


The making of the Japanese intelligence community

An analysis of different factors in the establishment and development of the
Japanese intelligence community: a case study of the Cabinet Intelligence
Research Office and the Public Security Intelligence Agency



Master's Thesis – International Relations in Historical Perspective

Name: Frans Hazeleger

Student number: 3942996 – f.hazeleger@students.uu.nl

Supervisor: prof. dr. Bob van de Graaff

Second assessor: drs. Yuri van Hoef

Utrecht University – Faculty of Humanities

June 14, 2018

Word count: 13,484

Image on front page: The flag of Japan. Source: Wikipedia, "Flag of Japan," last modified Oct. 3, 2011, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flag_of_Japan#/media/File:Flag_of_Japan.svg, accessed on June 12, 2018.

Abstract

This paper analyses different factors in the establishment and development of the Japanese intelligence community, hereby focussing on the Cabinet Information Research Office (CIRO) and the Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA). It adopts the theoretical framework as proposed by Brad Williams (2013), in which three factors are put forward: (1) alliance politics with the United States, (2) sectionalism and domestic bureaucratic politics and (3) the norm of antimilitarism. By giving a general overview of the establishment and development of the Japanese intelligence community from 1945 to 2018 and analysing the three factors for both the period of establishment (1945-1954) and the period of reforms (1954-2018) of the CIRO and the PSIA, it explores the following question: How can the post-World War II establishment and development of the CIRO and the PSIA be explained?

The analysis shows that sectionalism and domestic bureaucratic politics have had the strongest influence on the establishment and development of both the CIRO and the PSIA. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida played a crucial role in the establishment of the two agencies, where sectionalism has been the most important factor in the development. The norm of militarism has had barely any influence on both the establishment and the development of the two agencies. The United States played a major role in the establishment of both, but since the influence is negligible. This paper argues for exploration a fourth factor, currently called “responsiveness”. It hopes to add to the writing of the history of postwar Japanese intelligence, as well as to strengthen the theoretical basis for this writing.

This page is intentionally left blank

The making of the Japanese intelligence community

An analysis of different factors in the establishment and development of the Japanese intelligence community: a case study of the Cabinet Intelligence Research Office and the Public Security Intelligence Agency

Contents

Introduction.....	6
1.1 Problem statement.....	7
1.2 Theoretical framework	8
1.3 Academic Relevance	9
1.4 Sources and Method.....	13
1.5 Conceptual Framework	14
Chapter 1. The history of the Japanese intelligence community, 1945 to 2018	15
Chapter 2. 1945-1954: Establishment	21
3.1 Williams' three completing explanations.....	21
3.1.1 Alliance politics.....	22
3.1.2 Sectionalism and domestic bureaucratic politics.....	22
3.1.3 The norm of antimilitarism	23
3.2 The CIRO and the failure of a JCIA	24
3.2.3 The PSIA	27
Chapter 3. 1954-2018: Development and reforms	33
4.1 The CIRO	34
4.2 The PSIA	40
Conclusion	44
Bibliography.....	47
Appendix.....	53
I: Timeline	53
II: List of acronyms.....	56
III: Organisational charts of Japan's intelligence community.....	58

Introduction

February 21, 2011. While intelligence specialists around the world are still ploughing through hundreds of thousands of classified documents published by WikiLeaks a year earlier, a respectable but relatively unremarkable newspaper, The Sydney Morning Herald, publishes an article titled ‘WikiLeaks unveils Japanese spy agency’.¹ In a cable exclusively leaked to the Australian newspaper, it is suggested that in 2008 a Japanese secret foreign intelligence service had been established, modelled after the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the British Secret Intelligence Service, better known as MI6.² The leaked information seems remarkable at first glance. Not for the fact that Japan has indeed set up such a “spy agency”, but for the fact that the news seems at all noteworthy. Isn’t Japan after all one of the most powerful countries in the world, so would it not be logical for such a power to have a central spy agency?

The real story is a lot more complex. When it comes to security issues, Japan is one of the most widely discussed countries in the world. With tensions rising in the Asia Pacific region due to the increasingly assertive stance of both China and North Korea, Japan’s security policy is under close scrutiny both within Japan and abroad. However, the country finds itself in a special situation, the roots of which can be traced back to the post-World War II occupation of the country by Allied powers. These powers took the task upon them to write a new constitution for Japan, which eventually resulted in what is often called the “peace constitution”. In this constitution (in article 9 to be exact), Japan ‘renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes’.³ It also states that Japan, in order to attain its objectives as a peaceful member of international society, shall never maintain ‘land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential’.⁴ This constitutional prohibition is the reason why Japan has no official armed forces.

However, over the years Japan has nevertheless not only become one of the world’s economic superpowers, it has also been able to build up small but nonetheless formidable armed

¹ Philip Dorling, “WikiLeaks unveils Japanese spy agency,” last modified Feb. 21, 2011, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, <https://www.smh.com.au/technology/wikileaks-unveils-japanese-spy-agency-20110220-1b17a.html>, accessed on March 4, 2018. For an overview of the used abbreviations, see appendix II.

² Dorling, “WikiLeaks unveils Japanese spy agency.”

³ Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “The Constitution of Japan,” last modified Nov. 3, 1946, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html, accessed on Dec. 3, 2017.

⁴ Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, “The Constitution of Japan.”

forces, the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF).⁵ This has been much to the liking of most western countries, especially the United States. The US wants and has long wanted Japan as a more ‘equal’ partner, as at the end of the occupation both countries signed a security and alliance treaty which stated that the US would be largely responsible for the security and defence of Japan. In return, they would be allowed to maintain military bases and station American troops on Japanese soil, which are present until today.⁶ The surrounding Asian nations, however, are eyeing Japan with suspicion because of this military development. The so-called ‘remilitarisation’ of Japan has sparked intense academic debates. While most of the discussion is centred around constitutional revision with regard to the armed forces as a whole, a far less widely discussed but very much connected issue is the Japanese intelligence community.⁷

1.1 Problem statement

As intelligence is naturally closely linked to wider military and security issues, the special situation regarding Japan’s security and constitutional prohibition has had a far-reaching influence on the Japanese intelligence community. Most of the community was established in early 1950s, when Japan regained its independence from the Allied powers. Numerous agencies were established, both self-contained and ministry-embedded.⁸ There have been several ideas and proposals for the establishment of a Japanese CIA to integrate some of these agencies, already starting in the period of the establishment of the community, and going all the way through to today – but to no avail.⁹ Seen from a distance it seems that memories of a Japanese police state and its infamous *Kempeitai* and *Tokkō*, Japan’s military and “thought” police which

⁵ Jeremy Bender, “RANKED: The world’s 20 strongest militaries,” last modified Oct. 3, 2015, <http://www.businessinsider.com/these-are-the-worlds-20-strongest-militaries-ranked-2015-9?international=true&r=US&IR=T>, accessed on March 4, 2018. (Ranked no. 4)

⁶ Glenn D. Hook et al., *Japan’s international relations: politics, economics and security* (New York: Routledge, 2012) 126-127.

⁷ There are different agencies so community or structure seems more fitting.

⁸ Andrew L. Oros, “Japan’s Growing Intelligence Capability,” *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 15 (2002), 4-5.

⁹ The first of these proposals was already put forward in the 1950s when all the agencies were established. This paper will return to this specific proposal later. Source: Brad Williams, “Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency: Alliance Politics, Sectionalism, and Antimilitarism,” *Journal of East Asian Studies* 13 (2013). In 1998 the Cabinet Information and Research Office (CIRO) established a geospatial wing, intended to fuse separate intelligence streams. This wing, however, was completely bypassed. Eight years later, in 2006, a parliamentary committee produced a report in which a new agency was proposed which would be tasked with centralized intelligence analysis. Again little happened, the same goes for a proposal in 2015. Source: Stratfor, “Japan’s Intelligence Reform Inches Forward,” last modified March 2, 2015, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/japans-intelligence-reform-inches-forward>, accessed on March 5, 2018. These reforms and proposals will be further discussed in this paper.

existed until the end of World War II, still linger and make some fearful and sceptical of giving the state extensive intelligence and secrecy capabilities.¹⁰ Next to this the structuring of such an agency remains unclear. Anno 2018 the community is small and fragmented, which according to several authors, has made it ineffective, largely dependent on the US and a “spy haven” for other nations.¹¹

This paper will focus on the fragmented Japanese intelligence community. How is it possible that the community has developed in such an “illogical” way, to the extent that it is seen as ineffective and a treasure trove for other countries? Due to limitations in time and space, the paper will focus on two of the main intelligence agencies in Japan: The *Cabinet Intelligence Research Office* (CIRO) and the *Public Security Intelligence Agency* (PSIA). These two agencies, both established in the early 1950s, are considered as being two of the “three pillars” of the Japanese intelligence community.¹² Many see the CIRO as the Japanese counterpart of the CIA, while the PSIA is seen as the counterpart of the American Federal Bureau of Investigation, better known as the FBI.¹³ Both agencies have a contested history and are still at the centre of discussion nowadays, making the two agencies ideal for investigation. The main aim of this paper will be to explore the following question: **How can the post-World War II establishment and development of the CIRO and the PSIA be explained?**

1.2 Theoretical framework

To be able to answer the research question and to strengthen the analysis, this paper will make use of the framework put forward by the Australian scholar Bradley (Brad) Williams in his 2013 article ‘Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency: Alliance Politics, Sectionalism, and Antimilitarism’.¹⁴ In this article Williams evaluates several explanations for the failure of establishing a Japanese CIA in the 1950s. These three explanations are (1) alliance politics – the role of the US-Japan security alliance and more general the role of US pressure in the Japanese security policy, (2) Sectionalism and domestic bureaucratic politics – the role

¹⁰ In the 1950s, intelligence agencies were seen as “dark, shady and unclean” and as tools of a police state, and more recently thousands took to the streets in protest of a secrecy law which criminalised the leaking of state secrets, calling it a return to pre-war and wartime militarism, using the law against political opponents. Source: 137-164, 53 and Justin McCurry, “Abe defends Japan’s secret law that could jail whistleblowers for 10 years,” last modified on Dec. 10, 2014, *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/10/japan-state-secrets-law-security-dissent>, accessed on April 4, 2018.

¹¹ Oros, “Japan’s Growing Intelligence Capability,” 3-4 and P.Y. Chen, “Japanese leader concedes Japan is a spy haven,” last modified June 22, 1983, *UPI*, <https://www.upi.com/Archives/1983/06/22/Japanese-leader-concedes-Japan-is-a-spy-haven/3393425102400/>, accessed on June 7, 2018.

¹² Oros, “Japan’s Growing Intelligence Capability,” 20.

¹³ Oros, “Japan’s Growing Intelligence Capability,” 5, 8.

¹⁴ Williams, “Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency.”

played by domestic politics, politicians and the influence of the notorious sectionalism within the Japanese bureaucracy, and (3) the norm of antimilitarism – the assumed aversion of everything military embedded in a part of the Japanese public and political establishment. This theoretical framework will be further discussed in chapter 3.

1.3 Academic Relevance

Naturally this paper is not written in a vacuum. While the subject of Japanese post-WWII intelligence is an often overlooked subject in security and intelligence studies, there have been a number of studies. It is important to note here that I have no proficiency in the Japanese language and am therefore limited in the scope of my sources, which are necessarily in English or French. Most (but not all) western authors writing about the Japanese intelligence community are proficient in Japanese so Japanese sources are not totally off limits, but I am limited to following the interpretation of the western authors. Nevertheless I am convinced that a more than sufficient amount of sources were available to be able to write a well-founded paper.

The first English-language studies into post-WWII Japanese intelligence were done in the 1960s. These studies were undertaken by associates of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, a group within the United States CIA. These articles, published in the CIA in-house journal *Studies in Intelligence*, were examinations of the post-WWII Japanese intelligence community and the further employment of Japan's WWII spies.¹⁵ In 1963, Adam Jourdonnais (a pen name¹⁶), in a then-classified article (approved for release in 1994), already examined the origins and functioning of the agencies then in place. He aptly noted that while there were plans for an effective “national intelligence center”, the prospects for this were negative: ‘If the targeting is centripetal, the organizational forces are all centrifugal in Japan’s intelligence complex.’¹⁷ Reasons for this were both historical, psychological and institutional: it was not yet needed because of the US security umbrella, the public sentiment was against it and the institutional tradition was not exactly receptive. However, Jourdonnais noted, would the need arise, Japan would, ‘in its delightfully irrational way’, most likely quickly form a centralized agency.¹⁸ While 55 years later on this has not yet happened, Jourdonnais was sharp in his observation of the forces blocking the establishment of a ‘Japanese CIA’ (JCIA). Several

¹⁵ Adam Jourdonnais, “Intelligence in the New Japan,” *Studies in Intelligence* 7 (1963): 3 and Takemi Miyagi, “Which Way Did They Go?,” *Studies in Intelligence* 11 (1967): 1.

¹⁶ Nicholas Dujmovic, “Fifty Years of Studies in Intelligence,” *Studies in Intelligence* 49 (2005): 4.

¹⁷ Jourdonnais, “Intelligence in the New Japan,” 13.

¹⁸ Jourdonnais, “Intelligence in the New Japan,” 13-14.

other authors have since taken these forces as possible explanations for issues surrounding the intelligence community.¹⁹

The first real, relatively thorough examination of the post-WWII Japanese intelligence community was done by British journalist and former intelligence officer Robert Deacon. In his 1990 book *Kempei Tai: The Japanese Secret Service, Then and Now*, Deacon did exactly what he puts forward in his title: giving an overview of the historical development of Japan's intelligence community.²⁰ However, as specialist in Japanese security issues Andrew L. Oros already noted and as we will see much more often, Deacon's exploration of the post-WWII era is seriously flawed (as, according to Oros, opposed to the pre-WWII and WWII era), and he relied solely on sources written in English (which were spread quite thin). Next to this Deacon was not exactly an undisputed person: Deacon's real name was Donald McCormick, and he was widely suspected of being a fraud because of his unreliable claims, spread of misinformation and outright lying.²¹ It is clear that his arguments should be taken with a (large) pinch of salt, but as it is one of the most important works on the subject and used as basis for many more studies, his arguments need to be considered.

