Morality and Localism

The Justifiability of Ingroup-Outgroup Thinking, Loyalty and Care

Maarten Sesink
Student №: 3824853
Supervisor: Dr. Annemarie Kalis
Second examiner: Dr. Jos Philips

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Abstract

In this thesis I will investigate whether claims opposing universalist morality, promoting localism, are justified. Firstly, I will investigate if morality's scope is constrained to limited ingroups. Findings from evolutionary psychology are often thought to show that universalist morality is not even feasible. They are used to justify localist commitments by appealing to our evolutionary past. Since we evolved to cooperate in small scale groups, our moral emotions would be designed for such small groups. Secondly, I will review loyalty as argument for localism. Many appeal to loyalty in moral deliberation. It is even argued to be what drives us to be moral in the first place. Because morality can only exist and have meaning within communities, we would have an obligation to be loyal to them. Lastly, ethics of care is considered as alternative to loyalty for grounding localism. Considerations from care are a neglected part of moral deliberation. Care is less exclusivist than loyalty and may therefore be reconcilable with universalism. A pluralist conception of morality might help us conceptualise moral localism and universalism as continuous and equally valid.

Table of Content

Introduction

Imagine (if you have to) you're a reasonably well-off westerner, in need of a new phone charger. You have the choice to order one online from China or go out to a local shop and pick one up. Aside from considerations concerning the price and quality of the product, customer service and the time spent on the purchase, moral questions flit across the back of your mind. Is it okay for you to choose a foreign seller and manufacturer over local ones, thereby making it harder for small business owners in your community to run their businesses, as well as contributing to the shift in economic growth from your own nation's economy to economies like China's? Should you be supporting China's government, even indirectly, given the way it violates its own citizens' human rights? Is it permissible to let your charger be flown in across the globe, contributing to global warming, and all of its disastrous effects, including an increase in humanitarian crises due to draughts and floods in developing countries, even if it seems unlikely global warming will directly affect you or your community any time soon? All these questions are, primarily though not exclusively, concerned with your moral responsibilities to groups of people, ranging from your own local community to billions of complete strangers you'll never meet.

In an ever more globalized world, the question of what the scope of morality is and ought to be becomes ever more pressing. Our actions (indirectly) affect an increasingly large number of people all around the globe and we are increasingly aware of this. Another effect of globalisation is that (western) societies become more culturally and ethnically diverse. People are confronted with new groups of people which can lead to fear for the loss of cultural identity and economic security. This can lead to tribalism and protectionism, to thinking in terms of ingroups and outgroups and to ingroup favouritism and possibly even outright outgroup hate.

Is it morally permissible, justifiable, or even necessary to morally prioritize ingroups over outgroups? Are localism and tribalism in human morality even avoidable or reducible? Do we have moral responsibilities for humanity as a whole or just for our own family, our own community and our own nation? Can morality be stretched endlessly?

If we look to the elected leader of the most culturally influential and politically powerful nation of the West, the U.S.A., Donald Trump we see a trend noticeable in most of the western world: the increase in intergroup fear and hostility. Within America his election seems both a symptom as well as a catalyst of an increase in xenophobia and sexism, but also an increase in political animosity and polarization. Internationally there is an increase of ingroup-outgroup thinking, thinking about other people in terms of 'us' and 'them', a group of people with which we identify and a group of people with which we don't. This increase, underlined by Trump's presidency, is characterized by his repeated use of the words "America first!" in his inaugural speech.

We might hear of this resurgence of outgroup hate and resignedly concede that human morality is not built for these modern conditions and that therefore we are destined for conflict, poverty and exploitation. We might also interpret Trump's "America first!" as an expression of loyalty, an important value and contributor to morally stable and productive communities. While Trump might lead us to consider universalist morality an abstract or unrealizable ideal, disconnected from actual human moral psychology, the words of Episcopalian bishop Michael Curry in what is perhaps the most heard sermon of 2018, at the wedding of Prince Harry of the British royal family and Meghan Markle, might lead us to see it as a very common and innately human striving. He said:

> When love is the way, then no child will go to bed hungry in this world ever again. […] When love is the way, poverty will become history. When love is the way, the earth will be a sanctuary. When love is the way, we will lay down our

> swords and shields, down by the riverside, to study war no more. When love is the way, there's plenty good room - plenty good room - for all of God's children. Because when love is the way, we actually treat each other, well... like we are actually family. When love is the way, we know that God is the source of us all, and we are brothers and sisters, children of God. My brothers and sisters, that's a new heaven, a new earth, a new world, a new human family.[1]

The question I will try to answer in this thesis is: Is moral localism justified? I will use the term 'moral localism' as the counterpart of 'moral universalism'. Where universalist morality is directed at all humans equally, in principle indifferent of their relationship with, and (social or cultural) distance to, the agent, localist morality is directed at (socially or culturally) proximate people or communities, instead. It is the idea that we ought to show moral concern primarily to those 'close' to us (our ingroup), to our families, neighbourhoods, religious communities or nations, for instance, and only secondarily, if at all, to those who are alien and foreign to us (our outgroup), to those we don't know and share no cultural identity with. So, in other words the question I will try to answer is: Is it morally permissible, or even desirable or obligatory, to show more moral consideration to your ingroup than to your outgroup, or even exclusively to your ingroup? In order to answer this question I will investigate four further questions in three chapters, in Chapter 1: To what extent is the scope of morality psychologically constrained to ingroups?; in Chapter 2: Can loyalty justify moral localism?; and in Chapter 3: Might care be a better foundation for moral localism? and: Are localism and universalism reconcilable?

Chapter 1 is concerned with the feasibility of universalist morality. It deals with the question with how large a group, we *can*, practically, realistically, form meaningful and productive moral relationships. Besides political conservatives, also (evolutionary) psychologists and philosophers, have argued that the human psyche is simply unable to care morally for those far away and alien to us, that the emotions underlying moral behaviour are not able to handle billions of people and that virtues flourish only in tightly knit small scale communities. This is thought to be so because the selection pressures leading to our (capacities for) morality occurred in times we lived in small-scale groups, and also lead to our tendencies to form negative attitudes towards outgroups, because those groups were in hostile competition. 'Ingroup love' is thought to be reciprocally related to 'outgroup hate'. These claims turn out to be exaggerated, overemphasized or wrong. The attitude for our ingroups is not necessarily tied to any specific attitude towards outgroups, there exist strong moral sentiments specifically concerned with the idea of humanity as a whole and the scope of morality has up until now always expanded and there is no reason to assume it has finally reached its limits.

Chapter 2 is concerned with the justification of morality as predominantly or exclusively directed at (small scale) ingroups. It is concerned with the moral arguments made against universalist morality, specifically by an appeal to loyalty. Many political liberals and philosophers (since the enlightenment) have argued that we are morally obligated to correct (global) injustices and ought to be morally concerned with every human being. Traditional ethical theory is predominantly universalist. It says we are morally obligated to care for others based on their innate autonomy, rationality, rights, their capacity for pleasure and pain and so on. All humans share this innate value and therefore favouritism is morally unacceptable. The conservative opposition claims that these arguments are one sided and neglect the necessary condition for the existence of morality: our social nature; we, and therefore our morality, are formed by our communities. They

[1] Michael Curry, *The Power of Love: Sermons, Reflections, & Wisdom to Uplift and Inspire* (New York: Penguin, 2018), 11-12.

claim that loyalty is at the heart of morality. However, I will argue that loyalty does underly morality and that its value lies in external moral reasons.

In Chapter 3 we will review ethics of care as a localist foundation of morality. Ethics of care originated as a response to the invariably predominantly universalist ethical theory. Ethicists of care argue considerations like care are a neglected part of human morality. We will evaluate if it may do better than ethics of loyalty in grounding moral localism. It might for instance be less exclusivist. We will also investigate in what ways localism may be found in traditional ethics and in what ways localism and universalism may be reconciled. Bernard Williams' critique of universalism, saying it sometimes requires alienation from one's (localist and personal) commitments, might offer some insights in the differences between localism in ethics of care and in traditional theory. Pluralism and the concentric model of moral commitments to different groups might help us understand the relationship between localism and universalism as continuous and equally valid.

Chapter 1: Psychological constraints on the scope of morality

In the literature on social and moral psychology, the belief that our minds are severely constrained in granting people in the outgroup moral consideration, is held by a group of academics, which I will call 'evoconservatives'. This term is coined by philosophers Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell.[2] Evoconservatives try to show that (localist) conservatism is right, using evolutionary theory.

According to evoconservatives, we are simply not built to empathize with people we do not recognize as belonging to the same social group as ourselves. Empathy is central in generating moral sentiments and consideration. And, certainly, it is in human nature to care more for those close to us, because it yields (or yielded in our evolutionary past) benefits to do so. In this chapter I will try to answer: To what extent is the scope of morality psychologically constrained to ingroups?

In the first paragraph, I will discuss moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt's (evoconservative) conception of the origins and nature of morality. I will review Haidt's ideas on the evolutionary development of morality, of human nature and of the building blocks of morality. Then I will point out some misconceptions and contradictions within Haidt's story before turning in the second paragraph to a systematic critique of two premises found across the board in the argumentation against the feasibility of universalist morality. The first premise says that ingroups are fixed in size. The idea is that we cannot, psychologically, expand our ingroup and that, therefore, we cannot come to be morally concerned for groups of people larger than the group we care for. The second premise is rather a hidden assumption, a blindness to the fact that we do not belong to just one ingroup. The idea is that outside our ingroups no other ingroups are possible; everyone who falls outside of a certain ingroup and therefore belongs to an outgroup is assumed to be part of *no* ingroup, whatsoever.

§1.1 The origins and nature of morality

Jonathan Haidt is an influential social psychologist, primarily concerned with political and moral psychology. He has written about the evolutionary origins of morality. The following is Haidt's basic outline of our evolutionary past, with which most evoconservatives agree. A context of intergroup conflict in our evolutionary past created a strong need for group formation and with it the desire for a sense of belonging to ingroups as well as hostile attitudes towards outgroups.[3] For winning these conflicts, and thus surviving, cooperation, trust, altruism and familiarity with group members are beneficial. Group-level selection favoured more cohesive groups over groups with more conflict and less cooperation amongst group members. This is an important cause for our moral emotions, most prominently empathy. However, paradoxically, Haidt also sees empathy as the cause of one of our most important moral shortcomings, perhaps second only to our selfishness, namely, our tendency to show real moral consideration exclusively for members of our ingroup. For example, oxytocin binds people and mirror neurons help them empathize, but they only make people bind to and empathize with their own groups, not all of humanity.[4] Because our moral sentiments evolved in a context of intergroup competition and conflict, we needed to thrive *at the expense of* other groups. Therefore, it was counterproductive to care for those belonging to outgroups.

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[2] Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell, "The Limits of Evolutionary Explanations of Morality and Their Implications for Moral Progress," *Ethics* 126, no. 1 (October 2015): 37-38.

[3] Jonathan Haidt, *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion (*New York: Pantheon Books, 2012), 7: The Moral Foundations of Politics, 3: The Loyalty/Betrayal Foundation, 6-7, Kindle.

[4] Ibid., 10: The Hive Switch, In Sum, 5.

The groupish overlay

Haidt describes human nature as 90 percent chimp and 10 percent bee, where he considers chimps selfish and bees selfless.[5] According to him, every instance of seemingly cooperative behaviour of chimps is merely an act which is for that individual chimp, at that particular moment, the best thing to do for themselves, not for their groups. Bees, to the contrary, are completely selfless and sacrifice themselves for the survival of the group. According to Haidt, humans have a predominantly selfish nature, but developed a 'groupish overlay' and a 'hive switch' to tap into their beelike potential, in order to reap the benefits of cooperation and the division of labour, suppress free riders and outcompete other groups of humans. The groupish overlay is a set of prosocial tendencies unexplainable with individualistic selection pressures because, for the individual, the free rider impulse would always have trumped the positive effects of the prosocial behaviour. Evolutionary group level selection made these tendencies possible.[6] According to Haidt, this groupishness is laid over our predominantly selfish nature to suppress free riding and enable large scale cooperation with all its benefits. The hive switch is an example of how this groupish overlay manifests. This is our "ability (under special conditions) to transcend self-interest and lose ourselves (temporarily and ecstatically) in something larger than ourselves […,] an adaptation for making groups more cohesive, and therefore more successful in competition with other groups."[7] To explain how this works, Haidt refers to Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), the founder of academic sociology. Durkheim found that human sentiments can be categorized in 'two sets of emotions'. The first is individual and connects us to other people, as individuals, the second is 'inter-social' and connects us to large social groups, as large social groups. Engaged in the latter we lose our individuality and become part of the whole. We feel connected to everyone and everything, we forget ourselves, our ego's and hierarchy is absent or less dominant.[8]

According to Haidt, our societies are ultrasocial and the emergence of our ability and tendency to form them is a 'major evolutionary transition', similar to the transition of the first single-celled organisms to form a multi-celled organism.[9] This first 'cooperative' transition had its benefits, but was also a risky enterprise, because of the same reason ultrasocial societies are risky: the dependency on others (or other cells in this case). For such transitions, suppressing freeriding needed to be established. For human societies this was norm sharing, in what Haidt calls 'moral matrices', which provide "a complete, unified, and emotionally compelling worldview, easily justified by observable evidence and nearly impregnable to attack by arguments from outsiders."[10] Moral matrices coexist within societies and "bind people together and blind them to the coherence, or even existence, of other matrices."[11] The moral matrices are aided by religion, in which the tools enabling us to increase the size of our ingroups dramatically (symbolism, shared values, shared gods and rituals triggering the hive-switch) are institutionalized.

