President Richard Nixon’s Vietnamization Policy and Détente with the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union, 1969-1972: An Economic and Distant Reading Analysis

Abstract

President Richard Nixon’s Vietnamization in 1969 and his détente with China and the USSR in 1972 were situated in the Cold War. Both of these political decisions were framed largely in the context of peace; however, war expenditures and trade reasons are also important factors for analysis. Using economic analysis and distant reading method, this paper finds that Nixon’s Vietnamization of 1969 cannot be explained by cost reasons, the state of the U.S. economy, nor by cost-benefit considerations. Using the same method, this paper finds that Nixon’s détente with the two states could have been due to the U.S.’ trade deficits from 1968 to 1972 (except 1970) to open foreign markets for American products. Distant reading analysis of Nixon’s 1971 address, however, revealed that plans of détente or trade possibilities cannot be inferred from this national address.