Robots, Bridges, and Responsibiliy

Abstract

The debate around the permissibility of the use of autonomous weapon systems in war has been heating up over the last few years. Is it permissible to use such systems, and if so, how should we go about it? Most philosophers have argued against their use, and usually do so on a consequentialist basis. In this thesis, I aim to defend a different kind of argument in favour of the implementation of autonomous weapon systems. Simpson & Müller argue against the responsibility gap as originally posed by Robert Sparrow. They argue that the crucial moral question is not one of responsibility. Rather, it is whether the technology can satisfy the requirements of fairness in the redistribution of risk. De Sio & Mecacci criticize the theory based on their identification of three additional responsibility gaps. They claim the theory by Simpson and Müller will not be able to address these additional gaps. In this thesis I will examine both the theories and subsequent criticism, to conclude that de Sio and Mecacci’s criticism falls short in showing that Simpson & Müller’s theory is not true.