This major evolutionary transition is defining for who we are, for human nature, in as much as it is groupish. Haidt argues that we are designed to live in groups competing with other groups and that those groups are defined by shared norms, symbols and gods. Because our survival, as groups, depended on our willingness to sacrifice ourselves for those groups when intergroup

[5] Haidt, *The Righteous Mind*, 11: Religion Is a Team Sport, Chimps and Bees and Gods, 5.
[6] Ibid., 9: Why Are We So Groupish?, In Sum.
[7] Ibid., 10: The Hive Switch, The Hive Hypothesis, 3.
[8] Ibid., 10: The Hive Switch, Collective Emotions, 6-7.
[9] Ibid., 9: Why Are We So Groupish, Exhibit A: Major Transitions In Evolution, 3, 8-9.
[10] Ibid., 5: Beyond WEIRD Morality, Stepping Out of the Matrix, 4.
[11] Ibid., 5: Beyond WEIRD Morality, In Sum, 2.

conflicts arose, we evolved to feel so strongly connected to our ingroups and so hostile to a (perceived) outgroups that we are indeed, occasionally, still willing to die for them.

Moral foundations

This understanding of our moral psychological development underpins Haidt's conception of loyalty as a foundation of morality. The formation of groups, tribes or coalitions, with which we cooperate, share norms and empathise, in contrast to groups with which we do not do these things, gives us a sense of loyalty. One of the contemporary manifestations of this tribal loyalty can be seen in our love for team sports. But also in politics, as we shall discuss in §2.1.

According to Haidt, human morality is based on five of such 'moral foundations': Care, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority and Sanctity. These are the psychological roots of all moral norms. They are built into our constitution, as answers to certain evolutionary challenges.[12] They are merely foundations, they are malleable and experience shapes their particular manifestations, explaining cultural diversity. The Care(/harm) foundation makes us sensitive to signs of suffering and need and makes us caring and makes us despise cruelty. The Fairness(/cheating) foundation makes us sensitive to indications regarding the suitability of partners for collaboration and reciprocal altruism. It makes us want to shun or punish cheaters. The Loyalty(/betrayal) foundation makes us sensitive to signs that someone is, or isn't, a team player, and makes us feel warmly for team players and hostile towards those who aren't. The Authority(/subversion) foundation helps us form beneficial relationships within social hierarchies, making us sensitive to signs of rank or status and to what proper behaviour is, given someone's rank. The Sanctity(degradation) foundation includes the behavioural immune system and makes us sensitive to many symbolic objects or threats, in which we may invest extreme values, helping groups bind together.[13]

Universalism and altruism

Haidt claims we are not evolved to develop moral universalist capacities, because our moral foundations evolved as part of a single system, which also encompasses outgroup hate. However, we are also not evolved to develop ingroups as large as religious communities or nation states, which we clearly did, as Haidt describes as well. Haidt does not explicitly address the issue of why universalist morality is psychologically out of reach, yet nationalist morals aren't. It is possible he assumes that caring for an ingroup goes hand in hand with outgroup hate (which Marilynn Brewer debunks, as we shall see in the next paragraph). However, Haidt mentions no such argument when discussing this topic. He merely gives specific arguments for why we cannot become perfect universalists, arguments which should also be applicable to large scale ingroups, like nations and religious communities. He gives specific reasons for why we are able to have such large scale ingroups, which are also reasons for why we should be able to have universalist commitments.

Haidt's comparison of human nature as largely coinciding with chimp nature holds some persuasive power, because why would we differ so much from our closest living relatives? Are humans really that much more than wild beasts, with a layer of veneer in the form of rationality and civilization, covering up an egotistical and hedonistic nature?

However, we do, in fact, share many of the foundations of morality with Chimps. Jessica Flack and Frans de Waal argue that the evidence of primate research shows that many of the building blocks of morality are shared in some form with many non-human primates. Although morality as such is uniquely human, because of our greater ability to internalize rules, to adopt each other's perspective and to reflect and discuss, the fundamental inclinations and behaviours

[12] Haidt, *The Righteous Mind*, 6 Taste Buds of the Righteous Mind, Moral foundations theory, 3-8.
[13] Ibid., The Moral Foundations of Politics, In Sum 2.

underlying it are remarkably similar.[14] "Sympathy-related traits such as attachment, succourance, emotional contagion and learned adjustment in combination with a system of reciprocity and punishment, the ability to internalize social rules and the capacity to work out conflicts and repair relationships damaged by aggression, are found to some degree in many primate species, and are fundamental to the development of moral systems."[15] So, characterizing our nature as 90 percent chimp might not be unfair, however assuming this means selfish *is* very unfair.

Haidt's reliance on religion, especially the spiritual, mystical sense of human oneness, borrowed from Durkheim, illustrates very clearly that the hive-switch, but also our groupishness in general, is actually based on a psychological *universalist* feeling. When ministers argue for large scale compassion, they do not argue for care for Christians everywhere, but for people everywhere. The fact that they also argue for small scale, conservative commitments, does not render their universalist claims less universalist. Bishop Curry very clearly stated Christianity's universalist ideal in the sermon quoted in the introduction. He did this in the context of the celebration of the smallest possible ingroup, two individuals' wedding, illustrating his belief that romantic love (tied to moral commitments to the smallest group) and love for every human being (tied to moral commitments to the largest group) are continuous. The central claim of the sermon was a paraphrased quote from Martin Luther King Jr (himself bringer of perhaps the most quoted Christian sermon in recent history). And it was all over the media (perhaps even more so than any other topic from the wedding), being praised by many Christian clergymen.[16] Of course, similar sentiments can also be found at the centre of the other major western religions like Judaism and Islam. Religion is (still) held by many to be an authority on morality, substantiating the idea that it embodies several of our central ethical commitments. Many politicians cite it as a, or the, major cultural basis on which western society rests, a status shared by perhaps only the enlightenment.

§1.2 Two premises

I will question two premises on which many of the arguments against the feasibility of a universalist morality rests. Most prominently it rests on the premise that the scope of some core emotions on which morality is based and which give it its motivational force (like empathy) cannot be stretched to encompass groups beyond a certain size (which falls way short of mankind). I will show why this claim is misguided and under-evidenced. Later on, I will discuss the second premise: that outside any ingroup there is no further ingroup possible.

The First Premise

The evoconservative take on the scope of morality is that it cannot stretch beyond a certain limited group of people, at least psychologically. Philosopher Stephen Asma, for example, calls empathy a 'limited resource'.[17] We only have so much to go around. Within ingroups, loyalty, generosity and gratitude flourish by means of favouritism. Groups too big would undermine our ability to consider everyone morally, because it would simply be too exhausting to feel empathy for every individual. Universalist morality is the extreme of this misguided moral aim, because it would entail a world of 'bare minimums'.[18] We cannot be generous to billions of people, we do not have enough to give. We cannot feel gratitude or empathy for billions of people. We are simply incapable

[14] Jessica C. Flack and Frans B.M. de Waal, " 'Any Animal Whatever': Darwinian Building Blocks of Morality in Monkeys and Apes," *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 7, no. 1-2 (2000): 23.
[15] Ibid., 21-22.
[16] Nico De Fijter, "De preek was het hoogtepunt van de Royal Wedding," *Trouw,* May 21, 2018.
[17] Stephen T. Asma, "The Myth of Universal Love," *The New York Times,* January 5, 2013, 4.
[18] Ibid., 6.

because it differs too greatly from our evolutionary contexts. Empathy and care are not concepts but emotions, biological processes, which cannot be triggered constantly and indefinitely.[19] According to evoconservatives, the highly rationalist universalist ideals found in moral philosophy are far removed from practice and sentiments of morality as they evolved biologically and culturally in our species. Though they do not see these values as worthless, they see them as overemphasized as opposed to more local values and as too demanding for individuals.

Buchanan and Powell argue against evoconservatives like Asma, specifically focusing on inclusivist and universalist moral commitments. They argue that "even if [the evolutionary account of morality the evoconservatives draw on] is vindicated, it leaves unexplained a number of important features of contemporary human morality—namely, the very cosmopolitan and other inclusivist moral commitments that prominent evolutionary explanations appear to rule out."[20] They show that these explanations cannot be the whole story, by distinguishing four inclusivist features of morality that are widespread and that are not explainable by them. They call this the 'inclusivist anomaly'.[21] The first feature of the anomaly is the moral consideration we have often come to show nonhuman animals. The second is our increased insistence that moral norms ought to be universalizable. Race, gender, religion and ethnicity are more and more rejected as valid difference making principles. The third feature is the culture of human rights, which is based on our universalist inclinations. The widely held and institutionalized idea is that every person holds fundamental rights, unalienable by local law, group membership or strategic capacities (capacities to harm and/or benefit a moral community). The fourth feature is the rejection of the idea that the absence of such strategic capacities implies a lesser moral status. Marginalized or vulnerable groups, such as children, the elderly, disabled people or ethnic minorities are to be fully recognized as moral subjects, even if failing to do so poses no risks or costs to the moral community. All these tendencies are actually significantly represented in moral behaviour as well as national and international institutions. And then there is the large amount of people (around fifty percent of the world population) giving to complete strangers via nongovernmental humanitarian aid and the considerable demand for ethically sourced products.

All these features would have meant severe fitness costs instead of benefits in the conditions human morality evolved in. Buchanan and Powell argue that they cannot, therefore, be explained in the standard selectionist terms.[22] Evolutionary by-product explanations, which would have to show that inclusivist morality is not itself evolutionarily selected for, but is a phenomenon accompanying a selected for trait, also cannot account for this. Inclusivist morality does not reliably accompany the traits which it is has been argued to be a product of.[23]

Inclusivist morality is a real and significantly practiced and institutionalized feature of present-day morality. There is no reason to assume it cannot be durable. And, as Buchanan and Powell argue, it is reasonable to assume that we have not yet reached the limits of this inclusivity, because if traditional evolutionary explanations render the inclusivist anomaly inexplicable they can certainly not predict where it would end:

> The fact that inclusivist institutions now extend moral consideration to millions of strangers we will never encounter—namely, our fellow citizens in the modern state—is hard enough to explain given the standard evolutionary account of

[19] Asma, "The Myth of Universal Love," 4.
[20] Buchanan and Powell, "The Limits of Evolutionary Explanations," 38.
[21] Ibid., 48.
[22] Ibid., 42.
[23] Ibid., 55.

> parochial altruism. To explain why the circle of regard has extended as far as the nation-state, but can extend no farther, is even more daunting. Once we recognize the limits of evolutionary explanations of morality, and the significant steps toward inclusivist morality that have already been achieved, we can reasonably infer that we are far from the outer limits of our capacities for moral inclusivity.[24]

To explain the inclusivist anomaly, the idea of the 'open-ended normativity of the ethical' must be adopted; we are capable of evaluating and changing moral norms and readjusting the scope of morality to be more inclusivist.[25] Buchanan and Powell don't presume to be able to offer an evolutionary explanation of open-ended normativity. However, they observe that it is simply a demonstrable fact of human morality and that therefore, any evolutionary explanation of it must feature such a principle.[26] And precisely because there is presently no satisfactory evolutionary explanation of it there are no reasons to assume it is constrained the way evoconservatives claim.

The Second Premise

The second reason why our ability to empathize with outgroup members is thought to be constrained is because it is often thought that an ingroup implies an outgroup and positive attitudes towards ingroups are reciprocally related to negative attitudes towards outgroup members. This is untrue if ingroups can encompass each other entirely, fitting around each other, concentrically, as well as when ingroups can overlap just partially.

Psychologist Gordon Allport (1897-1967) developed the concept of concentric loyalties, which is the idea that one identifies as belonging to several ingroups which fit within each other. The farther out, the weaker the group loyalty, with the "smallest and firmest" of those ingroups being the family and the largest (and typically, though not necessarily the weakest, according to Allport) ingroup being mankind.[27] An important notion in the model of concentric loyalties is that "concentric loyalties need not clash."[28] This means that our commitments to larger groups, like nations, don't have to negatively affect those to smaller groups, like families. In fact, Allport writes: "The loyalties that clash are almost invariably those of identical scope."[29] The clashing of loyalties typically occurs on the same level.