Deacon paid very little attention to security-related intelligence, as he argues Japan had little need for it because of the US security umbrella. The little activity Japan did undertake on foreign intelligence in the sixties and seventies was focussed on the Soviet Union and later on China, and according to Deacon it did quite an admirable job at it (while at the same time being very vulnerable to foreign agents).²² However, the most important intelligence activities were focussed on economic prosperity. Japan had money to spare because of the lack of need of investment in orthodox intelligence, which it decided to spend on economic intelligence.²³ Deacon estimated that around 85 to 90 per cent of Japanese intelligence was directed towards

¹⁹ For instance Brad Williams, assistant professor at the City University of Hong Kong. Williams has researched why a JCIA has not been formed in the 1950s, and largely uses the same explanations as Jourdonnais. As the title of his 2013 article already states, it were, according to him, 'Alliance Politics, Sectionalism, and Antimilitarism' that could possibly stand in the way of progressive initiatives. Source: Williams, "Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency."

²⁰ The book was first published in 1982, then under the title *Kempei Tai: A History of the Japanese Secret Service* (London: Muller, 1982, New York: Beaufort, 1983).

²¹ A whole book has been published about his fraudulent assertions. R. Leeson (ed), *Hayek: A Collaborative Biography. Part 3, Fraud, Fascism and Free Market Religion* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005). Or see Cor Hendriks, "Richard Deacon, master of disinformation," last modified Feb. 2016, <http://robscholtemuseum.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Richard-Deacon-Master-of-Disinformation.pdf>, accessed on April 8, 2018.

²² Richard Deacon, *Kempei Tai: The Japanese Secret Service Then and Now* (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1990) 240-253.

²³ Deacon, *Kempei Tai*, 255.

making Japan a more prosperous nation.²⁴ He was hugely impressed by the Japanese efficiency in worldwide economic intelligence gathering and analysis:

The results of this global probe, which started a few years after the war, have been truly phenomenal. Somewhere in all this there are lessons for both the affluent Western powers, the Soviet bloc and the Third World. Indeed if the Third World copied Japan instead of perpetually taking a begging bowl to Washington, London, Bonn and Paris, they might more easily escape from their self-made poverty. As to the Western World, they, too might look eastwards with profit to themselves and haul in the lesson that, if you want to be prosperous, you need to plan for it.²⁵

It may be clear that Deacon was not exactly the person for nuanced statements, but his argument is clear. While only spending a fraction of what the US invested every year in research and development, Japanese emissaries ‘bought virtually all the technology of the Western World’.²⁶ The explanation for this is quite disputable, namely that economic intelligence was regarded as just as patriotic as military intelligence during the WWII, and that the Japanese are ‘tireless, perpetual-motion observers, quite capable of duplicating the jobs of salesmen or technicians, engineers or academics with those of information gatherers’.²⁷ But, even more important, business and government in Japan were (and are) relatively interconnected: according to Deacon business was government-guided and the two sectors acted as a single group, which gave them both great strength.²⁸ Deacon mentions little to no sources for most of his claims, so much stays speculative. However, his book was frequently cited by others.²⁹

The most extensive work since then is written by James H. Hansen in 1996, called *Japanese Intelligence: The Competitive Edge*. However, the book by Hansen, then a senior official at the American Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) largely suffers from the same flaws as Deacon. He again only cited pre-1993 English publications and his book does thus not reflect an Asian insight in the Japanese community. This is not in small part because of his heavy use of Deacon’s book. Robert D’A. Henderson, the editor of the *CASIS Intelligence Newsletter*,

²⁴ Deacon, *Kempei Tai*, 254.

²⁵ Deacon, *Kempei Tai*, 255.

²⁶ Deacon, *Kempei Tai*, 257.

²⁷ Deacon, *Kempei Tai*, 257-258.

²⁸ Deacon, *Kempei Tai*, 258.

²⁹ For example, both the following authors (Hansen and Faligot) make heavy use of Deacon, but also Peter J. Katzenstein in his book *Cultural Norms and National Security: Policy and Military in Postwar Japan* cites him, on page 36. Source: Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Policy and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

gave the book little credit in a review article, calling it ‘suitable for university libraries and researchers. For a useful current assessment of Japanese intelligence, interested readers should look elsewhere’.³⁰ Indeed, the study is too shallow to really be of use for such an assessment.³¹ Because of the heavy use of Deacon and his source materials, Hansen furthermore focussed primarily on economic intelligence and overlaps therefore quite a bit with Deacon.

A third and final major work on the subject was also still written before the end of the twentieth century, namely by French journalist and Asia specialist Roger Faligot. In his 1997 book *Naisho: Enquête au coeur des services secret japonais* Faligot traced the origin, evolution and structure of virtually all intelligence-related agencies and private companies in Japan up until the time of his writing, and he even looks to the future. In doing this Faligot took more of a journalistic approach than an academic one. Partly because of this there is just a small amount of footnotes, but in the bibliography in the end of the book it becomes clear that Faligot has actually used some Japanese sources (while not very many), and on top of that he is generous with anecdotes recalling his meetings and interviews with several Japanese intelligence officers or other government officials. While it is hard, if not impossible to check the reliability of his account of these alleged meetings, the book is full of useful information, and can act as a journalistic narrative of the Japanese intelligence community.³² The book is in French however, so it will sadly only come useful to people proficient in French.

Since the work of Faligot, little thorough research has been done on the subject. While there have been a number of authors who have researched specific issues, such as the restructuring of the Japanese intelligence community or the North Korean influence on the Japanese intelligence community,³³ most studies have done little more than giving a rudimentary overview of the current community.³⁴ These on the one hand often very specific and on the other hand very general studies have had as a result that there is as of today not yet

³⁰ Robert D’A. Henderson, “Reforming Japanese Intelligence,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 10 (1997): 2, 227-230.

³¹ Henderson, “Reforming Japanese Intelligence,” 227-230.

³² Roger Faligot, *Naisho: Enquête au coeur des services secret japonais* (Paris: La Découverte, 1997).

³³ See, for instance Oros, “Japan’s Growing Intelligence Capability,” Sung-jae Choi, “The North Korean factor in the improvement of Japanese intelligence capability,” *The Pacific Review* 17 (2004): 3 or Yoshiki Kobayashi, “Assessing Reform of the Japanese Intelligence Community,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 28 (2015).

³⁴ See, for example, Ken Kotani, “Current State of Intelligence and Intelligence Issues in Japan,” *The National Institute for Defense Studies News* 100 (2006), Ken Kotani, “Japan,” in *Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies*, eds Robert Dover et al. (Routledge: New York, 2014), Simon Schwenke, “State Intelligence,” in *East Asian Intelligence and Organized Crime*, ed Stephen Blancke (Verlag Dr. Köster: Berlin, 2015) and Hajime Kitaoka, “Japan,” in *PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches, Volume 1: The Americas and Asia*, ed Stuart Farson et al. (Westport/London: Praeger Security International, 2008).

an all-encompassing, well-informed study of the post-World War II Japanese intelligence community. Indeed, in 2002, the aforementioned Andrew L. Oros wrote:

There exists no good study of Japan's postwar foreign intelligence-related activities [FIRA, red.] in either English or Japanese. A handful of empirically driven articles on Japan's economic intelligence activities provide some useful information, but no theoretical framework by which to understand Japan's FIRA is available. [...] While it is premature to write the definitive history of Japan's postwar FIRA, however, it is time to begin the inquiry. Intelligence must no longer remain the "hidden dimension" of international relations, especially not for a rising international relations power such as Japan.³⁵

It is now 2018, and while numerous articles have been written about the Japanese intelligence community, the inquiry Oros spoke of has remained quite superficial, and a definitive history still seems far away. Even Oros himself, in his latest book on Japan's "security renaissance" (2017), still largely overlooks the subject of intelligence.³⁶ The aim of this paper is to fill this academic gap by doing a case study on two of the main agencies of the Japanese intelligence community. Williams has made a useful and thorough first exploration of the subject with his analysis of the failure of establishing a JCIA in the 1950s, but the scope of his research was limited to this case only. His framework can also be used for exploring the actual establishment of certain agencies, for different periods of time. This will be the added value of this paper.

1.4 Sources and Method

To be able to answer the research question, this paper will be divided into three parts. Before any analysis on the Japanese intelligence community can be done it is first important to get a clear picture of this "community": what actually is the Japanese intelligence community? How has this community developed since the end of World War II, and which agencies are part of it? These questions will be answered and this overview will be given in the first chapter, mainly on the basis of secondary literature.

Once the overview is clear and the current situation has been laid out, the second and third chapter will be used to analyse the establishment and the development of the intelligence community, the *why*-question. What has led to the current situation, and who has been in charge

³⁵ Oros, "Japan's Growing Intelligence Capability," 4-19.

³⁶ Andrew L. Oros, *Japan's Security Renaissance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017).

of decision making? Which factors have influenced the establishment and development of the Japanese intelligence community? This will be analysed by means of secondary literature, newspaper articles and primary sources available in English or for translation. To strengthen the analysis, this section will make use of the aforementioned theoretical framework also used by Brad Williams in his article ‘Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency’.³⁷ Also, as previously stated, due to a lack of time and space this paper will not address all major intelligence agencies, but only the Cabinet Intelligence Research Office (CIRO) and the Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA). The second chapter will discuss the establishment of these two agencies, the third chapter will analyse the development. After the analysis the results will be presented in the conclusion.

1.5 Conceptual Framework

Intelligence

As intelligence is a broad subject with numerous definitions and concepts, this paper will make use of the “working concept” of intelligence as put forward by Mark M. Lowenthal in his book *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*:

Intelligence is the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policy makers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities.³⁸

Intelligence community

With the term intelligence community this paper implies the main government and other public agencies and sections of agencies, as well as private agencies, responsible for the gathering, assembling and reporting of intelligence for and to the national government.

³⁷ Williams, “Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency.”

³⁸ Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 5th edition (Los Angeles/London: SAGE, 2012) 9.

Chapter 1. The history of the Japanese intelligence community, 1945 to 2018

When Japan finally surrendered at the end of World War II, it did not just lose the war, but also its sovereignty. The country was occupied by Allied forces, of which the overwhelming majority was of U.S. origin.³⁹ These Occupation authorities swiftly and resolutely quickly disarmed the whole country and dissolved both the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN).⁴⁰ On October 4, 1945, the office of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP⁴¹) issued an order for the removal of certain officials from the Ministry of Home Affairs downwards. This included the Kempeitai and the Tokkō. All secret police and departments that had been concerned with the control of free speech were abolished, and political prisoners were released.⁴² As mentioned before, the Occupation authorities took it upon them to write a new constitution, which was completed in 1946 and adopted a year later. The renunciation of both war and the maintenance of war potential did not stop Japan from rearmament, as both the Korean War and the Russian aggressiveness quickly made the Occupation authorities realize the possible advantage of an armed but controlled Japan.⁴³ In August 1950 a 75,000 strong National Police Reserve (NPR) was established, which was expanded in October 1952 and evolved into the JSDF, Japan's *de facto* armed forces, in July 1954.⁴⁴

Under the original terms laid down by the Occupation authorities, a secret service was tacitly forbidden. However, as the forerunners of the JSDF were eventually established by the Occupation authorities themselves, the terms for a secret service also changed. As journalist Richard Deacon states, 'naturally and logically any Self Defence Forces must have an intelligence-gathering agency'.⁴⁵ It would thus seem logical that with the creation or the independence of the NPR, an intelligence agency was indispensable. This was indeed the case, but the origin of the post-WWII Japanese intelligence community can already be traced to the early stages of the Allied occupation, or even before the war was lost. While the SPAC indeed dismantled all official intelligence networks, it did not signal the complete end of intelligence

³⁹ Sven Saaler, "The military and politics," in *Routledge Handbook of Modern Japanese History*, eds Sven Saaler and Christopher W.A. Szpilman (New York: Routledge, 2018) 191.

⁴⁰ Saaler, Saaler, "The military and politics," 191.

⁴¹ SCAP is generally written without the prefix "the". This paper will follow that spelling.

⁴² Deacon, *Kempei Tai*, 233.

⁴³ Deacon, *Kempei Tai*, 233.

⁴⁴ Deacon, *Kempei Tai*, 233 and Saaler, "The military and politics," 192.

