| dc.description.abstract | In this thesis, I discuss the linguistic process of slur reclamation. In general, philosophical theories on slurs focus on why slurs offend. I question whether these accounts adequately explain cases of slur reclamation. When faced with the question of why some uses of slurs are derogatory and some are not, content-based accounts turn toward positing ambiguity. This leads to a serious problem. If it is ambiguous whether or not a slur is used derogatorily, then we have no way of explaining why certain slurs are restricted to certain users. Positing ambiguity does not account for why only members of an in-group have access to the non-derogatory use of a slur, leaving open the possibility for out-group access. Scholars have put forth various solutions in response to these problems. In conversation with these accounts, I provide my own critique of ambiguity and a novel answer to the question of why certain slurs are, and should be, restricted to in-group members. I put forward a re-evaluative framework of slur reclamation inspired by the philosophical discourse on Black reparations for slavery. I argue that investigating a defense of reparations for past injustices--a defense of Black reparations for slavery--is a fruitful way of contextualizing the problem of ambiguity. If we recognize the use of reclaimed slurs as a kind of reparation for injustice, and we look at the reasons why individuals are due reparations for past harms then we can not only understand why certain slurs are restricted to certain users, but why they should be. | |