Social psychologist Marilynn Brewer substantiates that ingroups need not clash and has argued that ingroups can not only encompass each other entirely, but also overlap just partially.[30] If two or more ingroups overlap only partially, the number of individuals falling into at least one ingroup can be far greater than the maximum number of individuals which can be brought within a single ingroup. So, even if we grant the evoconservative claim that our ingroups cannot grow beyond a certain, limited size, this does not translate to maximum number of people our moral sentiments can be concerned with, even insofar as these sentiments are tied to our ingroups. At least, it would not be limited to the same number of people, but to a much larger number. However, if we grant the fundamental limitedness of ingroup size it becomes implausible to argue that the

[24] And, as Buchanan and Powell argue, it is reasonable to assume that we have not yet reached the limits of the inclusivity of morality because if traditional evolutionary explanations render the inclusivist anomaly inexplicable they can certainly not predict where it would end.
[25] Buchanan and Powell, "The Limits of Evolutionary Explanations," 63-64.
[26] Ibid., 64-65.
[27] Gordon W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954), 43-44.
[28] Ibid., 44.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Marilynn B. Brewer, "The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup Hate?" *Journal of Social Issues* 55, no. 3 (1999):434, 439.

uncompromised universalist morality is psychologically feasible, because this would require our ability to form a nearly endless number of ingroups.

However, for a community to be morally concerned with, and actually motivated to behave morally towards the entire world, not every individual needs to bring every other individual into some ingroup of theirs. Brewer argues that the internal division of nations along one single axis is dangerous and that this can be remedied by promoting many cross-cutting ingroups.[31] In a completely polarized society, outgroup hate can develop freely: spread among most and grow to destructive proportions, like it did in Nazi Germany. If every single differentiating axis is as much bridged as any other, not one of them can be developed by the mechanisms contributing to outgroup hate to disrupt the peacefulness and stability of a society.

A similar principle might hold for the division of mankind along the lines of nationalities. To elevate this idea from the national to the global level requires some modifications. Firstly, the division of the world population is currently not in danger of being divided along one single axis, as far as I'm aware, when seen from the global perspective. However, when seen from the national perspective, such a single division does in fact loom. Namely: the division along the lines of one's nationality splits the world into fellow countrymen and foreigners. Secondly, the kinds of local, cross-cutting ingroups Brewer envisages to stabilize a single society are unlikely to bridge national borders as successfully as they may be expected to bridge, for instance, ethnic divisions within a single society. However, this is mostly due to the fact that the modern nation state has already been allowed to develop its borders into very deeply ingrained social dividers. Within many nations there often exists, historically at least, as great a linguistic, religious and ethnic diversity as between neighbouring nations, often spanning a tremendous amount of land, eliminating geography as plausible social divider. On top of this, the still growing globalization and interconnectedness of societies across the globe due to the information revolution allows for the development of socially strong online ingroups unhindered by most political and geographical borders.

Since ingroups can overlap or encompass each other, when someone falls outside one of our ingroups, we will not necessarily have a negative attitude towards them. As Thoshio Yamagishi and Nobuhire Mifune argue, empirical evidence shows that ingroup love can exist without outgroup hate. They argue that outgroup aggression and ingroup cooperation need not have evolved as a single system and need not be contingent upon each other (which Haidt believes, see §1.1). Ingroup favouritism is shown to be conditional on expected benefits, and therefore not an inherent feature of ingroup-outgroup thinking.[32] Also, ingroup favouritism is much more preferred if it does not negatively affect outgroups than if it is actively hostile to outgroups, showing that ingroup cooperation and outgroup aggression are probably not related.[33] Favouritism towards ingroups can be sufficiently explained by merely appealing to a positive attitude towards ingroup members, without appealing to any form of antagonism towards the disadvantaged outgroup. Although there are several mechanisms tied to ingroup love that can significantly contribute to outgroup hate, because of which they in fact often accompany each other, there is by no means a necessary correlation. Allport has also argued that, because the perception of ingroups does not necessarily require corresponding outgroups, these do not need to be the outer frontier of our concentric loyalties. He regards universal loyalty as psychologically possible.[34] Our ability and tendency to

[31] Brewer, "The Psychology of Prejudice," 439.

[32] Toshio Yamagishi and Nobuhiro Mifune, "Parochial altruism: does it explain modern human group psychology?" *Current Opinion in Psychology* 7 (2015): 40.

[33] Ibid., 40-41.

[34] Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice*, 46.

become very loyal to, and proud of, our nation shows even extremely large groups are potential ingroups, so why not mankind?

Universalist morality may be hampered by our psychological constitution, which Allport himself seemed aware of, as he described the outermost loyalty as a hardly ever realized 'hopeful possibility'.[35] However, our psychological constitution does not constrain us to localist morality. Evoconservatives may be right in pointing out that advocates of universalist morality traditionally insufficiently acknowledge that it may be difficult for humans to be (significantly) morally concerned with humanity at large, because we are evolved to care morally significantly for small scale groups which can negatively affect our attitudes to people outside those groups. However, evoconservatives, in turn, are too pessimistic about human psychology when claiming universalist morality is an unattainable ideal because evolution hard-wired us to be exclusively able to effectively care morally for small scale ingroups. In fact, both universalist morality on the one hand, and tribalism on the other, are real human tendencies, to which we need to relate morally in some way. Both can possibly become dominant societal tendencies, both can be influenced by politics and other social forces and both can be subjected to critical, philosophical scrutiny.

Chapters 2 and 3 are dedicated to the question how we ought to relate morally to both tendencies, especially to localism and the exclusivism it entails. Besides, there is the possibility that the moral sentiments concerned with the outermost circles are of a significantly, perhaps fundamentally, different nature, which means that when regarding them as weakened versions of the same sentiments we feel for our closest loved ones (the smallest ingroup or loyalty) may be misunderstanding them. They might motivate us forcefully, when realized, perhaps even *as* forcefully, in a wholly different way. It might be the case they only seem weaker when regarded as being the same kind of thing. Asma appears to view localist and universalist sentiments to be the same kind of thing when he argues that emotions like empathy simply get exhausted when directed at humanity as a whole, that it is only really productive in smaller communities. 'Universal love', as some call it, the sentiment underlying the universalist tendencies Buchanan and Powell point out, is, it seems to me, a whole other type of love than the one we feel for those close to us or our communities. It is a love not felt for individuals, nor for shared values or cultural identity, rather it is a love for humanity itself. Something to do with the innate value which so many acknowledge lies in simply being human, whether this is defined by autonomy, consciousness, the possession of a soul, etc.

Is Allport correct in thinking that the fact of the matter is that the largest groups we commonly regard as ingroup (are loyal to) are the nation and race we belong to, and, regrettably, rarely mankind at large? I think not, because the existence and prevalence of the ideal of universalist morality and sentiments (some of which are mentioned above) seems to show that at least some form of loyalty towards mankind as a whole is rather common. Also, the question rises what an ingroup would be if there was no corresponding outgroup. We have already seen that ingroup love can exist without outgroup hate, but that is a different question from whether it means something to regard the entire world population as ingroup and feel loyal to it, and also whether this is possible. If we take Allport's understanding of ingroups as the groups we are loyal to, the concept is an odd one when there would be no group to which we are not loyal to contrast it by and to potentially betray the ingroup to. However, the attitudes we typically have for ingroup members, can often, to some extent, also be felt for mankind. Picturing the suffering all around the globe I can have a flash of compassion and sorrow similar to, though much less intense, the sentiment I have when confronted directly with the suffering of a particular individual close to me. The fact that I

[35] Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice*, 46.

cannot have a mental representation of billions of people does not make it impossible to feel for them all, *as a group*. The favouritism and partiality embedded in loyalty might not be possible attitudes towards the entire world population, but its other components, like care, empathy, compassion, commitment, familiarity, love and generosity surely can, at least in some way and to some extent.

In sum

In this chapter I have reviewed why evoconservatives see universalist morality as unfeasible, meaning we're only capable of localist morality. I have discussed two fundamental premises underlying this position.

The first premise says that the size of our ingroup cannot be stretched beyond a certain size, and with it our moral concern. However, this is a seriously under-evidenced claim. There are many features of morality which do in fact show moral concern for all humans, clearly visible in for instance religion. If nationalism is supposed to be feasible universalism would be as well. The scope of morality is still increasing in many agents, nothing requires it to stop.

The second premise says that outside our ingroups no further ingroups are possible. However, positive attitudes towards ingroups are not necessarily correlated with negative ones towards outgroups. This means that overlapping and cross cutting ingroups are possible, as well as concentric ingroups, or 'loyalties', culminating in universalism. Localist moral concern may differ in nature rather than in intensity to universalist moral concern. Universalism may however be hampered by mechanisms tied to positive attitudes towards ingroups, making it difficult to realize, though feasible.

So, to what extent is the scope of morality psychologically constrained to ingroups? The scope of morality is not constrained to any specific group size. Universalism is widely realized and growing. Concern for ingroups *need* not cause any obstacles for concern for outgroups or universalism, though it *may* do so. Human nature is furnished with malleable tendencies both for universalism and tribalism. Our capacity for open-ended normativity ensures universalism to be a hopeful possibility.

Now we've established universalism to be in principle feasible we'll turn to the question if we it is to be preferred, morally, over localism.

Chapter 2: Loyalty as argument against universalist morality

In this chapter I will review and argue against reasons why we *ought* to reject universalist morality, demanding equal treatment for all, in favour of localist morality, valuing commitments to smaller ingroups, like the family, the community in which we live, religious communities or nations. The position against which I shall argue in this chapter is not the normative mirror image of the factual position against which I argued in the first chapter. While that was a rejection of the psychological feasibility of a universalist morality, this is not a rejection of its moral value. It is the position valuing localist over universalist morality. Usually these positions see loyalty and community as fundamental for morality, they are thought to be the necessary conditions for morality because they underly our connection to others. This chapter will be constrained to a discussion of loyalty, because it is so very often relied on in localist, anti-universalist arguments. In this chapter I will try to answer the question: Can loyalty justify moral localism?

In the first paragraph I will review and critique Haidt's conception of loyalty as a *moral* foundation. I will discuss the moral intuitions different ideological groups have, why they ought – or ought not – to be considered *moral* ones and offer alternative ways of understanding, or framing, these differences. The second paragraph deals with the two major approaches to the philosophical justifications for loyalty as a central value of morality and even as the theoretical foundation for ethics in general. Firstly, I will review the communitarian project, which states morality can only exist and have meaning within a community and that therefore loyalty to the community is a precondition for morality. Secondly, we shall discuss Josiah Royce's attempt to ground morality in loyalty as source of meaning and value, ultimately valuing 'loyalty to loyalty', a principled striving to promote loyalty wherever.

§2.1 Loyalty as moral foundation

Haidt calls his Loyalty Foundation a 'moral foundation'. The idea that we evolved to develop exclusivist tribal loyalties supports Haidt's premise that universalist 'loyalty' is psychologically unfeasible. However, Haidt does not explicitly argue for the claim that loyalty is a *moral* foundation. He seems to assume loyalty is widely believed to be moral. Haidt mentions an example which, he believes, makes us all feel an intuitive flash of the Loyalty Foundation. He asks us whether we find it troubling to call into a radio show to critique our nation (with critique we believe is justified) in our own nation. He presumes we do not, but he presumes we do when instead we call into a radio show in another nation.[36]

The thought experiment he relies on to bring up our moral intuition for loyalty did not work for me. I think it is perfectly okay to call into a radio show in a *foreign* nation, to critique my own nation. Perhaps in conditions of war, or under the threat of war, or if the foreign nation was run by a dictatorial regime, I would feel differently. I certainly would in some of those conditions, but not necessarily in all of them. Haidt did not believe it necessary to add any of these conditions. Apparently, he considers disloyalty in itself morally wrong.

In the example of the radio show, I would perhaps condemn calling into a foreign radio show if it would be expected to bring about suffering or other unwanted consequences (or if this was the intent behind the call), but if the call, critiquing one's homeland, would be placed in order to further the international discussion of democratic organization and other political values, I would say it was morally praiseworthy, even if it meant being 'disloyal' to a government which one approves of for the most part and is indebted to in some ways. If the caller's intent was something more trivial, like just to vent, I'd say it is morally neutral, permissible but of no moral worth.

[36] Haidt, *The Righteous Mind*, 7 The Moral Foundations of Politics, 2,3, figure 7.1.

I mention my personal reaction to Haidt's argument, because I think many people would share my reluctance to see disloyalty per se as immoral, and consequently loyalty per se as moral. I think this shows that Haidt assumes too much about what morality is and that this thought experiment does not show loyalty is in fact moral. I do not respond the way Haidt hopes or expects and I do not share this intuition. I imagine many would agree.