⁴⁵ Deacon, *Kempei Tai*, 233.

in Japan. Seizo Arisue, a staunch right-wing nationalist and chief of the intelligence department at the Imperial General Headquarters (of Japan) during the latest stages of the war, when realising the war would definitely be lost and occupation was thus imminent, began to make plans to resist American forces if the occupation would be extremely harsh.⁴⁶ In September 1945, the month of Japan's surrender, Arisue was eventually secretly enlisted by Major General Charles Willoughby, chief of intelligence (G-2) for the Far East Command, to set up a clandestine intelligence section inside G-2.⁴⁷ Numerous likeminded high-ranking Japanese officials were enlisted for this section, among them Lt. Gen. Torashirō Kawabe, Deputy Chief of Staff of the IJA during the war. While the enlistment of Japanese officers, of whom many were seen as war criminals by their former enemy and occupier might seem odd, the practice of recruiting Japanese personnel was common practice within SCAP (Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces)⁴⁸. These experts could provide information on and an entrance to a country many occupiers were largely unfamiliar with.⁴⁹ However, as can be expected, this system was all but optimal. SCAP had to rely on the information provided by the Japanese officers, but, as historian Michael Petersen writes:

For the Japanese, however, this connection with G-2 provided a smokescreen for high-ranking nationalist and militarist officers to maintain their networks, enhance their standing among the informal intelligence groups, and gain resources for further operations, all while failing to fulfil their duties to G-2.⁵⁰

Despite the inefficiency of the system, G-2 started planning large-scale cooperation and activities in 1948. G-2 came up with operation "Takematsu", for which both domestic and foreign intelligence programs were set up (the "Take" program was focussed on foreign targets, the "Matsu" programme on domestic actors).⁵¹ Kawabe and Arisue were appointed supervisors of the operation, while only a couple of American officers were involved. This led to a largely autonomous Japanese intelligence operation. While the Americans paid for operation

⁴⁶ Michael Petersen, "The Intelligence That Wasn't: CIA Name Files, the U.S. Army, and Intelligence Gathering in Occupied Japan," in *Researching Japanese War Crimes: Introductory Essays*, ed E. Drea et al. (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration for the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, 2006) 199.

⁴⁷ Petersen, "The Intelligence That Wasn't," 200.

⁴⁸ SCAP and GHQ (General Headquarters) are often used interchangeably for the American occupational authorities. SCAP is also the title of General MacArthur, which may lead to some confusion. In this paper I will use SCAP for the occupational authorities and MacArthur's surname when discussing the person.

⁴⁹ Petersen, "The Intelligence That Wasn't," 201.

⁵⁰ Petersen, "The Intelligence That Wasn't," 201.

⁵¹ Petersen, "The Intelligence That Wasn't," 203.

Takematsu and had to give authorisation for specific activities, the Japanese quite easily got their funds and authorisation for whatever activity they undertook. This even led to the funnelling of classified information by the Japanese about G-2 to the Communists in China and to the fabrication of information, incorrect assessments and outright stealing by the Japanese from G-2.⁵² The group around Kawabe and Arisue is therefore sometimes called the “Kawabe Agency”⁵³, and it can be concluded that while under the G-2 umbrella, this Kawabe Agency might be seen as the first Japanese postwar intelligence organisation.

When the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the US-Japan Bilateral Security Treaty were finally signed on September 8, 1951 (they came into effect on April 28, 1952), SCAP was dismantled and with it G-2 and the Kawabe Agency. However, with the independence of Japan some intelligence-gathering agency (to use the words of Deacon) was indeed needed. In fact, in 1952 two agencies were established, one for foreign intelligence (the “Take”) and one for domestic intelligence (the “Matsu”).

The first official intelligence agency to come into existence was the Cabinet Intelligence Research Office (CIRO), originally called the Cabinet Research Chamber (CRC), in April 1952. It started off with only thirty personnel and was modelled after the CIA (which was founded in 1947). The CIRO is directly responsible to the cabinet, and its central tasks are reporting to the Prime Minister regularly (weekly or bi-weekly) about issues of importance, be it international security issues or issues relating to economics or crime, with intelligence gathered from open source information.⁵⁴ Next to this the CIRO is officially the coordinator of the other intelligence agencies, making sure that information is shared and reflected in government policy.⁵⁵ While the CIRO is indeed modelled after the CIA, it is important to note that it cannot be deemed as such. It has since its inception lacked personnel, resources, and most importantly, the authority to deploy agents abroad.⁵⁶ This is an important issue in the discussions revolving around the Japanese intelligence community. The issue will be addressed later in this paper.

The Public Security Intelligence Agency, the PSIA, was established in July of the same year. It can largely be seen as an indirect successor to the Special Investigation Bureau (SIB), which was created on December 17, 1946 to monitor the purging programme by SCAP and the people and organisations it had purged or was planning to purge.⁵⁷ The PSIA was tasked with

⁵² Petersen, “The Intelligence That Wasn't,” 202-207.

⁵³ Schwenke, “State Intelligence,” 159.

⁵⁴ Schwenke, “State Intelligence,” 163-164 and Oros, “Japan’s Growing Intelligence Capability,” 6.

⁵⁵ Oros, “Japan’s Growing Intelligence Capability,” 6.

⁵⁶ Williams, “Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency,” 138.

⁵⁷ Cecil H. Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law of Japan. Its Creation, 1951-1952* (Brill: Leiden and Boston, 2010) 4-5, 58.

domestic issues, especially the monitoring of nationalist and in particular communist groups in Japan. Next to this, it was also in charge of counterintelligence.⁵⁸ It was established as a division of the Ministry of Justice. The PSIA is often compared to the British Security Service (MI5) and the American FBI, but this is again not quite the case. It does not have the authority to force someone to cooperate in investigations.⁵⁹ Historian Ken Kotani states that it seems the case that the PSIA was only really created to act as an enforcement agency of the 1952 Subversive Activities Prevention Act, which was indeed aimed to monitor radical groups and prevent them from criminal activities.⁶⁰

The CIRO and the PSIA together took over the roles of the Kawabe Agency and can be considered the core intelligence agencies throughout the Cold War, but more agencies with intelligence capabilities were established since then, some of which were (or became) actually way more important and powerful (especially than the PSIA). With the installation of the Japan Defense Agency (the predecessor of the Ministry of Defense (MOD), into which it evolved in 2007⁶¹) and the Japan Self-Defense Forces, in July 1954, each branch of the forces (army, navy and air) also received their own intelligence section. This stayed largely unchanged over the course of the Cold War. The intelligence sections of the armed forces were in January 1997 finally joined into one organisation: the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH).⁶² The DIH and its predecessors (the intelligence sectors of the armed forces), together with the CIRO and the PSIA, are known as the “three pillars” of Japan’s intelligence community.⁶³

⁵⁸ Schwenke, “State Intelligence,” 164.

⁵⁹ Kotani, “Japan,” 202.

⁶⁰ Kotani, “Japan,” 202.

⁶¹ Reiji Yoshida, “Defense Agency given ministry status,” last modified Jan.feb 10, 2007, *The Japan Times*, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2007/01/10/national/defense-agency-given-ministry-status/>, accessed on May 2, 2018.

⁶² Oros, “Japan’s Growing Intelligence Capability,” 9.

⁶³ Oros, “Japan’s Growing Intelligence Capability,” 20.




Image 1. Organisational structure of the Japanese intelligence community.

Adapted from: Hajime Kitaoka, "Japan," in *PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches, Volume 1: The Americas and Asia*, ed. Stuart Farson et al. (Westport/London: Praeger Security International 2008) 264.

At the same time as the Japanese Defense Agency and the JSDF, the National Police Agency (NPA) was established, comparable to other police agencies in the world. It is not the case that there were not police forces in Japan until this time, but the 1947 Police Law introduced a largely decentralized police force. This was so ineffective that the law was amended in 1954 and the NPA was called into existence, together with it two intelligence bureaus (The Foreign Affairs Bureau and the Security Bureau).⁶⁴ A part of the mandate of the

⁶⁴ Oros, "Japan's Growing Intelligence Capability," 11 and Ken Kotani, "A Reconstruction of Japanese Intelligence: Issues and Prospects," in *Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere*, eds Philip H.J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson, (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 185.

NPA thus overlaps with that of the PSIA, which has led to some authors questioning the very existence of the PSIA since the end of the Cold War.⁶⁵

Two other parts of the intelligence community need to be addressed. The first one is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). While it is a ministry with a vast scope of activities and responsibilities, it already established an Investigation Department in 1934, tasked with collecting intelligence overseas.⁶⁶ This Department was in 1991 absorbed by and incorporated within the International Intelligence Department and in 1993, when the MOFA went through a reorganisation, it was renamed the Intelligence and Analysis Service (IAS). At the same time the Foreign Policy Bureau was established, which took over from the IAS responsibilities of developing foreign policy and national security strategies.⁶⁷

Last, but certainly not least, is the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI, until 2001 the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, MITI). Many authors do not mention the METI as officially belonging to the Japanese intelligence community and it is indeed not a core intelligence agency, but since its foundation in 1949 it has been one of the most powerful ministries in the Japanese government.⁶⁸ One agency of the METI, the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), is essentially the hub of the METI's intelligence activities and has during the Cold War, when Japan maintained a low profile with regard to international security issues, provided the bulk of intelligence to Japan, especially on the economic level.⁶⁹ Until today, it is still one of the important agencies, as Japan is still an economic powerhouse. To illustrate, in 2002 the METI had about 15,000 employees, roughly 3 times as many as the MOFA.

It is clear that the Japanese intelligence community is large but fragmented. Numerous agencies are tasked with different activities (and sometimes the same), while numerous reorganisations have taken place. This raises the question how and why the community developed into its current state. Which factors influenced the establishment and development?

⁶⁵ Kotani, "Japan," 202

⁶⁶ Kotani, "Japan," 201.

⁶⁷ Kotani, "Japan," 201-202 and Oros, "Japan's Growing Intelligence Capability," 12-13.

⁶⁸ Oros, "Japan's Growing Intelligence Capability," 14. Kotani and Schwenke make no real mention of METI, while Deacon, Faligot and Hansen do.

⁶⁹ Oros, "Japan's Growing Intelligence Capability," 14-16.

Chapter 2. 1945-1954: Establishment

For the sake of clarity, the analysis will be divided up into two parts (chapters). As explained in the previous chapter, the origins of the current Japanese intelligence community can be traced to the end of World War II and the subsequent Allied occupation, with most agencies established in the 1950s. It is therefore logical to start the analysis of the community in this period, which will be done in this chapter

The Cold War, in terms of security, was a relatively quiet period for Japan. Few developments or reforms therefore took place in this period. The 1990s, however, were a period of major transformation, and since then the debates surrounding reform have never really subsided. However, because of the quietness during the Cold War, all the reforms since 1954 and up until 2018 will be addressed together in the next chapter. To structure both chapters and to give the analysis a strong foundation, this paper will use the same three competing explanations as Brad Williams put forward in his 2013 article on the explanation of the failure of establishing a Japanese CIA in the 1950s.

3.1 Williams' three completing explanations

As Andrew L. Oros noted in 2002, a good study of Japan's postwar foreign intelligence related activities did not exist in either English or Japanese, and there was logically also no theoretical framework by which to understand these activities of the Japanese intelligence community as a whole. This is still the case, but as previously stated several studies highlighting different aspects of the community have been done. The theoretical framework is still absent, but Brad Williams, assistant professor of International Relations at City University of Hong Kong, has made the first steps towards this framework in 2013. In his article on explaining the absence of a Japanese CIA in the 1950s, Williams used three competing explanations, all three more often used in the research of international politics. The first explanation was US power resources and influence on the Japanese policy, more simply put alliance politics. The second explanation focussed on domestic bureaucratic politics and sectionalism within the Japanese bureaucracy, and the third is drawn from the school of constructivism, namely the norm of antimilitarism.⁷⁰

Williams states that these three schools of thought have before been applied in several studies of Japan's postwar foreign and security policy, and that they have even been used in Japanese studies of Japan's intelligence system. I am not in the position to check this, but as

⁷⁰ Williams, "Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency," 139-140.

Williams already stated in the footnote is that this author, Terumasa Nakanishi, ‘refers to the three factors as the “trinity” (*sanmi ittai*), but does not offer a substantial explanation of their impact on Japan’s postwar intelligence system’.⁷¹ It therefore seems safe to leave it with that and follow only Williams. Following is a clarification of the three competing explanations.

3.1.1 Alliance politics

An often discussed aspect of the Japanese security policy is the security alliance with the United States. As the US has since the occupation largely been responsible for the security of Japan, it seems fairly straightforward that Japan has closely followed the direction of the US in security issues. Indeed, this is very well documented.⁷² It is therefore quite plausible that the same goes for the Japanese intelligence policy. This first factor will be addressed further in this chapter.

3.1.2 Sectionalism and domestic bureaucratic politics

As has already been laid out in the previous chapters, the Japanese intelligence community is incredibly fragmented, with several ministries and agencies engaged in intelligence related activities. Japanese bureaucracy is notorious for its sectionalism and unclear jurisdictional boundaries.⁷³ Because of this lack of clarity of boundaries, jurisdictional disputes are very frequent. This often leads to the refusal of two or more agencies or bureaucracies to cooperate.⁷⁴ In *Japan’s International Relations*, Glenn. D. Hook explains that the central bureaucracy indeed has a lot of potential influence over policy making (both foreign and domestic), but that this influence is often counteracted by conflicts of interest, both between and within ministries. Next to this it is also inter-jurisdictional disputes, resource limits (both financial and resources) and competition from other political actors that play a role in undermining the influence of the bureaucracy.⁷⁵ Williams of course used sectionalism as a possible explanation of the failure to install a JCIA, but to be able to discuss the configuration of the community as a whole it seems necessary to broaden the scope. This is why domestic bureaucratic politics and the role of several political actors (such as Prime Minister Yoshida) will also be analysed. The role of the

⁷¹ Williams, “Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency,” 158. Williams cites this author as following: Nakanishi, Terumasa. 2010. “Buki naki Senso ‘ no Rekishi to Shinjitsu.” In *Biikoku no Interijensu: “Buki naki Sensii” to Nihon no Mirai*, ed. T. Kano, 30-61. Tokyo: Nihon Bungeisha.

⁷² See, for instance, Michael Penn, *Japan and the War on Terror: Military Force and Political Pressure in the US-Japanese Alliance* (London: I.B. Taurus, 2014) and Michael J. Green, *Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001).

⁷³ Williams, “Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency,” 146.

