The UNTEA-Equilibrium: A Game Theoretical Approach on Dutch Diplomatic Interactions during the Western New Guinea Dispute in Historical Comparative Analysis (1949-1962).

Abstract

This research aims to provide an answer to why the Dutch government held on to New Guinea from 1949 until 1962 in negotiations with Indonesia. In todays historiography this Dutch clasp on New Guinea is mostly perceived as traumatization after the Dutch lost its holding in the Dutch East Indies. This research opposes the paradigm by stating that the Dutch response was based on rational choices as preferred outcomes were calculated. A game theoretical analysis is used in this research by using the Theory of Moves. This case study argues that the Dutch government took initiative by changing its strategy in providing self-determination for the native population of New Guinea by calculating preferred outcomes and anticipations. In turn the Indonesian government responded to this change of strategy, resulting in international pressure. This pressure led towards a move towards an equilibrium situation as the territory is handed over to the United Nations in 1962.