A plausible explanation of the difference in intuitions between Haidt and me might be the difference between American and Dutch (or western European) culture. Haidt himself acknowledges that not everyone refers to all five moral foundations in moral justification. Liberals tend not to focus on Loyalty, for instance.[37] I think it probable liberals would even explicitly reject it. This means the loyalty foundation is disputed by a significant group of moral actors, rendering it an unlikely universal foundation, where care and fairness still are possibly universal.

Haidt does not make any distinction between moral principles and other normative principles, which people may report considering moral ones, like social norms. He does not make this distinction, because, as a psychologist, he studies the phenomenon of morality rather than arguing for, or trying to discover, which principles ought to be considered moral. Though it may not be his project to find out what truly counts as moral, he appears to be crossing the line into the moral realm, because in his description of the moral intuitions of two opposing ideological groups he does not stay neutral.

By choosing to frame the difference between typically liberal and typically conservative morality in this way, that liberals miss something, that the loyalty foundation is a moral one, Haidt is taking sides. He is legitimizing the conservative perspective and undermining the liberal perspective. Haidt appears to aim for a value neutral description of moral psychology in liberals and conservatives, collecting, analysing, comparing and classifying how both groups themselves report their moral experiences. The epigraph of his book *The Righteous Mind* is a quote from Baruch Spinoza and shows his supposed detached and neutral stance in the matter: "I have striven not to laugh at human actions, not to weep at them, not to hate them, but to understand them."[38] Haidt explains that he used to be a liberal who didn't understand where the conservatives where coming from until he got immersed in traditional moral matrices in India, for research on moral psychology.[39] This relieved him from his righteous anger and allowed him to transcend partisanship and truly understand the conservatives' perspective, in addition to the liberals'. He understands where the conservatives are coming from and is dedicated to recording their moral psychology alongside and in contrast to liberal moral psychology. This results in his five moral foundations. These five moral foundations are meant to represent the full breadth of morality. Conservatives rely on all five, making it an accurate description of precisely all (and no more) of the foundations of conservative morality, whereas three of those five don't describe foundations liberals typically rely on or even recognize as moral.[40] So, ultimately, this description of the foundations of morality accepts the conservatives' conception of morality and rejects the liberals'. In taking the conservatives' conception, that all five foundations are moral, at face value, he acknowledges a part of their conviction, which is irreconcilable with the liberal point of view. However, taking the liberals' conception, that care and fairness are moral foundations, at face value does not result in anything which is, fundamentally, irreconcilable with the conservative point of view. It is asymmetrical. He

[37] Haidt, *The Righteous Mind*, 7: The Moral Foundations of Politics, 3: The Loyalty/Betrayal Foundation, 10.
[38] Ibid., Epigraph
[39] Ibid., 5: Beyond WEIRD Morality, Stepping Out of the Matrix, 7.
[40] Ibid., 7: The Moral Foundations of Politics, In Sum, 3.

places conservatives in a better epistemological position to know what morality is, because they have internal access to all moral foundations. Whereas, the liberal moral domain is explicitly described as 'narrow'.[41] This removes the necessity to provide arguments in support of the moral value of, for instance, loyalty and at the same time undercuts all arguments liberals could offer against it. Now it is true that Haidt suggests that conservatives also don't (fully) get where the liberals are coming from.[42] However, this absence of understanding on the conservatives' part does not translate into extra moral foundations typically only liberals rely on in Haidt's classification, implying that this absence is less significant, less fundamental, than the absence of liberals' understanding of parts of conservative morality. Even if Haidt claims that conservatives also don't understand all there is to the care and fairness foundations, classifying the moral domain in this way, as conservatives typically having the same moral foundations liberals have plus three more, is still partisan, it still says that on a *foundational* level the conservatives have a broader understanding of morality. It is perhaps what a psychologist or anthropologist strives for: to take the language of the studied groups at face value in order to keep his own convictions out of the equation. However, in this instance, precisely this attitude *undermines* his claim to impartiality. Describing the moral outlook of one group as narrow and the other as broader, without the caveat that the morality of those extra foundations is up for discussion (precisely because the liberals apparently don't share them), very much invites the reader to view the latter as more complete and therefore more correct.

Because Haidt implicitly lets the conservatives off the hook, requiring no defence for their insistence on loyalty, what could have been an enriching broadening of the horizon for the traditionally more liberal academic ethics, remains a mere observation of the fact that conservatives simply do value loyalty morally and no insight as to why we all might ought to. Liberals would presumably disagree with the idea that they do not *understand* the argument from loyalty. Moreover, they would probably hold that it is the conservatives that fail to get something. There is an interesting difference in framing between Buchanan and Powell and Haidt. Whereas Haidt portrays liberals as typically having a *narrower* set of moral foundations, Buchanan and Powell portray conservatives as typically having moral concern for a *narrower* set of subjects. This narrowness operates at a different level. Nevertheless, combining the two insights results in a seemingly paradoxical position: having a broader moral foundation means having regard for a narrower group of people. This seems improbable, because the conservatives would *also* rely on the care and fairness foundations, according to Haidt, which in liberals bring about their universalist leaning. Presumably, the conservatives are able to truly understand the liberals' point of view whereas the other way around, liberals *cannot* take on the conservatives' point of view. So, according to Haidt, the localist leaning of conservatives is simply a different prioritizing of moral principles, a different allocation of moral concern, based on a *broader* moral foundation. This is, however, at odds with Buchanan and Powell's portrayal of the inclusivist anomaly found in some individuals (or groups) but not in others, as something extra, a richer variation of morality. The inclusivist anomaly is seen as a growing feature of morality, which is *not yet* shared by all. On the one hand we have the conception of morality in which the localists/conservatives have something which the universalists/liberals don't – three of the five moral foundations – whereas on the other hand we have the conception of morality in which the universalists/liberals have something which the localists/conservatives don't – the inclusivist anomaly.

[41] Haidt, *The Righteous Mind*, 5: Beyond WEIRD Morality, In Sum, 2.
[42] Ibid., Beyond WEIRD Morality, Stepping Out of the Matrix, 12.

Loyalty is not simply an observable part of morality, as Haidt assumes. The morality of loyalty is controversial and needs arguments in support of it. We shall now discuss some of the most influential normative arguments for loyalty.

§2.2 Ethics of loyalty

In his book *The Limits of Loyalty*, moral and political philosopher Simon Keller dissects loyalty and discusses and criticizes the two major systematic attempts to defend loyalty, to show its centrality and importance to ethics.[43] He argues against these attempts and concludes that loyalty is not a moral virtue or value and that loyalty cannot be the foundation of morality.

The first attempt he calls the 'communitarian approach', of which George Fletcher, an authority on criminal law and legal philosophy, is an important proponent. In *Loyalty: An Essay on the Morality of Relationships* Fletcher professes, similar to Haidt, to be a converted liberal, arguing that loyalty is essential to morality. Generally, the communitarian states that the social embeddedness of people in communities is essential for morality.[44] Keller explains where the four types of arguments communitarians tend to make go wrong. Firstly, I will discuss these arguments and secondly, I will show why morality, even universalist morality, often appears to be an expression of loyalty.

The second attempt Keller distinguishes is Josiah Royce's (1855-1916) *Philosophy of Loyalty*, which may be understood as a Christian virtue ethics. For Royce, loyalty is psychologically primary because in loyalty true self-expression and social conformity are able to harmonize and it is theoretically central because loyalty to loyalty itself is the truest form of morality.

Communitarianism

The central claim of communitarianism, as Keller describes it, is that "community memberships are of vital importance in generating genuine moral standards and grounding genuine moral motivation."[45] According to communitarians, ethics can only emerge and bear meaning within a community. A fundamental part of your identity, including your moral compass, is formed by your community membership. In Fletchers words: ethics of loyalty "takes relationships as logically prior to the individual."[46] To betray your community is immoral, because it undermines the moral system to which you belong and adhere and it is, essentially, to betray your own identity. I will describe four key communitarian arguments and show how they can be refuted, using Keller's work.

Firstly, the 'argument from the metaphysical self' says that "Group loyalty is a central virtue, because without it a person cannot live a life in which she is fully aware of and comfortable with her own true identity."[47] As Keller argues, while this argument sees loyalty as the essential relationship between an individual and the group without which the individual cannot truly be himself, loyalty is in fact not necessary for you to be familiar with your own true identity in as much as it is formed by your group membership.[48] Rather, if you don't *understand* or *acknowledge* this forming relationship with the group, then you might be alienated from yourself. No sense of loyalty is necessary for this.

Secondly, the 'argument from the ethical self' says that "It is only through the practices and activities of a particular community that a fully-functioning moral consciousness can be acquired and

[43] Simon Keller, *The Limits of Loyalty* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 182.
[44] Ibid., 162.
[45] Ibid.
[46] George P. Fletcher, *Loyalty: An Essay On the Morality of Relationships* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 15.
[47] Keller, *The Limits of Loyalty*, 164.
[48] Ibid., 166.

exercised, which is to say that moral beliefs and motivations make sense – find their articulation, justification and reinforcement – only within the context of a particular community and its shared history and form of life."[49] Just like in the first argument, from this claim no obligation to be loyal flows. The argument from the ethical self moves from the claim that ethics can only exist because of and within communities to the claim we should be loyal to those communities. If ethics is merely a product of a certain community and its traditions, the question whether loyalty to that community is a moral virtue is to be answered from within that tradition, using arguments and ideas from that tradition. However, it remains a question to be answered.

Thirdly, the 'empirical argument' "says that people who do not have loyalties to their communities are more likely to be alienated from themselves and their surroundings; they are more likely to be selfish, criminal and nihilistic."[50] Keller argues that this argument is often presented without actual empirical support.[51] It is merely assumed that loyal people make for the best citizens. Though loyalty will surely have its practical uses, it is not proven that a general moral sense might not have a more positive impact upon a society than loyalty.

Fourthly, the 'morality as loyalty argument' says that "Any individual that enters your moral consideration must do so in so far as she is fellow member of some group or other. And to take an individual into moral consideration is to express loyalty to a group to which you and she both belong."[52] Keller argues that this argument, in its most sophisticates version, says we need to reconstrue morality as always fundamentally motivated by a sense of group loyalty.[53]

However, in refuting this argument, I think Keller misses the point. He tries to show that not all moral motivation is based in loyalty, which I take to be true. This intuition is for me far more convincing in itself than the examples with which he tries to illustrate this. Keller's example is the following: Your dog, for which you care greatly, is terminally ill, but can be rescued, using a medicine which is offered to you. This medicine is scarce and also used for human treatment. If you accept it, some people will not be able to receive treatment and likely two or three will die.[54] Keller thinks it is obvious that what motivates you to help your dog is an instance of loyalty, whereas your motivation for not doing so, for choosing to save the humans, is a moral motivation, but is not based in loyalty.[55] This is, according to Keller, not an example of clashing loyalties, but of loyalty and (other) moral considerations clashing. 'Morality as loyalty' proponents would, I think, not be convinced, because they could argue that, though your commitment to your dog is clearly more personal and special in some way than the feelings you have for the strangers you save, what you feel for them is still loyalty. The loyalty you feel for other humans is even stronger than the loyalty you feel for you dog, because your group membership of mankind is in some ways more fundamental to who you are and therefore a stronger motivator than your relationship with your pet.

However, I believe Keller is right in claiming that not all moral principles or instances of moral motivation are reducible to loyalty. In fact, it may be the other way around. Considerations of justice or moral concern for strangers far away may look like loyalty, because we recognize the humanity of the other, we see they are the same as us, in some fundamental, relevant way, and feel that, therefore, they deserve no less than us.

[49] Keller, *The Limits of Loyalty*, 166.
[50] Ibid., 171.
[51] Ibid., 173.
[52] Ibid., 175.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid., 177.
[55] Ibid.

Moral and evolutionary psychology shows that one of the fundamental psychological building blocks of morality is empathy, which is made possible, and likely was able to be developed evolutionarily, by mirror neurons, which aid learning.[56] When you watch behaviour in someone you can recognize yourself in, the same neurons fire as when performing the same behaviour yourself, enabling you to mimic that behaviour and learn skills. The perceived similarity between humans enables them to empathize with each other. Ingroups and loyalties help us recognise each other as belonging to the same group, as similar. Therefore, we empathise more easily with ingroup members. Loyalties influence ingroup demarcation and strengthen ingroup bonds. This means loyalties influence our ability to empathise with certain individuals. Loyalty does not generate empathy (and indirectly morality) though it might seem this way because it may increase empathy because of its enhancing effect on ingroup formation. Loyalty might be a modifier (perhaps even a net increaser) of manifestations of moral concern, but if it modifies it cannot be the basis of it, it does not *create* it. Though the psychological building blocks for loyalty (a tendency for ingroup favouritism and outgroup antagonism) and morality (empathy, care) might have evolved in the same circumstances as reaction to the same or related selection pressures, they are distinct. Though they might influence each other they don't coincide. Loyalty does not create empathy, rather, it merely modifies, allocates, restrains, enhances or decreases empathy for certain groups. So, it is an influence on morality but not its starting point.