⁷⁴ Williams, “Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency,” 146.

⁷⁵ Hook et al., *Japan’s international relations*, 41.

bureaucracy and domestic politics and political actors in the development of the Japanese intelligence community is therefore a second factor which will be addressed.

3.1.3 The norm of antimilitarism

A third and final potential explanation draws from the International Relations-theory of constructivism, which focusses mainly on the role of non-material factors (such as norms, ideas and beliefs) and their influence on state behaviour in international relations. Peter Katzenstein, an influential constructivist author with regard to Japan, defines a norm in his book *Cultural Norms & National Security* as:

social facts whose effects are potentially as important in shaping politics as raw power or rational calculation. Norms typically inform how political actors define what they want to accomplish. Norms help coordinate political conflicts (regulative norms), and they shape political conflicts over identity (constitutive norms).

This is very specific, but a norm can basically be defined as the rules and regulations, or in other words the standards of behaviour that groups live by. In this the ‘live by’ is very important, because a norm has to be embedded – or institutionalised – to really be relevant.⁷⁶ Several authors highlight the role of norms on Japanese policy making, especially security policy. Katzenstein (among others) notes that, since the end of World War II, there exists a norm of antimilitarism in Japan, which means that many Japanese have a negative view on the military establishment and the development and deployment of Japanese military power.⁷⁷ This can lead to a restrained security policy and also deeply affect the intelligence community. However, it has barely been used for the Japanese intelligence policy and community (except for of course the study done by Williams, as well as a study by Oros).⁷⁸ This factor will therefore also be addressed. The establishment of the CIRO and the PSIA will now be analysed first.

⁷⁶ *Sociology Guide*, “Social Norms,” <http://www.sociologyguide.com/basic-concepts/Social-Norms.php>, accessed on May 18, 2018.

⁷⁷ Williams, “Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency,” 151 and Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security*, 20, Stratfor, “Japan’s Intelligence Reform Inches Forward.”

⁷⁸ Andrew L. Oros, *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008). Chapter 5 discusses the subject.

3.2 The CIRO and the failure of a JCIA

The CIRO, Japan's first and arguably its most important postwar intelligence agency, must naturally be addressed first. Its history starts with the Kawabe agency and the US. Especially in the period of the occupation and its aftermath, it is clear that the UD had a lot of influence on the Japanese security policy and plausibly also the intelligence community. This is obvious for the occupation. As noted in the historical overview, the Kawabe agency was established by and more or less within the American G-2.⁷⁹ However, G-2 was of course no official intelligence agency and as the occupation was coming to an end, both the Japanese and the Americans were positive towards the establishment of something formal. For the Japanese the end of the occupation meant a newly rebuilt and above all independent military establishment, for which some kind of intelligence gathering capabilities were naturally required.⁸⁰ For the Americans the end of the occupation would also mean the end of G-2 and the Kawabe agency, which would mean that with no alternative there would be no partner for the American CIA.⁸¹ To this end both countries started negotiating the future of the Japanese intelligence community.

The first meetings were held in January 1952, four months after the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and three months before the restoration of Japanese sovereignty. Charles Willoughby dispatched two G-2 members to the office of the Japanese Prime Minister, Shigeru Yoshida, to ask Yoshida about his idea for a post-independence intelligence agency in Japan. Yoshida referred them to Taketora Ogata, a long-time ally of the Prime Minister and former director of the Cabinet Information Bureau (CIB, an intelligence and propaganda agency during the war).⁸² Ogata was explained by them how different Western intelligence agencies were structured and how they functioned (including the British MI5, MI6 and of course the American CIA).⁸³ Ogata was also suggested to place the suggested organisation under the authority of the Prime Minister and to appoint the former secretary of Yoshida, Jun Murai, as the head of this organisation. Promptly, three months later, the CRC (the Cabinet Research Chamber, the predecessor of the Cabinet Intelligence Research Office, CIRO) was set up exactly according to these suggestions.⁸⁴

This seems to indicate that the US have played a large role in the establishment of the CRC. Their direct influence was twofold. First, while they gained very little from it, but helped

⁷⁹ Petersen, "The Intelligence That Wasn't," 201.

⁸⁰ Williams, "Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency," 143

⁸¹ Williams, "Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency," 143.

⁸² Barak Kushner, "Japan's war of words: World War II propaganda", in *Routledge Handbook of Modern Japanese History*, eds Sven Saaler and Christopher W.A. Szpilman (New York: Routledge, 2018) 258.

⁸³ Williams, "Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency," 144.

⁸⁴ Williams, "Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency," 144.

establish the Kawabe group within G-2, and second, they provided information which helped the establishment of the CRC (and even aided Ogata in his failed plan to establish a JCIA).⁸⁵ Williams goes further in his article to claim that alliance politics had little influence on the failure of the establishment of a JCIA, but that is not the subject of this study. It is clear however that the US *did* play a large role in the establishment and structuring of the CRC, the predecessor of the CIRO.

In his article, Williams further looks to domestic factors to explain the absence of a JCIA, of which sectionalism is an important one. When one sees the fragmented intelligence community it is easy to flip the argument on its head; as sectionalism seems to be able to (at least to some extent) explain the absence of a JCIA, it can quite easily also be used to explain the existence of a fragmented community. Before we do this, let us first return to Williams' argument.

In postwar Japan numerous high-placed officials were actively working on the establishment of a JCIA and a new community in general. As Williams states, 'The story of Japan's early postwar intelligence history is very much about the exercise of personal executive leadership to influence the institution-building process at an important historical juncture'.⁸⁶ The aforementioned Prime Minister Yoshida was one of these officials. Yoshida believed that an effective intelligence organisation would be of vital importance for effective international diplomacy.⁸⁷ It is therefore often said that the whole idea of establishing a Japanese CIA was originally Yoshida's.⁸⁸ Yoshida and Ogata, who was Yoshida's and a stark proponent of a JCIA as well, were nevertheless very much aware of the negative side of sectionalism and did their best to overcome these problems. When Ogata was elected to the House of Representatives he in November 1952 announced a proposal to establish a JCIA, in which he proposed (among other things) that this new agency would collect and analyse secret information regarding the Japan Communist Party separately from the then just established NPA and the PSIA, but also collect and analyse overseas information.⁸⁹ This implicates two things. First, the JCIA would exist next to the domestically operating NPA and the PSIA but would operate on the same turf, making it unclear what exactly would be the role of each respective agency, the new one included. Second, it would also handle overseas information, thereby doing pretty much the same as the CRC and the MOFA, creating even more tension.

⁸⁵ Williams, "Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency," 144

⁸⁶ Williams, "Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency," 147.

⁸⁷ Williams, "Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency," 147.

⁸⁸ Williams, "Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency," 147.

⁸⁹ Williams, "Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency," 148-149.

The proposal met with a lot of criticism in Japan, reportedly because of the fear of many (former) government officials that Ogata would become too powerful, as well as the fear of existing intelligence agencies that they would become less relevant.⁹⁰ Ogata therefore revised his proposal and dropped the idea of a JCIA, leaving it with a minor expansion of the capabilities of the CRC.⁹¹ Different Japanese authors even argue that the MOFA, all too wary of a loss of influence if Yoshida, Ogata and Murai would stay in charge of the structuring of the Japanese intelligence community, in 1953 staged a “coup” to prevent this. This was done by revealing details of a sensitive trip by CRC director Murai to the US and the UK to MI6, which led to Murai being detained in the UK. Here it was discovered he had \$3,000 in undeclared currency on him, eventually leading to his downfall.⁹² A year later Yoshida fell from power and two years later Ogata died, which effectively helped killing the plans for a JCIA.⁹³ Ogata’s plans for even a minor expansion of capabilities was not taken up.⁹⁴

It is clear that sectionalism and domestic bureaucratic politics have played a huge role in both the establishment of the CRC/CIRO and the failure of establishing a JCIA. Yoshida, Ogata and Murai had, largely in coordination with the US been at the centre of the postwar configuration of a CIA-inspired intelligence agency. The JCIA did not come off, but the CRC was largely a product of the active work of a couple of Japanese proponents.

As noted before, numerous authors apply constructivist theory and the norm of antimilitarism on Japan and the Japanese security policy. With the shattering defeat in World War II, the whole military establishment was dissolved and it was secured in the constitution that such an establishment would never again arise in the country (which makes this clause of the constitution fairly unique in the world until today), which, according to these authors, has led to an aversion of all things military and military related, including secret intelligence.⁹⁵ Indeed, as Deacon writes and Hansen cites, ‘The days of buccaneering espionage, of cloak-and-dagger activities around the world and secret societies plotting new empires were ended in Japan’s new constitution’.⁹⁶

Nevertheless, to consolidate antimilitarism in the constitution is one thing, but antimilitarism has first to be embedded in society to really be of importance. This has indeed

⁹⁰ Williams, “Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency,” 149.

⁹¹ Williams, “Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency,” 149.

⁹² Williams, “Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency,” 150.

⁹³ Williams, “Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency,” 151.

⁹⁴ Kitaoka, “Japan,” 267.

⁹⁵ See, for instance, Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security* and Thomas U. Berger, “Norms, Identity and National Security in Germany and Japan,” in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

⁹⁶ Deacon, *Kempei Tai*, 254-255 and Hansen, *Japanese Intelligence*, 35.

been the case, as in the 1950s intelligence was viewed commonly as ‘dark, shady and unclean’.⁹⁷ On the political left and in many media outlets the possible revival of a strong intelligence apparatus was also met with a lot of wariness and criticism, as a certain ‘intelligence phobia’ had taken hold.⁹⁸ Williams is not constantly very strong in his analysis on this front. The argumentation of his claim is quite thin (he focusses for instance on the difficult relationship of Ogata with the media and the public,⁹⁹ but the norm of antimilitarism certainly seems to have had an effect in the shaping of how many actors in Japan viewed (and view) intelligence, and thus also on the failure of the instalment of a JCIA. This means that antimilitarism also had a lasting influence on the CRC and the CIRO, as the CIRO’s structure and responsibilities were to a certain extent influenced and restrained by the intelligence phobia. Nevertheless, the CIRO was eventually established so it can also be argued that antimilitarism in the end has had considerably less influence on the CIRO than the advocacy by domestic political actors and also very much the help of the US.

3.2.3 The PSIA

For the analysis of the inception of the Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA), by many now considered the most defunct agency of the Japanese intelligence community, one must start with the Subversive Activities Prevention Law (SAPL) of 1952, for the PSIA was established to enforce this law (the setup and functioning of the PSIA is one of the main topics of the SAPL).¹⁰⁰ The drafting and passing of the law and thus the inception of the PSIA was an extremely rocky road, in which different factors played an important role. Alliance politics and the role of the US was certainly one of them.

The history of the conception of the SAPL is in many ways intertwined with the history of the early Cold War. After World War II the Japanese military establishment was completely disbanded, leaving the country relatively vulnerable for external and internal threats (of course the Allied forces occupied the country, taking care of external security). In the first couple of years after the end of the war there was little to fear, but when the threat of the Communist Soviet Union grew in the second half of the 1940s, in 1949 Mao Zedong declared the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (the PRC) and a year later the Korean War

⁹⁷ As cited by Williams, “Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency,” 153.

⁹⁸ Williams, “Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency,” 155-157.

⁹⁹ Williams, “Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency,” 157.

¹⁰⁰ For an English text of the law, see: Japanese Law Translation, “Subversive Activities Prevention Act,” last modified Sept. 8, 2011, <http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=1982&vm=2&re=02>, accessed on May 24, 2018.

started, the threat of Communism in the direct sphere of Japan became real.¹⁰¹ Early on the American forces stationed in Japan were able to handle both the internal and external threats, but as many of these troops were relocated to Korea, any internal threat could soon escalate and become unmanageable by the then just set-up National Police Reserve (NPR).

Japan was (and is) home to one of the largest non-governing communist parties in the world: the Japanese Communist Party (JCP).¹⁰² With the end of the militarist establishment in 1945 and the advent of a new democratic era in Japan, all political parties were legalised – so was the JCP.¹⁰³ The party, as well as other communist actors (e.g. labour unions) was soon seen as a threat to SCAP and the internal security of Japan and as it was clear that the occupation was coming to an end, a new internal security law was seen as necessary by both SCAP and the conservatives in Japan. Therefore on July 22, 1948 SCAP instructed the then Prime Minister Hitoshi Ashida to ban the right of government workers to strike, which later evolved into a general strike ban.¹⁰⁴ Two years later, in June 1950 (just before the start of the Korean War), SCAP instructed Yoshida to purge the leadership of the JCP, which was then also extended to the private sector. This resulted into the purging of in total 22,000 alleged left-wing employees from the public and private sector combined (this is known as the “red purge”).¹⁰⁵ Between 1945 and 1948 SCAP had already organised a “white purge”, in which 210,000 members of the military and other related, ultranationalist organisations were banned from public life.¹⁰⁶

However, while the purge of certain individuals was possible under the occupation, the banning of the JCP would be deemed unlawful under the 1947 Constitution, and was thus a huge problem. In March 1950 Prime Minister Yoshida discussed the topic with MacArthur, where he sought advice on how the JCP could be dissolved under the then existing ordinances.¹⁰⁷ MacArthur discouraged this suggestion, for if SCAP would give the Japanese the green light to go in with this approach, SCAP would be held responsible for this unconstitutional decision. SCAP held supra-constitutional authorities, meaning it was the only organisation able to give the Japanese government the power to implement such measures under the existing ordinances. However, as SCAP had written the new constitution and imposed it on

¹⁰¹ Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law of Japan*, 19-20.

¹⁰² Japanese Communist Party, “What is the JCP? A Profile of the Japanese Communist Party,” last modified July 2016, http://www.jcp.or.jp/english/2011what_jcp.html, accessed on May 24, 2018.

