The influence of norms and norm deviance on punishment behaviour in an asymmetric public good game.

Abstract

Humanity has punished undesirable behaviour for centuries. Punishment is a mechanism which enforces cooperation in society. Previous research shows that without punishment, cooperation levels drop in social situations. However, actors themselves need to punish when there is no central authority to enforce laws. One potential reason to punish for individuals is self-interest, an individual punishes to achieve maximum payoff in the situation next. Another reason is that an individual supports a social norm and punishes norm deviations because norm deviations endanger the group. This paper researches what drives people to punish in social dilemmas without a central authority. The possible effects of the norms equality (equal payoff) and efficiency (equal contribution) are examined, and in what way these norms causes people to punish. An asymmetric public good game is experimentally conducted to measure the possible effects of norms and deviation from these norms. Multiple regression analysis is used to examine the data. The results show that norms have an effect on punishment, and norm deviation increases this effect. This research contributes to the sociological literature by examining the effect of norms on punishment behaviour in social dilemmas, in future research the effect of other norms than equality and efficiency could be examined.