It seems that we are not so much motivated by loyalty as by the recognition that others are similar to us in fundamental, relevant respects. Fundamental in cases like these, are a shared nature, identity or capacities and our ability to recognize them, not a shared group membership (though, to be sure, this often affects our moral motivation as well). This motivation could be described in terms of group loyalty; we feel loyal to the group of people whom we recognize as relevantly similar: mankind. It is even natural to use the language of groups, because it is an efficient way of communicating that there is much similar suffering of many similar individuals. To draw attention to other humanitarian injustices it is logical to appeal to our compassion for mankind as a whole, as a group. Describing this as group loyalty is, however, missing the point. It suggests that our shared group membership is the primary motivator, that this is what justifies and calls for our moral concern. I believe this does not adequately describe the justification, nor the motivation, of common universalist moral concern or traditional universalist ethics. It is not informative for what universalist morality *really* is, as the proponents of 'morality as loyalty' would have it, though perhaps it might be informative for what loyalty really is. Care and empathy, and other emotions underlying moral concern, for humans and humanity may be both logically and psychologically prior to loyalty to mankind.

Loyalty to loyalty

Now I will discuss Royce's approach to justifying the moral value of loyalty. He attempts to give a firm foundation for ethics, because, he argues, in his time critics undermined the bases for traditional ethics.[57] Royce seems to adopt the virtue ethical idea that what is right follows from what an idealized actor would do, and the teleological idea that all aspects of one's life, including moral character, are in perfect harmony when one's telos (similar to Royce's 'plan of life') is realized. So, we should look into ourselves, "For your own will and your own desire, once fully brought to self-consciousness, furnish the only valid reason for you to know what is right and good."[58] However,

[56] Frans B.M. de Waal, "Putting the Altruism Back into Altruism: The Evolution of Empathy," *Annual Review of Psychology* 59 (2008): 286-287.
[57] Josiah Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1908), 6-7.
[58] Ibid., 26.

mere introspection cannot give us this knowledge, because "I, left to myself, can never find a plan of life. I have no inborn ideal naturally present within myself. By nature I simply go on crying out in a sort of chaotic self-will, according as the momentary play of desire determines."[59] The solution to this paradox lies in our social nature. In social interaction we learn the tools for self-expression, like language. Plans of life are suggested and we can look inward to see if they resonate.[60] There is a tension between the outer world, conformity, and the inner world, our egoistic or chaotic will. We go back and forth in moral development and deliberation. Loyalty can reconcile this paradox, merging conformity with true self-expression.[61] The patriot, for instance, passionately cares for his cause, serving his country in war, which is precisely what society wants from him.

Royce believes that for loyalty to achieve this reconciliation, it must be passionate, and therefore it cannot be tied to mere other individuals or mere customs or laws, but to complex social causes.[62] In answering the question what kinds of plans of life are to be adopted, he chooses a very peculiar instance of loyalty, to avoid militaristic associations, as illustration of the purest form of loyalty. In doing so, however, he removes from loyalty a very common association: loyalty to other humans, loyalty as simply social. He gives as example of the most pure form of loyalty the story of how the speaker of the House of Commons defied his king out of loyalty to the House, to a political institution, in essence an example of loyalty to a set of values.[63] Indeed, Royce defines loyalty as "The willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause."[64]

In his attempt to figure out which loyalties ought to count as good ones, Royce arrives at the notion of 'loyalty to loyalty'.[65] Where usually loyalty is directed at individuals, groups of people or institutions, Royce's supreme form of loyalty is directed at a value, at itself. Because loyalty is the source of morality, the best, most authentic attitude, it is itself the best object of loyalty. So, the most virtuous person would not seek to further merely the interests of his community but rather of loyalty *anywhere.*

However, as Keller argues, Royce's project does not really have loyalty at its heart. What Royce actually appears to mean when he writes of loyalty to loyalty, is best described as wholehearted devotion or principled commitment to the cause of wholehearted devotion or principled commitment.[66] Loyalty to loyalty is a principled commitment rather than a loyalty, because it can take the form of any and all traditional virtues and values, prominent among which are universalist commitments. According to Royce, people ought to scrutinize their local loyalties in the light of their commitment to loyalty in general, to how loyalty is best promoted for and to all people. Since this principled commitment is to take itself as the highest and primary value, it is a principled commitment to the cause of principled commitment, including but not limited to loyalty.

Loyalty has become so broad, general and all-encompassing and is used in such a particular, technical way in Royce's work, that it can hardly be understood as loyalty at all. Royce's reverence for loyalty as the principle value of morality seems to be inspired mostly by the passion with which he associates it. Mention of commitment to any group is rare. In his analysis of the development of loyalties like patriotism, he sees the solution of the paradox of the inner and outer influences on one's plan of life in loyalty, because in loyalty conformity and true self-expression merge. However,

[59] Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, 31.
[60] Ibid., 32-33.
[61] Ibid., 37-38.
[62] Ibid., 43.
[63] Ibid., 102-103.
[64] Ibid., 16-17.
[65] Ibid., 118.
[66] Keller, *The Limits of Loyalty*, 189.

civil disobedience, resistance, uprising and revolution surely have, in certain (historical) instances, the very same values at heart as Royce's hailed instances of patriotism, his social causes. Although their direction in relation to the prevalent public opinion or governmental stance might be completely opposite, the passion with which these principles are pursued could very well be the same as could their value. To understand these instances of devotion to causes as loyalty, would be stretching its meaning too far. Justified subversiveness is better characterized as (just or morally motivated) disloyalty than as loyalty. Royce would presumably not have thought a patriotist Nazi a virtuous person.

I would like to suggest a primary distinction between two different forms of loyalty This, I think, will help us assess the moral worth of loyalty. Manifestations of loyalty can be seen as falling into two broad categories: loyalty to other (groups of) persons and loyalty to ideals or values. However, most loyalties (possibly all, to some degree) fall into both. When you are loyal to a particular political ideal, you are probably also loyal, to some extent, to a political group, or political leaders, sharing and furthering that ideal. Conversely, when you are loyal to other humans, for instance your parents, friends or fellow citizens, one of the reasons (though probably often not the most important one) you might give for this loyalty is that you share ideals and values.

Still, I think it is useful to divide loyalty into these two categories, because the (moral) value of loyalty can be best assessed when these two aspects are considered separately. Assessments of any particular loyalty would get the form of 'this loyalty is (in)valuable to the extent that it is a personal or social loyalty, because… and it is (in)valuable to the extent that is an idealistic loyalty, because…'

Royce himself also defends the value of loyalty clearly in terms of extrinsic ideals when he explicitly rejects loyalty to mere individuals.[67] His rejection of loyalty to mere customs or laws entails that a cause worthy of loyalty is to have real substance, it is not the rejection of loyalty to (political) ideals or values. On the contrary, it is that they are not idealistic enough.

If it is true (and let us assume for the moment that it is, see 3.1) that the moral reasons for promoting personal concern for, and attachment to, other (groups of) humans, are better captured by other moral arguments, than those building upon loyalty, and if we accept that ideals and values are to be valued for their own sake, not for loyalty's sake, loyalty turns out to be an amoral concept (even if it would be a morally desirable social phenomenon), only extrinsically valuable.

I propose that loyalty, as a fundamental moral value, should be rejected. Loyalty to ideals may be admirable, but theoretically, those ideals in themselves have moral value (or not) and should *therefore* be valued and pursued (or not). They are not to be valued or pursued for the sake of loyalty, but for their own sake.

Of course, loyalty may have instrumental value. But understood like this, loyalty can never be an argument used by conservatives for keeping ingroups small and focusing more on them rather than on large inclusivist groups.

In sum

In this chapter we have looked into the value of loyalty and its capacity for founding (localist) morality. Haidt's conception of loyalty as moral foundation is not neutral; it portrays morality in such a way that conservatives would agree but liberals wouldn't. He puts conservatives in a better epistemological position, since conservatives 'get' something liberals don't, but conversely does not regard the inclusivist anomaly as some fundamental thing conservatives don't 'get'.

[67] Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, 43.

Communitarians mistakenly hold that if morality can only exist because of and within communities, and communities are essential for your identity and moral development, you must be loyal to them. Understanding the relationship between your community, your identity and morality does not require loyalty. Neither is moral concern always a manifestation of loyalty, since it is not shared group membership but rather shared human nature and capacity for pain and pleasure which motivates us.

Royce's defence of loyalty turns out to be best understood as a defence of wholehearted devotion. The loyalty to causes, he advocates, is only valuable insofar, and because of, the values or ideals are independently morally valuable.

So, can loyalty justify moral localism? No, it cannot. Loyalty is itself morally neutral and it is no precondition for morality. Loyalty is not universally relied on in moral justification. Morality's dependence on communities does not make loyalty fundamental or even valuable. Loyalty's moral value, when it has any, is always extrinsic, dependent on the moral value of its object.

Chapter 3: Ethics of care and pluralism

Theorists arguing for a politically conservative outlook on ethics, arguing for why we are right to prioritize ingroups over outgroups morally, traditionally lean on two types of arguments: one concerned with the psychological feasibility of universalist ethics (for instance, presented by Haidt and Asma) and one with the inherent moral value of loyalty (for instance, presented by ethicists of loyalty like Royce and Fletcher).

The feasibility argument rests on the idea that ought implies can. If we cannot concern ourselves morally with groups beyond a certain size it cannot, meaningfully, be considered a moral failure if we fail to do so. I have not argued against the logic of this argument, but rather against the truth of its premise. I have argued that it is not true *that* we are psychologically constrained to the extent that we are incapable of being morally concerned with mankind at large. Ingroups fit over each other concentrically, peacefully, with no inherent limitation on their size. Cross cutting ingroups are beneficial to a society and bring potentially everyone into some ingroup. The universalist tendencies of traditional ethical theories and religion (but also international law, relief agencies, etc.) sprouted from somewhere: clearly, we are also psychologically inclined to be morally concerned with mankind at large. Moral commitments to bigger groups may be of a different psychological kind than those to smaller groups. The scope of human morality is constantly successfully stretched and redefined; we care for an increasingly large number of people.

Proponents of this argument often add that we, as states, are obligated to aid people worse off in foreign countries. It is not a personal moral failure but a psychological impossibility and therefore this should be corrected by means of international law, for instance. Ultimately, they subscribe to universalist values but remove them from the personal sphere, from 'normal' human morality.

The normative argument is typically primarily concerned with loyalty and the innately social nature of morality, whether it is Royce, seeing loyalty as the solution to the paradox of morality of unguided inner passion versus social causes and conformity and therefore the foundation of morality, or communitarians, arguing communities are necessary preconditions for morality, that morality can only exist, and only makes sense, within communities. However, in what way communities underly our morality is irrelevant for the moral value of loyalty (to those communities). Every moral justification for loyalty ultimately rests on external moral values, making it at best instrumentally valuable.

Proponents of these arguments sometimes extend the ultimate, most true, or most desirable form of loyalty to mankind at large, ultimately also subscribing to universalist values, like Royce's moving away from specific communities aiming for dedication to a value to be applied universally: loyalty to loyalty.

Apparently, universalist morality is often right around the corner when we discuss morality's scope, even when loyalty is defended. Perhaps the idea that we ought to care for a person naturally flows into the idea that every person ought to be cared for, because our reasons for why we *ought* to, as opposed to why we want to, for instance, tend to be universal. Perhaps the disagreement lies primarily in our conceptions of the best way to bring such care about and whose responsibility it is.

In any case, besides what proponents of politically conservative ethics themselves ultimately hold, I have tried to show that we *can* in fact care morally for mankind at large and that we *ought* to do so, that loyalty is unable to generate a moral argument against universalist morality.

Thus far I have only argued against the idea that we ought not and cannot stretch morality to its universalist extreme. I have argued that we can look beyond our small ingroups with moral concern and that loyalty gives us no moral argument to show favouritism for our ingroups. I have painted a picture of politically conservative ethics on the one hand versus universalist ethics on the

other, where I have exclusively backed the latter. But is this all there is to it? Are there no defendable moral arguments in favour of caring more for those close to you than for those far away? There are. Even within traditional universalist ethics they may be found, though they are scarcer and more secondary to the more abstract and impersonal universalist principles from which they are derived. Feminists have pointed out this one-sidedness of traditional ethics and have argued for the recognition of the inherent moral value of care, human attachment and responsiveness to need and dependence, creating the ethics of care. In this chapter I will try to answer the question: Might care be a better foundation for moral localism? This will lead us to the question: Are localism and universalism reconcilable?

