A Defence of Aristotle's Unity of the Virtues: An Aristotelian response to the pluralistic rejection of the unity of the virtues

Abstract

In Aristotle’s virtue ethics the virtues of character are unified through practical wisdom. A virtuous agent cannot possess one virtue without possessing them all, as each requires practical wisdom, which in turn requires all the virtues. Today, pluralists assert that our ends are distinct, incompatible and possibly conflicting. Robert Adams and Christine Swanton have developed virtue ethical theories with pluralistic foundations. As a result of these foundations, they reject the unity of the virtues as it is presented by Aristotle. They do so using four arguments. The virtues are modular. Practical wisdom is modular. Virtue is a threshold concept and the world is too complex and difficult for a full unity of the virtues to possibly obtain. In this thesis, I argue that Aristotle’s theory offers the tools for rejecting these arguments. The virtues should be defined as active and procedural processes of the soul, such that they and practical wisdom are not modular. This also means that viewing virtue as a threshold concept does not lead to a rejection of the unity of the virtues. Lastly, the complexity of and conflict in the world around us does not imply a disunity of the virtues. I end the thesis by giving a positive account of how we might unify the virtues by appealing to a model for their integration that is offered by Adams and Swanton.