¹⁰³ John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat. Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company/The New Press, 1999) 81 and Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law of Japan*, xiii.

¹⁰⁴ Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law of Japan*, 12.

¹⁰⁵ Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law of Japan*, 12-14.

¹⁰⁶ Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law of Japan*, 4

¹⁰⁷ Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law of Japan*, 23.

the Japanese people, going against the constitution itself was deemed unwise.¹⁰⁸ In the early stages of the occupation SCAP had no problems with issuing orders to the Japanese government, but they became more and more reluctant of this practice as the occupation was drawing to an end. This was not in the last place because most Japanese ordinances derived by SCAP would cease to be effective with the coming into force of the Peace Treaty, leaving the country where it was before the laws.¹⁰⁹ They therefore argued that the Japanese government should have the supreme authority over the matter.

In August 1950, after the outbreak of the Korean War, the Legal Section of SCAP nevertheless drafted a long memo titled: 'Draft for the Essentials of a bill outlawing the Japan Communist Party and other organizations' (the so-called Oppler Memo).¹¹⁰ It was originally conceived as an internal draft by which to check the legal basis of any proposals for the banning of the JCP by the Japanese government ('to work out the essentials of a draft bill with the purpose of having standards available for comparison and checking in case the Japanese Government submits legislation on this subject [of banning the JCP]').¹¹¹ However, it kickstarted the drafting of an internal security bill within the Japanese government, which eventually led to the SAPL and the establishment of the PSIA. The draft of the law was eventually written by the Japanese (as wished by SCAP), but as the draft was completed just before the regaining of independence on April 28, 1952, SCAP still had to approve the draft.¹¹² SCAP did so, as there was no alternative. Had SCAP disapproved the draft, it would have been extremely sensitive for both SCAP and the Japanese government, as SCAP was still the supraconstitutional power but had by that time taken the role an advisor instead of an imposer. Moreover, disapproval would have given the actors in opposition of the SAPL a lot of ammunition against the law. This could not happen, as an independent Japan without a strong internal security law (a new draft would again take a long time) would be very vulnerable. After all, the communists and other possible dangerous actors had been purged but were still on the fringes. This would be costly and threatening for both Japan and the US, which at the time of independence would directly also immediately become an ally.¹¹³ The ultimate text of the law was naturally not directly targeted at the JCP and other communist actors, but against any 'Organization which has committed a Terroristic Subversive Activity as an Organizational

¹⁰⁸ Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law of Japan*, 23

¹⁰⁹ Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law of Japan*, 24.

¹¹⁰ Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law of Japan*, 25.

¹¹¹ Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law of Japan*, 26.

¹¹² Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law of Japan*, 207-208.

¹¹³ Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law of Japan*, 386.

activity'.¹¹⁴ This gave the PSIA the mandate to monitor any extremist or otherwise suspected organisation. Eventually the law was, after much debate, accepted by both houses on July 21, 1952, which immediately became the foundation day of the PSIA.

It is clear that the US has played an ambiguous but important role in the creation of the SAPL and thus the PSIA. SCAP was no supporter of using pre-SAPL ordinances to ban the JCP, but it had before that already organised the red purge (and a white purge). Hence, while SCAP was indeed against extreme left- and right-wing groups and individuals, it still wanted to give the Japanese government the ultimate control over the drafting of such laws and ordinances as the occupation was nearing its final stage. The Oppler Memo kickstarted Japanese initiatives to draft the SAPL law, but at the same time the US did not want to be at the centre stage of much criticism. It approved the SAPL law. However, it simply could not have disapproved the law, even if it wanted to. It can be concluded that the US was very important for the conception of the “idea” of the PSIA, but arguably not crucial.

Indeed, it seems le domestic bureaucratic politics may have played just as an important role. Prime Minister Yoshida, in particular, was the main adversary of communism in Japan and the main proponent of the SAPL law and the conception of the PSIA. As Cecil H. Uyehara, a former official of the US department of State, writes:

Yoshida's distaste and abhorrence of the communists was so deeply ingrained in his personality, philosophy and ideological approach that it overcame his own experience of being arrested by the police toward the end of the war under the aegis of the prewar Peace Preservation Law which had gradually broadened in its interpretation of coverage. This antipathy was so deep that he was willing to ban the JCP as an organization even though the guarantee of various freedoms was clearly and unequivocally enshrined in the Constitution.¹¹⁵

This was not just the view of Uyehara, but of Yoshida as well. In his autobiography, Yoshida dedicates two chapters to the labour unions and the communists, of which one is even titled ‘The Communists as a Destructive Force’.¹¹⁶ As noted earlier, in 1950 Yoshida already discussed the topic of banning the JCP with MacArthur, looking for possibilities of a ban under the then-existing ordinances. In his autobiography, and while the title of the concerning chapter

¹¹⁴ Japanese Law Translation, “Subversive Activities Prevention Act.”

¹¹⁵ Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law of Japan*, 26-27.

¹¹⁶ Shigeru Yoshida, *Yoshida Shigeru. Last Meiji Man* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: Lanham, 2007). Chapter 23 discusses the subject.

is called as such, Yoshida himself largely washes his hands clean by stating throughout the chapter that it was mainly SCAP which ordered and suggested the banning and purges of the JCP and other communist actors.¹¹⁷ However, Uyehara also stated that Yoshida reprimanded the Attorney General for not pursuing the banning of the JCP vigorously enough.¹¹⁸ Next to this, it is often stated that Cabinet officials made repeated inquiries into possibilities to be able to ban the JCP, either through existing ordinances or through new laws.¹¹⁹ The same view is put forward in other sources. Indeed, in the Japanese memoirs of Yoshida a whole subsection is devoted to the enactment of the SAPL law. In this subsection, Yoshida argues that the ‘enactment of a “permanent law” for internal security [the SAPL, red.] was of “parallel importance” to the Peace Treaty’.¹²⁰ Furthermore, in the authorised history of the Yoshida Cabinets, it is stated that:

The surface or outward legislative reason or rationale [...] was to prevent anti-democratic destructive activities whether from the right or the left wings, but in reality [...] the main objective was to counter the Japan Communist Party and communistic political forces. From the point of the view of the Yoshida Cabinet which took a cautious attitude toward the idea of making the JCP illegal, the SAPL was an important lever in managing the Cabinet’s anti-Communist measures, and should be regarded as the breakwater against a violent Communist revolution.¹²¹

It is indeed clear that while the US played an important (sometimes by ordering, sometimes by advising) role in the creation of the SAPL, it was really the Yoshida Cabinet and specifically Yoshida himself who worked so hard to come up with a law to ban the JCP and other subversive actors. Sectionalism was not exactly an issue. Instead, domestic bureaucratic politics proved to be crucial.

The last possible factor is the norm of antimilitarism. Antimilitarist norms were, as is clear, not sufficiently institutionalised or not even relevant enough to be able to block the establishment of the PSIA. However, the opposition was fierce. Numerous opponents, politicians as well as media outlets, compared the law to the prewar Peace Preservation Law, which was indiscriminately used to indict extremists and innocents alike, and more general to

¹¹⁷ See Yoshida, *Yoshida Shigeru. Last Meiji Man*, chapter 23.

¹¹⁸ Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law of Japan*, 23-24.

¹¹⁹ Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law of Japan*, 23-24.

¹²⁰ Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law of Japan*, xii.

¹²¹ As cited in Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law of Japan*, xii. The Japanese source is: *Yoshida Naikaku*, Yoshida Naikaku Kankōkai. 1954, 484.

the Tokkō, the prewar secret police system.¹²² This opposition was fierce, as it is argued that the SAPL law because of this opposition underwent no less than 23 revision and four name changes before eventually being submitted to the *Diet* (the Japanese parliament).¹²³ Of course not all revisions were because of antimilitarist sentiment, but it is clear that antimilitarism already played a role in this early postwar period. It was relatively minor, but it already placed a check on any possibility of an unrestrained law.

¹²² Uyehara, *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law of Japan*, 49-50.

¹²³ John W. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath. Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979) 367.

Chapter 3. 1954-2018: Development and reforms

Cold War stability

The Cold War was, as far as security matters are concerned, a very quiet time for Japan. The country had regained its independence, had established the necessary intelligence agencies and could for its external security for a large part rely on the US.¹²⁴ Discussions regarding reform were largely absent. Japan's intelligence community and with it the CIRO and the PSIA were by all means active. During the Cold War, the PSIA had fourteen domestic subjects under its surveillance, among which the JCP and several right-wing and foreign interest groups.¹²⁵ Next to this it published reports on communist nations and it was responsible for counterintelligence, making it a useful agency during the period.¹²⁶

The CRC/CIRO, however, was controversial from the onset – partially because of the nature and structure of the organisation itself. The CIRO was tasked with collecting open source information and coordinating the efforts of the other agencies, but sectionalism made this incredibly difficult. The CIRO had no authority to force the MOFA, the MOD and the NPA to share their information, which led to the withholding of CIRO of much what could be regarded as relevant.¹²⁷ Next to this, the staffing of the CIRO was quite simply put incredibly counteracting to its purpose, as with all the sectionalism the CIRO has around half of its staff “on loan” from other agencies, with a quarter of the total employees *and* the head of the CIRO coming from the NPA. This resulted in what some depict as the “colonisation” of the CIRO by the NPA and in minor part by other agencies.¹²⁸ A third factor was the lack of funds and staff: the CIRO could simply not play a role of importance with the means it received.¹²⁹ These factors made it hard for the CIRO to function properly during the Cold War – but neither was that really perceived as necessary.¹³⁰

Reforms

Finally, as the Cold War was drawing to an end in the late 1980s, policy makers in Tokyo realised that something had to change. Japan was regaining somewhat of a profile on the

¹²⁴ Schwenke, “State Intelligence,” 159.

¹²⁵ Oros, “Japan’s Growing Intelligence Capability,” 8.

¹²⁶ Oros, “Japan’s Growing Intelligence Capability,” 8.

¹²⁷ Kotani, “Japan,” 205.

¹²⁸ Oros, “Japan’s Growing Intelligence Capability,” 6 and Schwenke, “State Intelligence,” 164.

¹²⁹ Kotani, “Japan,” 203.

¹³⁰ Kotani, “Japan,” 203.

international stage and had become the second economy in the world¹³¹, but its security (and intelligence) apparatus was still lacking. This was not to the liking of both the US and conservative politicians in Japan, which eventually led to discussions surrounding reforms.¹³² Additionally, several national emergencies hit Japan in the 1990s, such as the Kōbe earthquake (also called the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake) on January 16, 1995, the Tokyo subway sarin attack by the sect Aum Shinrikyo on March 20, 1995 the Japanese embassy hostage crisis in Lima, Peru from December 1996 to April 1997 and the Firing of a North Korean ballistic missile over Japan in August 1998.¹³³ The CIRO and the PSIA will be discussed separately, as in the previous section.

4.1 The CIRO

The first small reform that has to be mentioned did actually not take place at the end of the Cold War, but already in 1957. In this year the Prime Minister's Office was reorganized and the CRC put under the jurisdiction of the Cabinet Secretariat, changing its name into the Cabinet Research Office (CRO) This did nevertheless mean nothing for the responsibilities of the agency.¹³⁴

First phase

While the malfunctioning of the CRO due to sectionalist tendencies of other intelligence agencies was just a minor problem during the earlier Cold War, it became a larger problem in the later stages of it. To overcome this problem, the Japanese turned their eye to the United Kingdom. In 1936 the UK had installed a Joint Intelligence Committee, composed of high-ranking government officials, both of the intelligence community and other agencies. It is charged with the coordination, assessment and dissemination of intelligence.¹³⁵ The Japanese adopted this system, leading to the creation of a Japanese Joint Intelligence Council (JIC) in 1986. It is chaired by the director-general of the CIRO, further composed of the directors-

¹³¹ *The World Bank*, "GDP (Current US\$)," <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>, accessed on June 7, 2018.

¹³² Akihito Tanaka and Masayuki Tadakoro, "The 1980s: The Decade of Neoliberalism," in *The History of US-Japan Relations: From Perry to the Present*, eds Makoto Iokibe and Tosh Minohara (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017) 199-201.

¹³³ Oros, "Japan's Growing Intelligence Capability," 6, Kitaoka, "Japan," 272-273, Kotani "Japan", 203-204 and Yuki Tatsumi, *Japan's National Security Policy Infrastructure. Can Tokyo Meet Washington's Expectation?* (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2008) 116.

¹³⁴ Tatsumi, *Japan's National Security Policy Infrastructure*, 113.

¹³⁵ *Security Service MI5*, "National Intelligence Machinery," <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/national-intelligence-machinery>, accessed on June 6, 2018.

general of the NPA, the JDA (since 2007 the MOD), the PSIA, the MOFA, the Cabinet Security Affairs Office and the deputy secretary of the Cabinet Secretariat.¹³⁶ The goal of this committee, meeting bi-monthly, is to ease the intelligence coordination and sharing effort (essentially taking over a part of the role of the CRO). In the same year the CRO was also officially finally renamed to the CIRO.¹³⁷

The JIC did not come close to functioning as its British counterpart, nor did it meet any of the other expectations. Again, sectionalism was one of the main obstacles. There was still no obligation to share information, which again lead to the withholding of information, as well as the bypassing of the JIC/CIRO, with the responsible agencies preferring to send their intelligence directly to the secretariat of the Prime Minister.¹³⁸ Indeed, Yoshio Omori, director of the CIRO in the early 1990s, stated that he never received any intelligence by either the MOFA or the MOD.¹³⁹ Next to this, the JIC was severely lacking in means: it had no permanent residence, almost no supporting staff and it did not produce any written intelligence assessments for the preparation of committee meetings or after these meetings, leading to more of a talking group than a working, effective council.¹⁴⁰

The aforementioned emergencies in 1995 and 1996 finally led to decisive discussions on the effectivity of the Japanese intelligence community and the role of CIRO and the JIC. Especially the ineffective reaction to the Kōbe earthquake was immediately taken up to establish the Cabinet Intensive Information Center (CIIC) (later the Cabinet Information Integration Division (CIID)) within CIRO, as a way to be able to more effectively coordinate relief efforts after disasters.¹⁴¹ More was on its way, however. The Japanese government held the opinion that the government system as a whole would be unsuitable for the twenty-first century, which led to extensive reforms of the whole government. In December 1997 it hereto published the 'Final Report of the Administrative Reform Council'.¹⁴² The Cabinet Secretariat would be reformed to make it more powerful, giving it the authority for 'supreme and ultimate

¹³⁶ Oros, "Japan's Growing Intelligence Capability," 6.