In the first paragraph we will look at ethics of care, because it may be considered an alternative to ethics of loyalty for grounding localist morality, since its focus lies on care, attachment and dependence between people close to each other, small scale ingroups. I will briefly sketch its history and main arguments before comparing it to ethics of loyalty to see where they differ relevantly. I will show why it might be considered a more promising approach to moral localism. In the second paragraph I will review how this position relates to the universalist morality, which is prevalent in traditional ethical theory and which I defended against attacks from evoconservatism and ethics of loyalty in the first two chapters. Are localist and universalist morality reconcilable, and if not, is that a problem?

§3.1 Ethics of Care

In chapter 2 I have shown where attempts to ground ethics in loyalty go wrong. However, to say loyalty cannot properly ground ethics is not to say that localist morality (including the value of loyalty) should be discarded altogether. It just means localist morality is not to be grounded in loyalty. In this chapter I will look towards another moral theory, which like an ethics of loyalty, focusses on localist commitments, but tries to ground it on different principles: ethics of care.

Ethicists of care seek to formulate an alternative to traditional ethical theory, because of its impersonal approach and place care at the foundation of morality. Care, rather than loyalty, is a clear instance of empathy, or perhaps it encompasses it. Either way, it is very similar and overlaps greatly. Care and empathy are genuine, primary and personal forms of other regard. If you truly care for someone you undeniably feel empathy for them and when you feel empathy for someone you cannot help but to care for them. Empathy is widely held to psychologically underly morality.

Therefore, ethics of care is a very promising alternative. In what follows I shall discuss the critique ethicists of care have on traditional universalist ethical theory, and how some seek to supplement it. I will also show what advantages ethics of care holds over ethics of loyalty and how ethics of care can ground loyalty.

A feminist alternative

Developmental psychologist Carol Gilligan played an important role in the coming about of ethics of care. In her 1982 book *In a Different Voice* she critiques her colleague Lawrence Kohlberg's work. He found that boys develop quicker towards moral maturity, and even that girls sometimes don't reach the same level of moral maturity at all.[68] The model used for establishing this was constructed using data from boys' development. Gilligan studied female moral development and found that a different

[68] Virginia Held, *The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 27; Kathryn Norlock, "Feminist Ethics," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, May, 2019, accessed July 15, 2019, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-ethics/, 2.2.

perspective or *different voice* was discernible.[69] In an important paper, Gilligan and Jane Attanucci report three studies which she conducted, in which men and women where asked if they were ever in a moral conflict where they weren't sure what the right thing to do was, and then extensively to elaborate.[70] This way they were able to analyse what kinds of real life moral dilemma's people themselves present. All considerations concerning these dilemma's people mentioned where classified as either justice or care. They found that two thirds of the participants presented considerations of at least 75 percent from either the care ('Care Focus') or justice ('Justice Focus') category, with many even presenting exclusively one of the two.[71] They also found that "there is an association between moral orientation and gender such that both men and women use both orientations, but Care Focus Dilemmas are more likely to be presented by women and Justice Focus Dilemmas by men. Analysis of care and justice as distinct moral orientations that address different moral concerns leads to a consideration of both perspectives as constituitive of mature moral thinking."[72] Since there was only one man falling in the Care Focus group, "if women were excluded from a study of moral reasoning, Care Focus could easily be overlooked."[73] This shows that women aren't slower and don't fail to develop into full moral maturity more often than men, but that they typically develop towards a slightly but distinctly different moral outlook. A bias in Lawrence's methods left the female point of view out, leading to an incomplete picture of moral maturity.

Feminist philosophers found that such skewed trends were not confined to developmental psychology but were present in moral theory as well.[74] So Gilligan's work underpinned and inspired feminist ethics; for a large part, she gave birth to the fruitful idea of the perspective of care, sprouting several philosophical critiques of traditional moral theory.[75] Ethicists of care show that there is a long tradition of underrepresentation of moral values which women focus on more often than men. The typically slightly but distinctly different moral orientation of women has long been left underexamined and seen as (developmentally) morally inferior.

Social and political feminist philosopher Virginia Held was one of the most influential thinkers developing the idea of the perspective of care as an alternative to the dominant perspective of justice into a fully-fledged moral theory, stressing the moral fundamentality of care, as distinct from the fundamentals recognized in traditional moral theory.[76] As Held explains, this different perspective can be explained by the traditional role of women: "Traditionally, women have been expected to do most of the caring work that needs to be done; the sexual division of labor exploits women by extracting unpaid care labor from them, making women less able than men to engage in paid work. 'Femininity' constructs women as carers."[77] Which is not to say that care-oriented morality is entirely or exclusively a product of this oppressive, gendered division of labour. Rather, the fact that there is a discernible difference between men and women in their reliance on care in moral deliberation may, in part, be explained by this history. It is to be expected that a certain group with a certain role in society tends to be more focused on specific subjects, has specific inclinations

[69] Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).

[70] Carol Gilligan and Jane Attanucci, "Two Moral Orientations: Gender Differences and Similarities," *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly* 34, no. 3 (1988): 229.

[71] Ibid., 231.

[72] Ibid., 233.

[73] Ibid., 232.

[74] Held, *The Ethics of Care*, 28.

[75] Norlock, "Feminist Ethics," 2.2.

[76] Held, *The Ethics of Care*, 3-4; Norlock, "Feminist Ethics," 2.2.

[77] Held, *The Ethics of Care*, 16.

and intuitions regarding ethics, not shared by another group. Ethicists of care have investigated thoroughly and productively this neglected perspective's understanding of the fundamental questions of ethics, giving its own answers, its own conceptualizations of the right and the good.

This care-centred moral tradition is unrecognized by traditional ethical theory, which has overwhelmingly been developed by men. The male focus on rationality, on universalist, abstract principles like justice and the absence of more personal principles prompted feminists to develop the ethics of care. Ethics of care "calls into question the universalistic and abstract rules of the dominant theories," Held writes.[78] Ethicists of care reject the priority given to abstraction, universality and impartiality over particular moral claims of particular individuals. Also, ethics of care acknowledges the epistemological role emotions play in ethics, instead of the rejection of emotionality in favour of rational deduction, often found in other theories. Ethics of care values certain emotions, like empathy and responsiveness but also anger, under certain provisions, like critical scrutiny.[79] It does not provide a mere description of (the emotion of) care, but an evaluation of it. The focus of traditional ethical theory on autonomy is also criticized for overlooking the dependency, which is inherent and plentiful in human life. Those traditional theories idealize the rational and independent agent, overlooking that in reality we are for a considerable part of our lives, very dependent on the care others give us, and some their whole lives.[80]

Virginia Held identifies the central focus of ethics of care as being on "the compelling moral salience of attending to and meeting the needs of the particular others for whom we take responsibility."[81] For instance, the special appeal a child places on her parents is a fundamentally moral appeal, which is insufficiently, or not at all, recognized or explained by traditional ethical theory. The recognition of care as a basic moral principle (like justice) is meant to remedy this deficiency.

This deficiency has not only been noticed by ethicists of care, but also for example by moral philosopher Bernard Williams. Williams speaks of 'ground projects', which provide one with "the motive force which propels him into the future, and gives him a reason for living."[82] Similarly, 'commitments' are projects "with which one is deeply and extensively involved and identified," "around which one has built his life" and of which it is absurd to demand of someone to lay them aside because of a universal moral judgment.[83] Williams argues that when alienating yourself from some particular fundamental 'projects' of yours, which utilitarianism or Kantianism might require of you, life has no substance, and without substance in life, morality, among other things, does not make sense. To blindly apply a utilitarian calculation or categorical imperative to whatever moral dilemma you're faced with, removes yourself from the equation in a way that undermines your very adherence to a moral system, whatever it is.[84]

He has discussed an example by Charles Fried to illustrate how one such project may trump or undermine universalist morality: "surely it would be absurd to insist that if a man could, at no risk or cost to himself, save one or two persons in equal peril, and one of those in peril was, say, his wife,

[78] Held, *The Ethics of Care*, 11.
[79] Ibid., 10.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Bernard Williams, "Persons, character and morality," in *Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980*, edited by James Rachels (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 13.
[83] Bernard Williams, "A critique of utilitarianism," in *Philosophy: Basic Readings*, edited by Nigel Warburton (London: Routledge, 2005), 103-104, Taylor & Francis e-Library.
[84] Williams, "Persons, character and morality," 18-19; Williams, "A critique of utilitarianism," 103-104.

he must treat both equally, perhaps by flipping a coin."[85] Williams argues it lies beyond justification that this man may choose to save his wife, for any justification he could give would constitute "one thought too many," he should only be motivated by the thought of his wife alone, not also by extra thoughts expressing universal moral judgments.[86]

Williams' critique of universalist morality is rather similar to the one offered by ethics of care. However, Held takes issue with Williams' argument because it still takes the traditional moral framework of an individualistic dilemma between egoism and universalist moral commitments. I do not think this criticism is wholly justified, because Williams' 'ground projects' or 'commitments' cannot simply be reduced to egoistic desires since he explicitly argues they need not be selfish or self-centred and may be altruistic.[87] I think Williams was trying to get at something rather similar as ethics of care is. However, ethics of care goes one step further. Even though Williams apparently believes that it is permissible in some way to save one's wife in Fried's example, he does not argue that this is *morally* justified. Instead he argues that it lies beyond justification. Because he qualifies moral consciousness as impartial and seems to regard the 'impartial view' inherent to morality, he is committed to claiming that the agent saving his wife lies beyond (moral) justification, rather than just beyond the scope of universalist moral justification.[88]

I think it is a missed opportunity Williams did not make this distinction, between impartial morality and morality per se, otherwise he might have said that the agent's thoughts of his wife alone (as opposed to in conjunction with some universalist moral principle) are morally relevant and sufficient for judgments like these, and that this fact is missed by traditional ethics, like ethicists of care argue. The insistence that some of one's projects, for instance the connection to one's partner, give one substance by virtue of which morality makes sense at all is similar to the insistence on the moral primacy of human interconnectedness and interdependence, argued by ethics of care.

So, there are in fact some clear issues with universalist moral theory. It is traditionally one-sided, it has not seen the moral salience of special relations and dependencies and the moral concerns flowing from this, typically presented by women, and it (therefore) sometimes requires you to alienate yourself from some of your fundamental commitments in a way that undermines all moral commitment.

Now an ethics of loyalty may also critique universalism in some similar ways. This in itself would leave undecided if ethics of care or ethics of loyalty is preferable. Ethics of loyalty does, however, not seem to stem from a neglected, unseen or oppressed perspective. Loyalty is typically advocated by (conservative) politicians, academics, and religious preachers, who are, here in the West, typically, members of the group responsible for the traditional ethical theories: white men. The overwhelmingly male constitution of traditional ethical theorists created a bias such that typically female moral considerations, which differ slightly, were left unseen. It is unclear what biased group dynamics, unseen perspectives or social injustices an ethics of loyalty would point out or originate from.

It could be argued that Williams' critique of universalism may support ethics of loyalty, just as much as ethics of care. However, there are, at least some striking similarities between Williams' issues with traditional ethics and those of ethics of care. Though Williams' criticisms may be explainable from an ethics of loyalty point of view, the focus and spirit of his criticisms seem to me to be more similar to those of ethics of care. Ethicists of loyalty might disagree. However, *if* loyalty is disqualified, because of some differences between loyalty and care, Williams' critique only provides

[85] Williams, "Persons, character and morality," 17.
[86] Ibid., 18.
[87] Ibid., 13.
[88] Ibid., 17-18.

us with a reason to look further for an account of moral localism, which does not run into the same issues, as care might. One such difference may be the different, unoppressed, origins of ethics of loyalty. Next we shall discuss some further differences which may support a preference for care as localist foundation.

Hierarchy

Another reason to favour ethics of care over ethics of loyalty has to do with their perspectives on hierarchies. Gilligan noted that women, more often than men, understand human connection in a distinctly non-hierarchical way.[89] Ethicists of care in general focus on values like personal attachment, rather than the more impersonal values like justice and equality traditional ethical theory is primarily concerned with, when analysing (the morality of) human relationships. As Gilligan writes, this means that "the images or metaphors for relationships shift from hierarchy or balance to network or web."[90] Many ethicists of care even seek to abolish hierarchy as inherent feature of society and replace it with a cooperative model fostering mutual trust and care.[91]

Ethics of loyalty tends to be not particularly critical of the hierarchical ordering and understanding of human relationships. It is not mentioned often but when Fletcher does discuss it, it is valued positively as instrumental to effective mass action and the continuity and stability of government.[92] Also, loyalty, outside of these specific philosophical attempts to ground ethics in it, is used to reinforce particular hierarchical power structures, loyalty to a party, to a country, to a president, to a general, etc.

Ethics of care on the other hand focuses especially on dependencies within personal relationships. In other words, it is concerned with those who require help or care, with those who are vulnerable or needy, as we all are at least in some point in our lives. It typically seeks to promote the wellbeing and empowerment of those less well of than us. So, whereas, ethics of loyalty looks 'up' to authority and enforces hierarchy, ethics of care looks 'down' towards the vulnerable and seeks to level out power inequalities.

