Conditionals and Truth Values

dc.rights.license	CC-BY-NC-ND
dc.contributor.advisor	Visser, A.
dc.contributor.author	Kortbeek, L.
dc.date.accessioned	2011-06-16T17:01:28Z
dc.date.available	2011-06-16
dc.date.available	2011-06-16T17:01:28Z
dc.date.issued	2011
dc.identifier.uri	https://studenttheses.uu.nl/handle/20.500.12932/7129
dc.description.abstract	The aim of this thesis is to determine what problems arise when trying to formalize "if" using compositional semantics, and whether the word 'if' can be formalized in a satisfactory manner at all in this way. To determine the answer to this question, a comparison will be made between two approaches on conditionals: The work by Robert Stalnaker, which relies on possible world semantics to define the truth conditions of 'if', and an epistemic theory of conditionals developed by Peter Gärdenfors, which defines conditionals in terms of acceptance rather than truth.
dc.description.sponsorship	Utrecht University
dc.format.extent	221283 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	en
dc.title	Conditionals and Truth Values
dc.type.content	Bachelor Thesis
dc.rights.accessrights	Open Access
dc.subject.keywords	conditionals, logic, implicatures, lewis, stalnaker, gärdenfors
dc.subject.courseuu	Kunstmatige Intelligentie