Lifetime Well-Being: A Mere Sum of Momentary Pleasures? -- A Normative Defense of Life Narrativity

Abstract

What makes a life well-lived? In this thesis, I offer a novel perspective, which I call (Intermediate Eudaimonic) Narrativism, whose central claim goes as follows: Other things being equal, a life is better lived when it incorporates narrative thinking than when it does not, as this integration elevates, specifically, one’s eudaimonic well-being. My account critically engages with two central debates regarding well-being assessment and narrative thinking: First, against Additivist-Hedonists, such as Fred Feldman, who reduce lifetime well-being to the mere sum of momentary pleasures. Second, against Episodic critics like Galen Strawson, who deny the value of life narrativity altogether. At the same time, I intend to avoid the overreach of those strong Narrativist views (e.g., Taylor, MacIntyre, and Lieberman) that thinking narratively about one’s life implies that one should fit all such life events into a unified, overarching story. Instead, drawing crucial inspiration from Hilde Lindemann and Peter Goldie, I reconceptualize life narrativity as an interpretive lens that involves a dynamic, situational, and morally sensitive cognitive process. Based on this argumentative strategy, in this thesis, I develop a more thorough exploration of the following guiding questions: (1) Why is narrative thinking significant for one’s lifetime well-being? (2) Why is the value of narrative thinking in fostering one’s meaningfulness, purposefulness, and ethical resilience in life non-reducible to merely producing momentary pleasures? (3) What moral and epistemic safeguards are required to responsibly integrate narrative thinking into one’s self-understanding and corresponding well-being assessment? Therefore, through critical analysis, illustrative examples, and engagement with those rival views, I aim to articulate how narrative thinking, when incorporated with appropriate moral and epistemic care, serves as a powerful vehicle for a more fulfilled, dynamic, and meaningful self-understanding that eventually enhances one’s eudaimonic well-being. In short, through this thesis, beyond providing a more robust normative defense of life narrativity, I aspire to open up possibilities for interdisciplinary collaborations that bridge the philosophy of well-being with narrative theories, ultimately shedding some critical light on re-examining the question of “What constitutes a good life?” in an era characterized by a constrained focus on fragmented experiences and fleeting pleasures.