for this writing.