¹³⁷ Tatsumi, *Japan's National Security Policy Infrastructure*, 113.

¹³⁸ Kitaoka, "Japan," 274.

¹³⁹ Kotani, "Japan," 205.

¹⁴⁰ Kitaoka, "Japan," 274 and Kotani, "Japan," 205-206.

¹⁴¹ Oros, "Japan's Growing Intelligence Capability," 7 and Tatsumi, *Japan's National Security Policy Infrastructure*, 116.

¹⁴² An executive summary can be found here: Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, "Final Report of the Administrative Reform Council (Executive Summary)," last modified Dec. 3, 1997, <https://japan.kantei.go.jp/971228finalreport.html>, accessed on June 7, 2018.

coordination within the government, as well as intelligence community'.¹⁴³ It proposed the following about the intelligence environment:

Information sharing among the Ministries/Agencies concerned, information integration into the Prime Minister's Cabinet, and competitive analysis/evaluation of information shall be promoted. For that purpose, the importance of "intelligence community" shall be well recognized. Therefore, JIC, which has been mainly ceremonial so far, shall be positioned as an official institution of the Prime Minister's Cabinet so that it functions effectively.¹⁴⁴

In accordance to the report, the Cabinet did not only elevate JIC to an official status in January 1999, but also established the Cabinet Intelligence Council (CIC), in October 1998 (see image 1 on page 19). The main function of the CIC, meeting once every six months, would be to set out the agenda for foreign and domestic intelligence gathering and analysis for the coming half year.¹⁴⁵ This agenda could then be used by the JIC to produce the necessary information. Nevertheless, while sounding like an extra big stick to overcome sectionalism, the concrete goals of the CIC were still vague, and the whole CIC/JIC system and the elevation of the JIC to an official institution has not elevated it above sectionalism, rendering it relatively ineffective until today – despite new reports calling for other reforms.¹⁴⁶

In 1998, the Japanese intelligence community was shocked by the firing of a North Korean ballistic missile (the Taepodong-1 missile) over Japan. The inability to anticipate and the launch revealed another weakness of the community, namely its dependence on the US for its national security intelligence.¹⁴⁷ Japan had no reconnaissance satellites until that moment, while it had been wanting to acquire these since the 1980s, when the larger discussion over Japan's security and intelligence apparatus was heating up.¹⁴⁸ However, this wish for satellites was vehemently opposed by the US, for a twofold of reasons. One was the fact that Japan would become more independent from the US in security matters, the other that the US the production of satellites by Japan would be very expensive and thus draw away funding from other US-Japan security projects.¹⁴⁹ The US forced with sanctions and tried to persuade the Japanese to at least buy American-made satellites, but to no avail. The first Japanese reconnaissance

¹⁴³ Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, "Final Report of the Administrative Reform Council."

¹⁴⁴ As cited in Kitaoka, "Japan," 273. The report is only in Japanese.

¹⁴⁵ Kitaoka, "Japan," 274.

¹⁴⁶ Yoshiko Kobayashi, "Assessing Reform of the Japanese Intelligence Community," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 28 (2015), 724 and Kitaoka, "Japan," 274-276.

¹⁴⁷ Tatsumi, *Japan's National Security Policy Infrastructure*, 152.

¹⁴⁸ Oros, "Japan's Growing Intelligence Capability," 17.

¹⁴⁹ Oros, "Japan's Growing Intelligence Capability," 17-18.

satellite was launched in early 2003, under the in 2001 established Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center (CSICE) within CIRO.¹⁵⁰ The program is constantly being expanded until today.¹⁵¹

Second phase

The next shock came in 2001, with the attacks on the Twin Towers on September 11. Japan is of course a close ally to the US, making Japan a possible target for terrorism. The terrorist attacks, according to Yuki Tatsumi, lead to the second phase of the reforming of the Japanese intelligence community.¹⁵² The reforms really gained momentum Shinzō Abe was elected as Prime Minister in September 2006. Within three months, Abe established the Council on Enhancing Intelligence Function (alongside two councils researching the infamous article 9 and the national security as a whole).¹⁵³ Abe had to resign after a year and many of his incentives surrounding security were halted with it, but the intelligence debate kept going strong. In 2008, it published a report in 2008 that would form a basis for further reforms.¹⁵⁴

The recommendations, which were largely the same as those in many studies published over the previous years, were as follows:

1. Enhancement of Intelligence Capabilities

(1) Establishing the mechanism to connect policymakers and the intelligence community

(2) Improving intelligence collection

(3) Improving intelligence analysis and sharing

2. Enhancement of Information Security (Counterintelligence)¹⁵⁵

As a consequence to this, in order to the sub-recommendation, the CIC was officially acknowledged as ‘an institutional hub connecting policymakers and the IC [intelligence community, red.]’.¹⁵⁶ Its membership was expanded to officials of policy departments as well, whereas it was previously limited to members of the intelligence community. This would have

¹⁵⁰ William H. Radcliffe, “Origins and Current State of Japan’s Reconnaissance Satellite Program (U),” *Studies in Intelligence* 54 (2010): 3, 9. A predecessor of the CSICE was established in 1998, the in the introduction mentioned geospatial wing.

¹⁵¹ The Japan Times, “Japan launches H-IIA rocket carrying reconnaissance satellite,” last modified Feb. 27, 2018, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/02/27/national/japan-launches-h-ii-a-rocket-carrying-reconnaissance-satellite/>, accessed on June 7, 2018.

¹⁵² Tatsumi, *Japan’s National Security Policy Infrastructure*, 116.

¹⁵³ Tatsumi, *Japan’s National Security Policy Infrastructure*, 116.

¹⁵⁴ Tatsumi, *Japan’s National Security Policy Infrastructure*, 116-117.

¹⁵⁵ As cited in Kobayashi, “Assessing Reform of the Japanese Intelligence Community,” 723.

¹⁵⁶ Kobayashi, “Assessing Reform of the Japanese Intelligence Community,” 724.

to ease the policy drafting process.¹⁵⁷ The satellite program was furthermore expanded as a way to meet the second sub-recommendation. In April 2008 so-called Cabinet Intelligence Analysis Officers (CIAO) were installed within CIRO, tasked with the writing of ‘Intelligence Estimate Reports’ (IERs), “all-sourced” intelligence products representing the official views of the entire IC’.¹⁵⁸ The council assumed this would help meeting the third sub-recommendation. The last recommendation was taken up to set up the Counterintelligence Center within CRIO, also in April 2008.¹⁵⁹ Finally, in 2014, a new state secrets law (Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (SDS)) became active, with the aim of protecting highly sensitive information and shedding of the image of a spy haven.¹⁶⁰ The law was strongly opposed by media and the public, but nonetheless was passed by both houses of parliament. In 2015, a year later, all discussions and criticism revolving around the law had silenced.¹⁶¹

One more detail is interesting: in the chart on the next page, the “International Terrorism Information Office”, established in 2015 is included in the organisational structure of the CIRO, but officially it placed under the MOFA, although with officers from the CIRO.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁷ Kobayashi, “Assessing Reform of the Japanese Intelligence Community,” 724-725.

¹⁵⁸ Kobayashi, “Assessing Reform of the Japanese Intelligence Community,” 718, 724-725 and Kotani, “A Reconstruction of Japanese Intelligence,” 187-188, 196.

¹⁵⁹ Kobayashi, “Assessing Reform of the Japanese Intelligence Community,” 726.

¹⁶⁰ Kobayashi, “Assessing Reform of the Japanese Intelligence Community,” 726. An overview of the law can be found here: *Cabinet Secretariat*, “Overview of the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (SDS),” http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/tokuteihimitsu/gaiyou_en.pdf, accessed on June 7, 2018.

¹⁶¹ Mina Pollmann, “Japan’s Controversial State Secrets Law: One Year Later”, last modified Dec. 9, 2015, *The Diplomat*, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/japans-controversial-state-secrets-law-one-year-later/>, accessed on June 7, 2018.

¹⁶² Yuki Tatsumi, “To Fight Terror, Japan Must Fix Its Intelligence Apparatus,” last modified June 1, 2015, *The Diplomat*, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/to-fight-terror-japan-must-fix-its-intelligence-apparatus/>, accessed on June 7, 2018.




Image 2. Organisational structure of the CIRO

Source: Cabinet Secretariat, “Cabinet Intelligence Research Office,”

<http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/jyouhoutyousa.html>, accessed on May 22, 2018.

It is clear that the reforms of the CIRO have been extensive. Whether it has been enough to make the CIRO and its accompanying divisions such as the JIC and the CIC more effective remains to be seen, but what at least is clear is that there only one factor has really been influential in the reforms of the CIRO, which has been sectionalism and domestic bureaucratic politics. The US even tried to block the development and launching of Japanese reconnaissance satellites, but to no avail. It next to this seems that the norm of antimilitarism was absent from any discussions: the government effectively did as it pleased. There was some opposition to the state secrets law, but this opposition quickly died out. Sectionalism has been a scourge of the Japanese intelligence community and eventually a main drive for the reforms, as it needed to be overcome. This led to numerous reforms of the JIC/CIC system, but it is not yet clear whether or not this had until now worked.

4.2 The PSIA

The PSIA was in the 1950s originally established as a means of monitoring and countering extremist (communist) groups in Japan, but by the mid-1980s, when discussions surrounding the activities of the Japanese intelligence community had come under closer scrutiny, it had to prove the necessity of its existence.¹⁶³ Communism was declining as a threat and when the Soviet Union eventually collapsed in 1991, there was a large void in the responsibilities of the PSIA. Calls for reform were gaining voice and there were some budget and personnel cuts and a plan for reorganisation, but the definitive watershed moment for the PSIA came with the sarin attacks on the Tokyo subway by the Aum Shinrikyo sect on March 20, 1995. This sect was under the supervision of the PSIA, but it could not prevent the attacks from happening.¹⁶⁴ The PSIA tried to ‘exploit’ the attacks by trying to invoke the Subversive Activities Prevention Law (which, as seen before, was the law which gave birth to the PSIA) for the first time *ever*.¹⁶⁵ This approach was applauded by the Japanese press and public, but the commission investigating the legitimacy of invocation denied the approach on the ground of sufficient evidence, effectively backfiring the PSIA’s search for legitimacy.¹⁶⁶

The whole affair led to numerous investigations into the abolishment of the PSIA and for ways of transferring its responsibilities to the CIRO and effectively merging the two, as well as a revision of the Subversive Activities Prevention Law.¹⁶⁷ However, to prevent this from happening, the PSIA quickly set out on a major reorganisation, moving away from the focus on communist and other leftist groups and moving towards other extremist groups, both domestically and foreign (see image 3).¹⁶⁸ Whether or not this saved the PSIA, or the fact that it was and is the largest intelligence organisation in Japan and can thus exert a certain amount of influence in such a sectionalist community and political bureaucracy, is not clear.¹⁶⁹

The 9/11 attacks, just as with the CIRO, proved an important moment for the PSIA. With criticism regarding its existence never far away, the agency has been trying to remodel itself into a truly international intelligence agency, with the capacity to collect and analyse intelligence important to national security in its broadest terms.¹⁷⁰ Since 2005 the PSIA writes

¹⁶³ Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo, the Changing Nature of Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War Security Agenda,” *Pacifica Review* 10 (1998): 1, 54.

¹⁶⁴ Hughes, “Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo,” 54.

¹⁶⁵ Hughes, “Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo,” 54.

¹⁶⁶ Hughes, “Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo,” 54.

¹⁶⁷ Oros, “Japan’s Growing Intelligence Capability,” 8 and Hughes, “Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo,” 55.

¹⁶⁸ Oros, “Japan’s Growing Intelligence Capability,” 8.

¹⁶⁹ The PSIA in 2002 had 1,800 employees, while for instance CIRO had only 175. Source: Oros, “Japan’s Growing Intelligence Capability,” 5, 8.

¹⁷⁰ Tatsumi, *Japan’s National Security Policy Infrastructure*, 104.

an annual white paper called *Review and Prospect of Internal and External Situations*, in which it presents its findings on security threats worldwide.¹⁷¹ Next to this, while a terrorism division has been established under the MOFA in 2015 and while the NPA also boasts a similar bureau, the PSIA tries to steal a piece of the pie (of course made easier by sectionalism) by presenting itself as an agency specialised in terrorism prevention.¹⁷² In the latest white paper a whole chapter devoted to international terrorism, in which not only Islamic State is discussed, but Afghanistan, Israel-Palestine and North-African terrorism as well.¹⁷³

So far this has seemingly been enough to legitimise the continuing existence of the PSIA. Furthermore, in 2015, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Abe announced it was looking into the opportunity of establishing a centralised intelligence agency, like the British MI6.¹⁷⁴ While the LDP itself made no mention of it, it has been argued that the PSIA could form the core of this new agency.¹⁷⁵ This seems quite unlikely as it is also mentioned that the NPA is very influential within the LDP and the intelligence community as a whole, but naturally a police agency does not have the best papers for forming the core of a new intelligence agency itself. Here lies an opportunity for the PSIA to finally cement itself.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷¹ The reports can be found here: Public Security Intelligence Agency, “Annual Report,” http://www.moj.go.jp/psia/English_AnnualReport.html, accessed on June 6, 2018.

