Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: State capture in Serbia and its influence on EU enlargement

Abstract

This thesis analyses the effect of state capture on the cost/benefit calculation of EU accession in Serbia through the framework of the External Incentives Model by Schimmelfennig and argues that state capture severely increases the adoption and implementation costs of EU rule adoption for political, ruling elites in Serbia. Following a mechanistic process-tracing research design, this thesis shows how state capture allowed Serbian political elites in the SNS party led by Aleksander Vučić, to reduce checks and balances in society and create an unequal democratic playfield from 2012 onwards. This thesis finds that under such conditions, there are high power, opportunity, and welfare costs involved in the bona fides implementation of politically sensitive pieces of the EU acquis. Faced with high costs for EU rule adoption, these elites balance engagement and disengagement through the selective implementation and enforcement of EU acquis. More broadly, the findings indicate that state capture decreases both the effectiveness as well as the credibility of EU conditionality in Serbia. Lastly, state capture is identified as a key obstacle to be overcome in the EU enlargement process.