Exploring the Impact of Board Characteristics on Accounting Conservatism

Abstract

This study examines the impact of historically significant governance mechanisms on accounting conservatism in the United States. Inside directors, CEO duality, and board size during 1999–2001 are a particular focus, because this period was a time of widespread corporate scandals and heightened regulatory scrutiny. The central concern is to uncover which board characteristics might be enhancing this kind of accounting-financial reporting conservatism. While using the market-to-book ratio (price to book value) approach as a proxy to quantitatively measure accounting conservatism -and not the accrual-based method as stated in the research proposal-, this research provides a robust analysis of how governance mechanisms like inside directors, CEO duality, and board size influence conservative financial reporting practices. The findings reveal that a higher proportion of inside directors and larger board sizes are significantly associated with the effect on accounting conservatism. From those findings, the importance of internal governance is clear. It ensures the financial integrity, and the transparency as well, especially during periods of thorough regulatory oversight. This study has put forward an important academic output, which particularly may be used for the benefit of national policymakers, corporate leaders, and academics involved in the analysis of the link between the composition of the board and financial reporting quality.