¹⁷² Tatsumi, *Japan's National Security Policy Infrastructure*, 104.


¹⁷³ Public Security Intelligence Agency, *Annual Report 2017. Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations* (Tokyo: Public Security Intelligence Agency, 2018). See chapter 4, “International Terrorism,” <http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001255171.pdf>, accessed on June 7, 2018.

¹⁷⁴ Mina Pollmann, “Japan Mulls Its Own CIA,” last modified Feb. 13, 2015, *The Diplomat*, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/japan-mulls-creating-its-own-cia/>, accessed on March 4, 2018.

¹⁷⁵ Linda Sieg and Nobuhiro Kubo, “Japan eyes MI6-style spy agency as it seeks to shed pacific past,” last modified March 6, 2015, *Reuters*, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-intelligence-military/japan-eyes-mi6-style-spy-agency-as-it-seeks-to-shed-pacifist-past-idUSKBN0M20CM20150306>, accessed on March 5, 2018.

¹⁷⁶ Sieg and Kubo, “Japan eyes MI6-style spy agency as it seeks to shed pacific past.”

PSIA organisational structure prior to and after reforms of May 1996
(bold writing in parentheses represents responsibilities of each section)



Source: Based on Yū Miyaoka, *Kōanchōsachō no Bōsō*, pp. 67, 209.

Image 3. Organisational Structure of the PSIA.

Source: Christopher W. Hughes, "Japan's Aum Shinrikyo, the Changing Nature of Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War Security Agenda," *Pacifica Review* 10 (1998): 1, 45.

Comparison

As seen above, the issues regarding reforms are very much different for the PSIA than for the CIRO. While the CIRO tries to function as a coordinating agency for the Japanese intelligence community as a whole, the PSIA has since the end of the Cold War constantly had to fight for its bare survival. Many voices were calling for the dissolution of the agency, but the PSIA did and still does not want to cease to exist. Because of the bureaucratic and sectionalist tendencies of the Japanese intelligence community, it can be argued that this survival has been made considerably easier. Alliance politics have had little to do with the restructuring of the PSIA as it is still a predominantly domestic actor – but who knows for how long? Antimilitarist norms have until now had no influence on the reforms of the PSIA, but this is something which the PSIA must keep an eye on. As it is struggling for its survival it will in the future have to present itself as a worthy and efficient intelligence agency in the future. After all, if the public, which has been relatively uninterested in the whole reforms affair until now, turns itself against the PSIA, a prolonged existence may become impossible.

	Alliance Politics		Sectionalism and domestic bureaucratic politics		The norm of antimilitarism	
	Establishment 1945-1954	Reforms 1954-2018	Establishment 1945-1954	Reforms 1954-2018	Establishment 1945-1954	Reforms 1954-2018
CIRO	++	-	++	++	0	0
PSIA	+	0	++	+	-	0

Table 1. Influence of each respective factor on the establishment and development (reforms) of the CIRO and the PSIA. + denotes a positive influence, - a negative. 0 denotes neutral.

Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to answer the question how the post-World War II establishment and development of the CIRO and the PSIA could be explained. For this purpose, it has adopted the theoretical framework put forward by Brad Williams in his 2013 article ‘Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency’. In this article Williams proposed three competing explanations: alliance politics with the United States, domestic bureaucratic politics and the norm of antimilitarism. These explanations have been analysed for two periods: the period of the establishment of the CIRO and the PSIA and the period of reforms. Due to the relative inactivity of the Japanese intelligence community during the Cold War it was possible to analyse the whole period of reforms from 1954 to 2018 in one section.

As far as the establishment of the CIRO is concerned, it were two factors that have had a strong influence. The US first helped establish the Kawabe group, the unofficial predecessor of the CRC and the CIRO, and, second, provided the information necessary for the establishment of the CRC, which made the establishment of the agency considerably easier. The influence of sectionalism and domestic bureaucratic politics has arguably been even larger, as Prime Minister Yoshida and two of his allies, Ogata and Murai had been at the centre of the efforts of establishing a JCIA, constantly proposing and pressuring for the establishment of a strong centralised agency. In the end, this did not succeed, but the CIRO is the eventual outcome of these efforts and can thus be seen largely as the product of these domestic proponents. Many others feared that with the establishment of a JCIA their own agency would become less relevant, which is another influence of sectionalism on the establishment of the CIRO. The last factor, the norm of antimilitarism, has played a minor role, as many on the political left and in the press viewed a JCIA as a return to the feared prewar and wartime intelligence apparatus. The failure of the establishment of a JCIA stems in a certain part from this fear. Nevertheless, in the end the role of antimilitarism was only minor, as sectionalism and alliance politics were considerably stronger factors.

For the establishment of the PSIA the roles are largely the same, but with a considerable nuance. The Oppler Memo, a memo exploring the possibilities of outlawing extremist organisation in Japan, written by US officials kickstarted Japanese initiatives for the creation of the law for this. However, the US quickly lost control of these initiatives. Yoshida was a staunch anti-Communist and worked tirelessly on a way to indeed outlaw the JCP and again the SAPL law and the subsequent establishment of the PSIA can be seen as another product of his

efforts. In the end the US was not exactly on one line with the proposed law, but had to accept it to not lose face. Antimilitarism was again a very minor influence. The SAPL law had to undergo no less than 23 revisions before it was finally accepted, so antimilitarism placed a check on a largely unrestrained law, but further than this the influence of antimilitarism does not go. It was thus again, as with the establishment of the CIRO, sectionalism and domestic bureaucratic politics that played the most important role.

For the reforms of the CIRO, it is clear that only sectionalism and domestic bureaucratic politics have been of real importance. The US tried to block the acquisition of reconnaissance satellites by Japan, but did not manage to have any influence. The same goes for the norm of antimilitarism, which has been totally absent from any discussions surrounding the reforms of CIRO – except for the state secrets law. The opposition to this quickly waned. The proposal for reform came from the Japanese policy makers themselves; and the CIC/JIC system was and is constantly being blocked by agencies and actors bypassing the system, which has led to numerous reforms of it.

The reforms of the PSIA have been motivated by domestic actors as well. Originally established to execute the SAPL law and counter communism, after the Cold War it lost most of its purpose and until today it is constantly trying to reinvent itself. Alliance politics and antimilitarism have had no influence, but it might be stated that was it not for sectionalism, the PSIA might have already ceased to exist.

In the end it may be concluded that sectionalism and domestic bureaucratic politics have had the strongest influence on the establishment and development of the CIRO and the PSIA Japanese intelligence community. Domestic proponents, especially Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, played the largest role in the establishment of two agencies, and the notorious problem of sectionalism has been one of the main drivers for reform, as the reforms were often executed to overcome this. The US played a major part in the establishment of the two agencies, but has since then played barely any role. The norm of antimilitarism has had almost no influence at all. This might be due to the nature of intelligence, which is inexorably far away from the public. When one compares this to the discussions surrounding revision of article 9 of the constitution, the contrast is clear: regular protests against revision draw tens of thousands of protesters and has even led to brawls in parliament.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁷ Hirotaka Kojo, “40,000 protest Abe’s plans to revise Article 9 of the Constitution,” last modified Nov. 4, 2017, *The Asahi Shimbun*, <http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201711040033.html>, accessed on June 11, 2018 and Lisa Torio, “Japan is Scrapping Its Pacifist Constitution, Despite Massive Public Opposition,” last modified Dec. 16, 2015, *The Nation*, <https://www.thenation.com/article/japan-is-scrapping-its-pacifist-constitution-despite-massive-public-opposition/>, accessed on June 11, 2018.

This paper illustrated that it might be possible to identify a fourth factor in the establishment and especially the development of the Japanese intelligence community: “necessity-driven development” or, more commonly, “responsiveness”. The establishment of certainly CIRO was partially a consequence of necessity, as an independent Japan needed to have a somewhat centralised intelligence agency. This of course very much oversimplifies the establishment, but for the development of the CIRO and the PSIA the necessity-driven development/responsiveness can be identified more precisely: for instance, the CIIC was established after the Kōbe earthquake, the geospatial wing and reconnaissance satellite programme of the CIRO were established after the Taepodong-1 missile crisis and the PSIA was reformed after the Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attacks. It can be valuable to further explore this fourth factor.

The results of this paper complement the writing of the complex postwar history of Japan’s intelligence community. Furthermore, by adopting and adding to the framework put forward by Bradley Williams, it hopes to not only help writing this history, but also give theoretical depth to it – a basis on which others can build. As this paper was limited in its scope to only two agencies of the community, further research can start for instance with doing for the other parts of the Japanese intelligence community what this research has done for the CIRO and the PSIA. Next to this sources written in Japanese have been largely absent in this research. Incorporating these sources in further research can strengthen future analyses.

What the future holds is hard to say. There have over the last thirty years been numerous reforms and the voices for reform are still loud, but there is and has been little pace in it. As stated it seems that the intelligence community has been reactive in the past, managing to push through reforms only after an unexpected emergency. It is a relatively safe assumption to expect that, however unpleasant, new and swift reform and the bypassing of sectionalism will only be able after another emergency situation – which, in the current Asia Pacific region and world in general, is never too far away.

Bibliography

Books and academic articles

Berger, Thomas U. "Norms, Identity and National Security in Germany and Japan." In *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, 317-356. Edited by Peter J. Katzenstein. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

Choi, Sung-jae. "The North Korean factor in the improvement of Japanese intelligence capability." *The Pacific Review* 17 (2004): 3, 367-397.

Deacon, Richard. *Kempei Tai: The Japanese Secret Service Then and Now*. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1990.

Dower, John W. *Embracing Defeat. Japan in the Wake of World War II*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company/The New Press, 1999.

Dower, John W. *Empire and Aftermath. Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.

Dujmovic, Nicholas. "Fifty Years of Studies in Intelligence." *Studies in Intelligence* 49 (2005): 4.

Faligot, Roger. *Naisho: Enquête au coeur des services secret japonais*. Paris: La Découverte, 1997.

Green, Michael J. *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001.

Hansen, James H. *Japanese Intelligence: The Competitive Edge*. Washington: National Intelligence Book Center, 1996.

Henderson, Robert D'A. "Reforming Japanese Intelligence." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 10 (1997): 2, 227-230.

Hook, Glenn D., J. Gilson, C.W. Hughes and H. Dobson. *Japan's international relations: politics, economics and security*. New York: Routledge, 2012.

Hughes, Christopher W. "Japan's Aum Shinrikyo, the Changing Nature of Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War Security Agenda." *Pacifica Review* 10 (1998): 1, 39-60.

Hughes, Christopher W. *Japan's re-emergence as a 'normal' military power*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Hughes, Christopher W. *Japan's remilitarisation*. New York: Routledge, 2009.

Institute for International Policy Studies, "A Vision of Japan in the 21st Century." Last modified September 5, 2006. <http://www.iips.org/en/research/data/NationalVision.pdf>. Accessed on Jan. 12, 2018.

Jourdonnais, Adam. "Intelligence in the New Japan." *Studies in Intelligence* 7 (1963): 3, 1-14.

Katzenstein, Peter J. *Cultural Norms and National Security: Policy and Military in Postwar Japan*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.

Ken Kotani, "Japan." In *Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies*, 201-208. Edited by Robert Dover et al. Routledge: New York, 2014.

Kitaoka, Hajime. "Japan." in *PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches, Volume 1: The Americas and Asia*, 263-279. Edited by Stuart Farson et al. Westport/London: Praeger Security International, 2008.

Kobayashi, Yoshiki. "Assessing Reform of the Japanese Intelligence Community." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 28 (2015), 717-733.

Kotani, Ken, "Current State of Intelligence and Intelligence Issues in Japan." *The National Institute for Defense Studies News* 100 (2006).

Kotani, Ken. "A Reconstruction of Japanese Intelligence: Issues and Prospects." In *Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere*, 181-198. Edited by Philip H.J. Davies and Kristian C. Gustafson. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013.

Kotani, Ken. "Japan." In *Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies*, 201-208. Edited by Robert Dover et al. *Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies*. New York: Routledge, 2014.

Kushner, Barack. "Japan's war of words: World War II propaganda." In *Routledge Handbook of Modern Japanese History*, 251-263. Edited by Sven Saaler and Christopher W.A. Szpilman. New York: Routledge, 2018.

Leeson, R. (ed). *Hayek: A Collaborative Biography. Part 3, Fraud, Fascism and Free Market Religion*. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005.

Lowenthal, Mark M. *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. 5th edition*. Los Angeles/London: SAGE, 2012.

Miyagi, Takemi. "Which Way Did They Go?." *Studies in Intelligence* 11 (1967): 1, 67-70.

Oros, Andrew L. "Japan's Growing Intelligence Capability." *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 15 (2002), 1-25.

Oros, Andrew L. *Japan's Security Renaissance*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2017.

Oros, Andrew L. *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.

Penn, Michael. *Japan and the War on Terror: Military Force and Political Pressure in the US-Japanese Alliance*. London: I.B. Taurus, 2014.

Petersen, Michael. "The Intelligence That Wasn't: CIA Name Files, the U.S. Army, and Intelligence Gathering in Occupied Japan." In *Researching Japanese War Crimes: Introductory Essays*, 197-230. Edited by E. Drea et al. Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration for the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, 2006.

