We Think, Therefore We Do : How assumptions held by statebuilders determine the statebuilding effort in Afghanistan

Abstract

In this work, I analyze two different statebuilding attempts in rural Afghanistan that work at the village level. Their approaches to the Afghan village institution differ profoundly. These enterprises represent the split in the current statebuilding debate. In the current intervention, divergent assumptions and strategic interests are merged under a common ideological rhetoric. In practice however, they have disparaging results. This research concentrates on how the assumptions of the intervening party affect its project design and process, and form the interaction with Afghan counterparts. These assumptions, I argue, are a determining factor in the success of these enterprises. The most determining assumptions relate to the causes of state fragility and the statebuilding process: the questions about how to achieve such ambiguous goals as good governance, statebuilding, and development. Moreover, assumptions about the Afghan cultural and socio-political landscape are decisive. I show how these shape the project design and execution, the interaction with the local powerholders and all together, the success of the intervention. I maintain that the assumptions of the external actors that determine the outcome of the interactive institution building process. I herewith expand the statebuilding research from its focus on weak governance in Afghanistan to the approaches of the external actors.