Morality and Localism: The Justifiability of Ingroup-Outgroup Thinking, Loyalty and Care

Abstract

In this thesis I will investigate whether claims opposing universalist morality, promoting localism, are justified. Firstly, I will investigate if morality’s scope is constrained to limited ingroups. Findings from evolutionary psychology are often thought to show that universalist morality is not even feasible. They are used to justify localist commitments by appealing to our evolutionary past. Since we evolved to cooperate in small scale groups, our moral emotions would be designed for such small groups. Secondly, I will review loyalty as argument for localism. Many appeal to loyalty in moral deliberation. It is even argued to be what drives us to be moral in the first place. Because morality can only exist and have meaning within communities, we would have an obligation to be loyal to them. Lastly, ethics of care is considered as alternative to loyalty for grounding localism. Considerations from care are a neglected part of moral deliberation. Care is less exclusivist than loyalty and may therefore be reconcilable with universalism. A pluralist conception of morality might help us conceptualise moral localism and universalism as continuous and equally valid.