Arguably harm averseness is one of the most uncontroversial moral principles, found in some shape or form in most ethical systems as one of the central principles. Ethics of care's directedness towards the vulnerable is more in line with this principle than ethics of loyalty's directedness towards authority. Though these hierarchical structures often contribute to many morally praiseworthy causes, like the welfare state, with its social security, social resource allocation, division of labour, peace keeping, etc. it is also a major moral liability because, left unchecked authority can create moral disaster at unprecedented scale. For any systemic injustices, for any structural mechanisms making certain groups of people worse off, the (unquestioning) reinforcement of existing hierarchies enables the continuation of those injustices.

Exclusivism

An ethics of care might replace an ethics of loyalty as the basis for a moral argument in favour of localist commitments. This is not to say, however, that ethics of care denies the moral value of loyalty; it does not. On the contrary, it values some forms of loyalty, albeit not as morally fundamental but rather as product of primary values like care.

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[89] Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice*, 62.

[90] Carol Gilligan, "Moral Orientation and Moral Development," in *The Feminist Philosophy Reader,* ed. Alison Bailey and Chris Cuomo (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 469.

[91] Held, *The Ethics of Care*, 152.

[92] Fletcher, *Loyalty*, 33.

Ethics of loyalty and ethics of care are to a large extent not mutually exclusive. There is a large overlap and in some instances the difference seems to lie merely in language. For instance, Philip Pettit argues that "to be loyal is to be dedicated to a particular individual's welfare."[93] This is remarkably similar to the focus of ethics of care on personal relationships and the accompanying responsibility for others. Both start from everyday experience, from moral practice.

However, the inherently exclusivist characteristics of loyalty, with which an ethics of loyalty needs to deal, clash with traditional ethical theory. Care does not share those characteristics. To be loyal means to not betray a certain group (or person, or institution, etc.). This is a core feature of loyalty, one of its defining characteristics. This is not controversial; Haidt also refers to the Loyalty foundation as the Loyalty/Betrayal foundation.[94] This means that loyalty to one group is irreconcilable with loyalty to the other group (the group defined by the negation of the definition of the first group). There must be some outgroup which we don't show the same dedication, to which we don't betray the ingroup and which might pose challenges in the face of which we might prove our loyalty. For loyalty to one group to exist, another group must be excluded from such loyalty. The denial of loyalty to a group entails the denial of *some* moral considerations (even more so if loyalty is taken as the foundation of morality). However, care to one group is not irreconcilable with care to any other. Care, and the (other) moral considerations accompanying it, may be distributed unequally, but not because of the exclusion of some groups as direct consequence of the care shown others, rather, because of unequally distributed *obligations*, based on neediness, dependence, the relationship to the agent, etc. Care does not entail the denial of care for others, it does not exclude others from care, and the (other) moral considerations accompanying it, in any direct sense.

An ethics of loyalty does not endorse the same kinds of loyalties as an ethics of care would. Loyalty is often associated with exclusivism and militarism and authority, and, by extension, (the thread of) violence. An ethics of loyalty needs to either embrace these and explain why they are morally good or permissible, or it needs view their association as mistaken. Royce opts for the latter when he writes: "I have mentioned the patriot aflame with the war-spirit, the knight of romance, and the Japanese Samurai. But these examples may have too much emphasized the common but false impression that loyalty necessarily has to do with the martial virtues and with the martial vices."[95] He seems discomforted by this steady association, as I think many would, and do. However, they may very well be a natural product of the exclusivism I argued is inherent in loyalty and therefore accompany loyalty so reliably. Proposing an ethics of 'loyalty' therefore requires a modification of the common conception of loyalty, when one wishes to disassociate it from the 'martial virtues and vices', like Royce does. This discomfort with exclusivism and militarism might in part explain Royce favouring loyalty to loyalty over patriotism and other loyalties to (groups of) people. Loyalty to loyalty is indeed a very strange sort of loyalty, moreover it is, as Keller argues, best understood not as a form of loyalty at all but rather wholehearted devotion. Likewise, 'betraying' this loyalty, the loyalty to a central value (loyalty), seems to only make sense in a metaphorical way, more accurately it would be described as a failure of integrity. Royce, ultimately, does not advocate loyalty in any ordinary sense, he does not advocate a loyalty at odds with universalist morality, he does not advocate a truly localist loyalty, and, unsurprisingly, there's an argument to be made that he does not advocate loyalty at all. Instead of defending loyalty and distorting it almost beyond recognition to shake off its unwanted consequences, thereby removing what it was supposed to

[93] Philip Pettit, "The Paradox of Loyalty," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 25, no. 2 (1988): 163.
[94] Haidt, *The Righteous Mind*, 7: The Moral Foundations of Politics, The Loyalty/betrayal Foundation.
[95] Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, 102.

bring to morality: a defence of localist morality, we might better turn to care to defend localist morality, having no such violent or exclusivist associations, avoiding these difficulties.

Likewise, when Allport argues that loyalties need not clash, that to be loyal to a certain group does not entail one cannot also be loyal in some way to individuals or groups outside of that group, this is a bit of a departure from the traditional, everyday understanding of the term 'loyalty'. Though 'loyalty', in this common sense, is primarily concerned with a positive attitude towards a certain group or individual, it *is* parasitic upon the notion that there are groups or individuals to whom we do *not* show this positive attitude, which we might even actively seek to disadvantage to our own advantage. There needs to be some kind of appeal from outside the group to which we are loyal, in the face of which we can prove our loyalty. If we were to use the term ingroup, the same kinds of issues occur. As I discussed before, an ingroup *seems to* imply an outgroup. If we replace the term 'loyalty' with 'care', these issues seem to be kept at bay. As I argued, it is perfectly consistent to declare that you care for the entirety of humanity.

A reason to prefer ethics of care over ethics of loyalty is that ethics of care is able to ground localist morality, that it offers a way of valuing moral commitments and connections to small scale ingroups, *without* at the same time denying outgroups moral concern. Some ethicists of care actually wish to incorporate the value of care into a universal moral framework.[96] A version of ethics of care which sees itself as supplementary to universalist ethics, is best understood as neither a complete rejection of, nor a harmonious addition to, universalist ethical theory. On the one hand ethics of care is an *alternative* to universalist ethical theory. Ethicists of care critique traditional ethical theories for focusing exclusively, or too much, on abstract and impersonal values like impartiality and universality. On the other hand, ethics of care may be understood as a *supplement* to universalist ethical theory. Some proponents of ethics of care hold that universalist moral principles have their place, their proper domain, just as localist moral principles like care. Ethics of care is not clearly exclusively a localist ethics. It may be reconcilable with universalist morality because it is not exclusivist. However, it still proposes a shift in focus, and even if it may be integrated with universalist morality, this universalism is still not primary, at most it is on par with its (added) localist foundational value: care.

Instrumental value

In the previous chapter, I have argued that loyalty, as a fundamental moral value, should be rejected. Again, this is not to say that the language and dynamics of loyalty cannot have an instrumental moral value. Undeniably it brings about a lot of morally valuable behaviour. Haidt argues that loyalty can increase our moral capital (the total of willingness and ability to act morally) and that it therefore furthers not exclusively loyally motivated behaviour, but also moral behaviour in general.[97] A consequentialist argument could be made promoting the adoption of the language of loyalty on instrumental grounds.

It might be the case that the language of care and personal attachment and responsibility, will ultimately turn out to be less potent, less able to generate moral capital, less able to, for instance, produce tightly knit small scale ingroups. This provides pragmatic reasons to promote the adoption of an ethics of loyalty. The question then becomes if loyalty is so exclusivist that its negative impact on large scale social processes outweighs its positive impact on small scale social processes, which is mostly an empirical question, which I cannot here answer. It could also be the other way around; loyalty could be better at safeguarding large scale peace and cooperation than

[96] Held, *The Ethics of Care*, 11.

[97] Haidt, *The Righteous Mind*, 12: Can't We All Disagree More Constructively?, The Left's Blind Spot: Moral Capital, 16.

care (because of its ability to socially bind groups the size of nations and religions), whereas care could be better at producing wellbeing and moral behaviour in small scale groups because of its personal character. However, the same considerations apply. It still would be a question of weighing pros and cons in consequentialist terms. Even if a pragmatic argument along those lines could be formed, it is up for discussion if you'd want to promote localist morality based on loyalty over localist morality based on care, because, at least according to virtue ethics and deontology, moral behaviour is only moral because the agent has the right kinds of intentions and motivations. If someone adopts loyalty as central value and her behaviour produces morally desirable outcomes because of it, virtue ethicists and deontologists would still want to know how morally good qua motivation loyalty is in order to assess the desirability of loyalty as central value, since they don't concern themselves with desirable outcomes per se, rather with agent based considerations, like moral deliberation, rationality and attitude.

§3.2 Pluralism

Ethics of care's central commitment is to a localist principle: care. However, as previously mentioned, it does not necessarily seek to exclude universalist principles or arguments. The way traditional universalists as well as evoconservatives frame the issue, it may seem as though one has to choose between universalist and localist morality. Ethics of care, in contrast to ethics of loyalty, shows this to be a false dichotomy. How then, are we to see morality, if both ethics of care as well as traditional universalist ethics are to be seen as valid, even though they within and between themselves are in disagreement or at least incompatible in some ways? I will suggest a pluralist model which may make sense of this diversity of seemingly valid moral considerations, which are seemingly at odds with one another. And again: ethics of care itself sometimes embraces the idea of pluralism. In what follows it will become clear why this is logical.

A plurality of moral positions

There is so much variety within and between ethical belief systems and theories that the idea that morality can be simplified to one all-governing, (potentially) universally accepted moral principle is widely held to be false. This has contributed to the rise in popularity of the language (although, I don't think the actual endorsement) of nihilism and rigorous moral and cultural relativism. The (western) discovery of the differences between western and non-western cultures and their moralities have contributed greatly to this trend. Pluralism says that there exists a plurality of moral values which are not reducible to each other.[98]

Pluralism allows localist principles, like those central to ethics of care, and universalist principles, like those central to many traditional ethical theories, to exist next to each other, while both are regarded as valid, each of them focusing on a different but overlapping set of moral considerations. Each of them might be viewed as being applicable to their own domain, as best suited and most obviously relevant to deal with the moral dilemmas within that domain. Those domains presumably overlap greatly. Where there is overlap moral discussion is needed, which might or might not be able to resolve the issue, in any case the discussion itself might also be valuable, without generating a definitive answer right away or at all.

I will focus on one axis within this pluralist domain of values, on what I will call the localist-universalist axis: the scale ranging from highly personal to highly universalist moral values. I will show that both universalist and localist morality are widely subscribed to and highly influential, explicitly or implicitly, in ethical theorizing but also in everyday moral deliberation, public debate and

[98] Susan Wolf, "Two Levels of Pluralism," *Ethics* 102, no. 4 (1992): 785.

legislation. Though, as we have seen, there's an argument to be made that localist morality is developed insufficiently within ethical theorizing.

Apparently, most of us feel that universalist morality should be endorsed. Kant's insistence that we may never treat humanity, in ourselves or *any* other human being, merely as a means but should always be regarded as an end in itself strongly resonates with some part of our moral, psychological constitution.[99] Ideas like these about the innate inviolability of human beings are institutionalized in international law, in, for instance, the UN's *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*.[100] Likewise, the Christian dogma that we are all created equal as children of God is widely preached and accepted and inspires similar respect for the innate moral rights of all. For utilitarianists human rights might not be such a central principle, however they are very much universalists, in a different sense. The weighing of happiness and suffering includes the welfare of the entire group of people affected by a certain action, potentially all human beings. As I have mentioned before, even localist theorists, who strongly value loyalty, do often, ultimately, also value universalist morality. Many more examples could be given.

On the other hand, within clearly universalist doctrines, advocating moral consideration for all, like Kantianism and Christianity, we may find some personal moral principles which can seem at odds with its universalist principles. It is, for instance, no coincidence that in the West political conservatism often goes hand in hand with Christianity. Christianity advocates taking special care of those who are closest to you. The traditional family is highly valued. The communities in which Christianity is more practiced and preached, are, generally speaking, more tightly knit, increasing compassion, generosity, trust and care for each other, for relatively small groups.

