Pandora's Jar has opened: now what?

Abstract

This thesis studies the navigation of trade-offs and key decisions in carbon removal scale-up policy. It does so by means of an explorative case study comparing two nations with emerging carbon removal policy: California and the Netherlands. Starting from a literature review in which key elements were identified, this thesis then proceeds to analyse data from semi-structured expert interviews and from relevant policy documents. This thesis finds that several intertemporal trade-offs arise in carbon removal policy: coupled with large degrees of uncertainty, these preclude informed decision-making by market parties. Market mechanisms are inherently limited in what they can achieve: a compensation market cannot provide net negative emissions, due to the latter being a public good. A large role for government in realizing carbon removals follows from this reasoning. Further, the alleged corporate capture of the powerful Californian regulator stresses the necessity of democratic decision-making in this field, since decisions made now produce significant lock-in effects for future generations. This thesis contributes to economic theory by the understanding of net negative emissions as a public good. Further, it lays bare the threat of increasing democratic deficit during the development of carbon removal policy. This thesis marks a first step at economic-governance theoretical understanding of carbon removals