Radcliffe, William H. "Origins and Current State of Japan's Reconnaissance Satellite Program (U)." *Studies in Intelligence* 54 (2010): 3, 9-21.

Schwenke, Simon. "State Intelligence." In *East Asian Intelligence and Organized Crime*, 155-168. Edited by Stephen Blancke. Verlag Dr. Köster: Berlin, 2015.

Shigeru, Yoshida. *Yoshida Shigeru. Last Meiji Man*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers: Lanham, 2007.

Tanaka, Akihito and Masayuki Tadakoro. "The 1980s: The Decade of Neoliberalism." In *The History of US-Japan Relations: From Perry to the Present*, 193-213. Edited by Makoto Iokibe and Tosh Minohara. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017.

Tatsumi, Yuki. *Japan's National Security Policy Infrastructure. Can Tokyo Meet Washington's Expectation?*. Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2008.

Uyehara, Cecil H. *The Subversive Activities Prevention Law of Japan. Its Creation, 1951-1952*. Brill: Leiden and Boston, 2010.

Williams, Brad. "Explaining the Absence of a Japanese Central Intelligence Agency: Alliance Politics, Sectionalism, and Antimilitarism." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 13 (2013), 137-164.

Government sources

Cabinet Secretariat, “Cabinet Intelligence Research Office.”
<http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/jyouhoutyousa.html>. Accessed on May 22, 2018.

Cabinet Secretariat. “Overview of the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (SDS).” http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/tokuteihimitsu/gaiyou_en.pdf. Accessed on June 7, 2018.

Japanese Law Translation. “Subversive Activities Prevention Act.” Last modified Sept. 8, 2011. <http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=1982&vm=2&re=02> Accessed on May 24, 2018.

Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. “Final Report of the Administrative Reform Council (Executive Summary).” Last modified December 3, 1997.
<https://japan.kantei.go.jp/971228finalreport.html>. Accessed on June 7, 2018.

Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. “The Constitution of Japan.” Last modified Nov. 3, 194. http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html. Accessed on Dec. 3, 2017.

Public Security Intelligence Agency. “Annual Report.”
http://www.moj.go.jp/psia/English_AnnualReport.html. Accessed on June 6, 2018.

Public Security Intelligence Agency. *Annual Report 2017: Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations*. Tokyo: Public Security Intelligence Agency, 2018.
<http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001255171.pdf>. Accessed on June 7, 2018.

Security Service MI5. “National Intelligence Machinery.” <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/national-intelligence-machinery>. Accessed on June 6, 2018.

Newspaper articles and websites

Bender, Jeremy. “RANKED: The world’s 20 strongest militaries.” last modified Oct. 3, 2015. *Business Insider*, <http://www.businessinsider.com/these-are-the-worlds-20-strongest-militaries-ranked-2015-9?international=true&r=US&IR=T>. Accessed on March 4, 2018.

Chen, P.Y. “Japanese leader concedes Japan is a spy haven.” Last modified June 22, 1983. *UPI*, <https://www.upi.com/Archives/1983/06/22/Japanese-leader-concedes-Japan-is-a-spy-haven/3393425102400/>. Accessed on June 7, 2018.

Cochrane, Paul. “Japan ready to operate in shadows of espionage with new spy agency.” Last modified Sept. 5, 2015. *Global Times*, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/940689.shtml>. Accessed on May 2, 2018.

Dorling, Philip. "WikiLeaks unveils Japanese spy agency." Last modified Feb. 21, 2011. *The Sydney Morning Herald*, <http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/wikileaks-unveils-japanese-spy-agency-20110220-1b17a.html>. Accessed on March 4, 2018.

Fitsanakis, Joseph. "Japanese government 'not aware' of existence of clandestine spy unit." Last modified Nov. 28, 2013. *Intelnews.org*, <https://intelnews.org/2013/11/28/01-1377/>. Accessed on March 4, 2018.

Japanese Communist Party. "What is the JCP? A Profile of the Japanese Communist Party." Last modified July 2016. http://www.jcp.or.jp/english/2011what_jcp.html. Accessed on May 24, 2018.

Jibiki, Koya. "Japan mulls its own CIA-like agency." Last modified March 31, 2015. *Nikkei Asian Review*, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan-mulls-its-own-CIA-like-agency>. Accessed on March 5, 2018.

Kojo, Hiroataka. "40,000 protest Abe's plans to revise Article 9 of the Constitution." Last modified Nov. 4, 2017. *The Asahi Shimbun*, <http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201711040033.html>. Accessed on June 11, 2018.

McCurry, Justin. "Abe defends Japan's secret law that could jail whistleblowers for 10 years." Last modified Dec. 10, 2014. *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/10/japan-state-secrets-law-security-dissent>. Accessed on April 4, 2018.

Pollmann, Mina. "Japan Mulls Its Own CIA." Last modified Feb. 13, 2015. *The Diplomat*, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/japan-mulls-creating-its-own-cia/>. Accessed on March 4, 2018.

Pollmann, Mina. "Japan's Controversial State Secrets Law: One Year Later." Last modified Dec. 9, 2015. *The Diplomat*, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/japans-controversial-state-secrets-law-one-year-later/>. Accessed on June 7, 2018.

Sieg, Linda and Nobuhiro Kubo. "Japan eyes MI6-style spy agency as it seeks to shed pacific past." Last modified March 6, 2015. *Reuters*, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-intelligence-military/japan-eyes-mi6-style-spy-agency-as-it-seeks-to-shed-pacifist-past-idUSKBN0M20CM20150306>. Accessed on March 5, 2018.

Simpson, James. "Does Japan have a secret foreign intelligence service?." Last modified Feb. 20, 2011. *Japan Security Watch/New Pacific Institute*, <http://jsw.newpacificinstitute.org/?p=4924>. Accessed on March 4, 2018.

Sociology Guide. "Social Norms." <http://www.sociologyguide.com/basic-concepts/Social-Norms.php>. Accessed on May 18, 2018.

Stratfor. “Japan’s Intelligence Reform Inches Forward.” Last modified March 2, 2015. <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/japans-intelligence-reform-inches-forward>. Accessed on March 5, 2018.

Tatsumi, Yuki. “To Fight Terror, Japan Must Fix Its Intelligence Apparatus.” Last modified on June 1, 2015. *The Diplomat*, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/to-fight-terror-japan-must-fix-its-intelligence-appartus/>. Accessed on June 7, 2018.

The Japan Times. “Cabinet approves state secrecy law guidelines.” Last modified Oct. 14, 2014. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/10/14/national/politics-diplomacy/cabinet-approves-state-secrecy-law-guidelines/#.Wo06UuciHyQ>. Accessed on May 3, 2018.

The Japan Times. “Japan launches H-IIA rocket carrying reconnaissance satellite.” :ast modified Feb. 27, 2018. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/02/27/national/japan-launches-h-ia-rocket-carrying-reconnaissance-satellite/>. Accessed on June 7, 2018.

The World Bank, “GDP (Current US\$).” <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD> Accessed on June 7, 2018.

Torio, Lisa. “Japan is Scrapping Its Pacifist Constitution, Despite Massive Public Opposition.” Last modified Dec. 16, 2015. *The Nation*, <https://www.thenation.com/article/japan-is-scrapping-its-pacifist-constitution-despite-massive-public-opposition/>. Accessed on June 11, 2018.

Volkskrant. “Japan begint inlichtingendienst.” Last modified Jan. 13, 1995. <https://www.volkskrant.nl/archief/japan-begint-inlichtingendienst~a411880/>. Accessed on Feb. 27, 2018.

Yoshida, Reiji. “Defense Agency given ministry status.” Last modified Jan. 10, 2007. *The Japan Times*, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2007/01/10/national/defense-agency-given-ministry-status/>. Accessed on May 2, 2018.

Other sources

Hendriks, Cor. “Richard Deacon, master of disinformation.” Last modified Feb. 2016, <http://robscholtemuseum.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Richard-Deacon-Master-of-Disinformation.pdf>. Accessed on April 8, 2018.

Appendix

I: Timeline

1934	Establishment of the Investigation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
September 1939 – September 1945	World War II
1945	Establishment of the Kawabe Agency
August 15, 1945	Surrender of Japan in World War II
September 2, 1945	Signing of surrender of Japan in World War II
October 5, 1945	Order by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) for the dissolution of the Kempeitai and Tokkō, the white purge
1945	Legalisation of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP)
1946-47 – 1991	Cold War
1946	New constitution for Japan written
December 17, 1946	Establishment of the Special Investigation Bureau (SIB)
1947	New constitution for Japan adopted
1948	Operation Takematsu
1949	Establishment of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, after 2001 METI)
1949	Establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC)
1950	The red purge
June 1950 – July 1953	Korean War
August 1950	Writing of the Oppler Memo
August 1950	establishment of the NPR (National Police Reserve)
September 8, 1951	Signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the US-Japan Bilateral Security Treaty
April 1952	Establishment of the Cabinet Research Chamber (CRC)
July 1952	Enactment of the Subversive Activities Prevention Law and the establishment of the Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA)
October 1952	First expansion of the NPR
July 1954	Evolution of the NPR into the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), establishment of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA)
July 1954	Establishment of the National Police Agency (NPA)
1956	Death of Taketora Ogata

1957	CRC name change into Cabinet Research Office (CRO), under jurisdiction of the Cabinet Secretariat
1967	Death of Shigeru Yoshida
1986	Establishment of the Joint Intelligence Council (JIC)
1986	Name change of CRO into Cabinet Intelligence Research Office (CIRO)
1991	Absorption of the Investigation Department of the MOFA into the International Intelligence Department
1991	Collapse of the Soviet Union
1993	Renaming of the International Intelligence Department into the Intelligence and Analysis Service
1993	Establishment of the Foreign Policy Bureau
January 16, 1995	Kōbe (Hanshin-Awaji) Earthquake
March 20, 1995	Sarin gas attacks on Tokyo subway by the sect Aum Shinrikyo
1996	First major reorganisation of the PSIA after the Sarin gas attacks
December 1996 – April 1997	Japanese embassy hostage crisis in Lima, Peru
January 1997	Establishment of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH)
December 1997	Publishing of the ‘Final Report of the Administrative Reform Council’, extensive government reforms
August 1998	Firing of a North Korean ballistic missile over Japan
October 1998	Establishment of the Cabinet Intelligence Council (CIC)
January 1999	Elevation of the JIC to an official institution of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet
2001	Establishment of the Cabinet Sattelite Intelligence Center (CSICE)
September 11, 2001	Terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers
2003	First Japanese reconnaissance satellite launched
2005	First annual white paper by the PSIA, <i>Review and Prospect of Internal and External Situations</i> , published
September 2006 – September 2007	First term of Shinzō Abe as Prime Minister
December 2006	Establishment of the Council on Enhancing Intelligence Function

2008	Publishing of the first report by the Council on Enhancing Intelligence Function, basis of further reforms
December 2012 – now	Second term of Shinzō Abe as Prime Minister
2014	Enactment of the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets
2015	Establishment of the International Terrorism Information Office

II: List of acronyms


CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (United States)
CIAO	Cabinet Intelligence Analysis Officers
CIB	Cabinet Information Bureau
CIC	Cabinet Intelligence Council
CIIC	Cabinet Intensive Information Center
CIID	Cabinet Information Integration Division
CIRO	Cabinet Intelligence Research Office
CRC	Cabinet Research Chamber
CRO	Cabinet Research Office
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency (United States)
DIH	Defense Intelligence Headquarters
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation (United States)
FIRA	Foreign intelligence-related activities
G-2	Military Intelligence staff of a unit in the United States army
GHQ	General Headquarters
IC	Intelligence Community
IER	Intelligence Estimate Report
IJA	Imperial Japanese Army
IJN	Imperial Japanese Navy
JCIA	Japanese Central Intelligence Agency
JCP	Japanese Communist Party
JDA	Japan Defense Agency
JETRO	Japan External Trade Organization
JIC	Joint Intelligence Council
JSDF	Japan Self-Defense Forces
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
METI	Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
MI5	Military Intelligence, Section 5. Other name for the British Security Service
MI6	Military Intelligence, Section 6. other name for the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS)
MITI	Ministry of International Trade and Industry
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NPA	National Police Agency
NPR	National Police Reserve
PM	Prime Minister
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSIA	Public Security Intelligence Agency
SAPL	Subversive Activities Prevention Law

SCAP	Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces
SIB	Special Investigation Bureau
SIS	Secret Intelligence Service (United Kingdom)
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
WWII	World War II

III: Organisational charts of Japan's intelligence community


JAPAN'S INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE

Japan's lack of a central analysis agency means that separate, unintegrated intelligence agencies report independently to the prime minister's office.



Stratfor, "Japan's Intelligence Reform Inches Forward," last modified March 2, 2015, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/japans-intelligence-reform-inches-forward>, accessed on March 5, 2018.

Japan's framework for gathering, analyzing intelligence



Koya Jibiki, "Japan mulls its own CIA-like agency," last modified March 31, 2015, *Nikkei Asian Review*, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan-mulls-its-own-CIA-like-agency>, accessed on March 5, 2018.






Figure 7. The Japanese Intelligence Community.
 Source: August 2006 by H. Kitaoka, NII.

Hajime Kitaoka, "Japan," in *PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches, Volume 1: The Americas and Asia*, ed. Stuart Farson et al. (Westport/London: Praeger Security International 2008) 264.



Roger Faligot, *Naisho: Enquête au coeur des services secret japonais* (Paris: La Découverte, 1997) 216. Translated version on next page.



Roger Faligot, *Naisho: Enquête au coeur des services secret japonais* (Paris: La Découverte, 1997) 216. Translated version.