Likewise, in Kantianism amongst all its talk of impartiality and universalism, some localist tendencies may be discernible. For example, a Kantian might argue for specific, very localist maxims as long as they are universalizable. However, ethicists of care (and to a lesser extent ethicists of loyalty) see *personal* localist commitments as central and fundamental to morality, which these maxims are not, as products of the categorical imperative. Kantian philosopher David Velleman offers a comparison between Williams' example and Kantianism, showing Kantianism at perhaps its most personal, on a fundamental level. He argues that Williams' argument against universalist morality, which I have discussed earlier, is in fact rather similar to a central Kantian argument, and therefore no effective attack on it.[101] What it is that makes you choose your wife over another is not the comparison between her and the other but rather the recognition that her value is incomparable.[102] Likewise, Velleman argues, the Kantian respect prescribed by the moral law is a response to the same incomparable value: personhood itself (or as Kant himself would call it: 'rational nature').[103] However, as Held argues, love may not be concerned with something universal in the loved one, rather the opposite: with her particularity and uniqueness. Still, Velleman's comparison does show that the Kantian commitment to respect a certain individual can be something very acute, personal and weighty, directed at someone's core, and therefore very similar to love, in some sense. Though the moral motivation out of love may be a response to a different quality, than the moral motivation out of Kantian respect, as Held argues, it may still be the recognition of someone's incomparable value and may still manifest relevantly similar in way, as

[99] Robert Johnson and Adam Cureton, "Kant's Moral Philosophy," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, July 7, 2016, accessed July 20, 2019, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/, 6.

[100] United Nations General Assembly, *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (Paris, 1948), accessed August 23, https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.

[101] David J. Velleman, "Love as a Moral Emotion," *Ethics* 109, no. 2 (1999): 341.

[102] Ibid., 371.

[103] Ibid., 365.

passionately felt moral responsibility for a specific person, in a specific context, for their own sake. However, while there are some clear similarities, at its very core the universalist Kantian commitment to personhood and the personal commitment out of care are of a fundamentally different nature. Ultimately, the Kantian respect is blind to whichever specific person it is aimed at, though it may manifest in response to a specific person, whereas ethics of care takes specific relationships between people as morally relevant, denouncing such blindness.

So, even within one of the most universalist ethical theories, Kantianism, some localism may be found. However, as Gilligan shows, localism, in the form of care-oriented morality, is a significant part of morality, unrecognized because of biased theorizing, including Kantianism.

Oikeiosis

Traditional ethical theory has throughout this thesis been portrayed as predominantly universalist. However, the examples have exclusively come from two of the three major (western, contemporary) strands of ethical theorizing, deontology and consequentialism (specifically Kantianism and utilitarianism), since they are extremely influential and are the ones under attack by localists, like ethicists of care and loyalty, but also by Williams. The third strand, virtue ethics, is rather less clearly universalist; Royce may be understood as virtue ethicist and Held notes ethics of care is sometimes seen as a version of virtue ethics.[104] Since the subject of this thesis is the tension between universalist and localist morality, I have tried to discuss the best and most clearly universalist arguments and the best and most clearly localist arguments. The previous paragraph nuanced this dichotomy slightly, but now, an example form virtue ethics might illuminate how this dichotomy may be bridged (or perhaps rather shown to be a false one) within one theory, an example with imagery remarkably similar to Allport's concentric loyalties: a single model incorporating localist commitments as the inner circles, as well as universalist commitments as the outer circles of a set of concentric circles encompassing the individual.

Virtue ethics is not primarily concerned with moral rules, or maximizing well-being but rather with moral character, with long term dispositions to do the right sorts of things for the right kinds of reasons: virtues.[105] If we look back to an early instant of virtue ethics, we see the Stoics arguing that we ought to act in accordance with the natural order, or the divine law of nature in order to realize our *telos* (end or goal), which is becoming fully rational and thereby fully virtuous.[106] A central concept in Stoic ethics is *oikeiosis*, which means something like apprehension or appropriation of what is one's own, acting as a foundation for a rational ordering of one's preferences in accordance with (one's own) nature.[107] Primarily *oikeiosis* manifests in the fact that we are clearly designed to value and pursue self-preservation. However, as we develop as humans, we become more rational (virtuous) and we begin to understand nature as a whole and live in harmony with it. Seeing nature's bigger plan (which we may never completely grasp) we see that acting in accordance with it *is* our telos, is *our own* goal, widening our *oikeiosis* to be aimed at something larger, including larger bodies of individuals, even if that sometimes means acting against our primary self-preservation impulse.[108] Here we see the emergence of an image of human attachment similar to the one Allport gives. Though much more normative, it also conceives humans

[104] Held, *The Ethics of Care*, 9.

[105] Rosalind Hursthouse, introduction to *On Virtue Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 11, ProQuest Ebook Central.

[106] Richard Bett, "Stoic Ethics," in *A Companion to Ancient Philosophy*, ed. Mary Louise Gill and Pierre Pellegrin (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 532-537.

[107] Ibid., 536-537.

[108] Ibid., 538-539.

as primarily and (almost) automatically (emotionally and morally) committed to those near him as well as possibly, and ideally, ultimately committed to all human beings.

Hierocles (2nd century AD), a later Stoic, actually describes *oikeiosis* using the same imagery of concentric circles. As Richard Bett explains: "Hierocles speaks of a person's being surrounded by a series of concentric circles, each containing different groups of people. The largest circle includes the entire human race. The smaller circles include sub-groups of humanity, and the smaller the circle, the closer one's attachment to the people it contains; the smallest circle (except for the one that simply contains oneself) includes only one's immediate kin."[109] According to Hierocles, we ought to continually draw all the circles closer to ourselves, meaning caring for ourselves as well as (ultimately all) others. This is rational, natural and virtuous. Allport regards the outermost loyalty to mankind as a rarely realized but hopeful possibility. The Stoics agree in the sense that only the sage, the idealised actor, the end goal of moral development, may have succeeded in reaching this outermost circle, 'drawing it in', and the sage is very rare, he may not even exist. However in another, less demanding, sense they see this universalist ideal as already widely realised, because the very existence of the commonly valued virtue of justice is a product of our recognition that all humans 'belong to us', and that therefore we ought to show them all (equal) moral consideration.[110]

How it all fits

The concept of *oikeiosis*, like Allport's concentric loyalties, enables us to reconceptualize the relations between the central values of traditional ethical theory and those of localist projects, such as ethics of care, pluralistically. Universalist moral commitments, advocated by theories like Kantianism and utilitarianism, and localist commitments, such as care, may be equally valid. Traditional universalist ethics and ethics of care are primarily answers to different sorts of questions, pertaining to overlapping, but distinct domains. There are morally relevant questions about how to relate to people with whom one is personally, intimately involved in some way, as well as to questions about how to relate to people in general, irrespective of if and how you are related to them, including large groups of strangers, like the entire human population. In short, there are valid moral considerations concerned with the inner as well as the outer circles.

This is not to say there are no scenarios in which both kinds of questions are relevant and in which the answers given by the theories primarily concerned with them are in conflict; there may be many. However, this does not mean those answers can't both be valid. It also does not mean this conflict, though it is no theoretical problem for the pluralist, can't ever be resolved by further discussion, inquiry or mutual understanding between the proponents of the two opposing, valid, positions, or that in attempting to do so, nothing valuable can be gained. Besides, some ethicists of care try to reconcile universalist and localist morality *within* one theory. Conversely, the localist commitments to be found within traditional ethical theory may be attempted to be developed into fully-fledged (in depth and in breadth) localist systems, balancing out the overwhelmingly universalist leaning of traditional ethical theory the ethicists of care took issue with. So, conflict between universalist and localist morality within certain projects may even be reconciled altogether, though it seems extremely unlikely the diversity of conflicting outlooks found in the body of contemporary ethical theories will be resolved any time soon or even at all. However, this may very well have nothing to do with the universalism-localism schism which seemed so unbridgeable in the first chapter.

[109] Bett, "Stoic Ethics," 539.
[110] Ibid., 538-539.

In sum

Ethics of care critiques universalist ethical theories for its impersonal nature and focusses instead on care and human dependency in personal relationships, making it a localist alternative for an ethics of loyalty.

Loyalty appears to be inherently exclusivist and is closely associated with violence, where care isn't. It is possible to care for mankind, without contradiction. Ethics of care is more harm averse and less potentially dangerous than ethics of loyalty because of its critique of hierarchy, as opposed to ethics of loyalty's acceptance or defence of it. It is itself the emancipation of a typically female and oppressed perspective, which ethics of loyalty isn't.

Pluralism might clarify the relationship between moral localism and universalism. Both universalism and localism are significant parts of moral practice, and, since the emergence of ethics of care at least, in moral theory. Ethics of care may see itself as reconcilable with universalist morality. Stoicism regards universalist and localist commitments as harmonious parts of one single system consisting of concentric circles. Even Kantianism can in some ways be understood as localist. Localism and universalism might, pluralistically, be understood as different domains where different theories are predominantly applicable.

So, might care be a better foundation for moral localism? Yes, it might. Care does not share some harmful and anti-universalist tendencies of loyalty, and it offers an explanation of the one-sidedness of traditional theory. And are localism and universalism reconcilable? Yes, they are. Though, Kantianism, for instance, may not be reconcilable with care as fundamental value, pluralism offers a way of incorporating localism and universalism per se into one system, which some ethicists of care and classical stoicism envisage.

Conclusion

In moral theory universalism is traditionally highly valued and ubiquitous. Localism is seen as adversary, because of its denial that morality should be blind to the location of the agent, to her (social, emotional and cultural) proximity to others. However, there are some attempts to challenge universalism's moral monopoly. Do these attempts justify localism?

Firstly, there are those arguing that universalism is psychologically unfeasible and that therefore it can't meaningfully be morality's aim. In the first chapter we've shown this argument to be lacking. The scope of morality is not constrained to any group size, though our tendency to think in terms of ingroups and outgroups *can* hamper universalist striving. Concern for one group does not prohibit concern for another. In fact, universalism is already widely realised and part of a growing trend. There is nothing to suggest this trend needs to stop; we have a capacity for open-ended normativity.

Secondly, loyalty is sometimes seen as foundation of morality, justifying moral localism. The second chapter dealt with several such arguments and found them to be faulty. Conservatives' reliance on loyalty does not in itself justify its status as *moral* foundation. Loyalty does not underpin morality because of morality's reliance on communities. Royce's loyalty to loyalty strips loyalty from its usual meaning and is best understood as a principled commitment. Loyalty to ideals or causes is only valuable insofar, and because of, those ideals or causes have moral value in themselves.

Thirdly, we considered ethics of care as an alternative to ethics of loyalty for grounding moral localism, because there are some reasons why it may be more promising. Care is anti-hierarchical and therefore less liable to support injustices than loyalty. Also, care, unlike loyalty, is not exclusivist, care for a group does not prohibit care for another group and may therefore be reconciled with universalism.

Pluralism might help us conceptualise this reconciliation. Understanding localism as concerned with the inner circles and universalism with the outer, in a model like the one proposed by Allport or the Stoic *oikeiosis*, enables us to conceive them as equally valid positions, as primarily answers to different kinds of moral questions, pertaining to different domains.

So, is moral localism justified? The answer to this question is dependent on how moral localism is conceptualised. If it is conceptualised as exclusivist, meaning morality to only be applicable to a limited group of people, then the answer is: no. A morality limiting concern to a certain group, is neither psychologically necessary nor morally justifiable. The reviewed literature defending exclusivist localism has shown to be always lacking in some relevant way. If localism is conceptualised in the terms like those of ethics of care, then the answer is: possibly. There are reasons to suspect ethics of care might fare better as a defence of localism, though this cannot be decided merely on the basis of the considerations I offered.

In any case, localist attacks on universalism per se are unfounded. Though attacks on specific universalist theories may not be. Universalism is often applied to domains in which a more personal or localist moral consideration might be more appropriate. My point is merely that universalism is not psychologically out of reach and has not been shown to be morally wrong, redundant or confused, on the contrary, localists often find themselves incorporating or embracing universalism in some way, shape or form.

However, some issues remain unaddressed. It might be argued that ethics of care is liable to many of the same criticisms as ethics of loyalty. One could perhaps argue that care, like loyalty, can only be extrinsically valuable. This may be true. Further research exploring the question if ethics of care is able to successfully address all the criticisms of ethics of loyalty I presented would certainly be valuable. For now, I have only considered *some* reasons favouring care over loyalty.

Ethics of care may seek to supplement traditional ethics, but traditional ethics may often not be open to this. The Kantian foundation of morality may leave no room for other values as primary. This leaves the question if it means anything at all to conceptualise Kantian values and ethics of care-values as part of one domain, if the one fundamentally denies the possibility of the validity of the other. Based on the arguments in this thesis, this, too, remains an open question and it would be interesting to see it answered.

There also might of course be more exclusivist localist arguments, aside from those from loyalty, presenting considerations I have not addressed. However, there don't appear to be many and those from loyalty appear to be the most influential ones, and I have therefore concerned myself with them. They gave no cause to abandon moral universalism.

For now, let us conclude that exclusivist localism is wrong to oppose universalism. It is wrong because psychology does not say that universalism is out of reach. It is wrong because universalism is not defeated by arguments from loyalty. It is wrong because localism need not oppose universalism in order to be valid.

Universalism is a hopeful possibility, and there's no reason we shouldn't pursue it. Even if we are sometimes right to morally prioritise those close to us, we need not and should not give up on universalist ideals.

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