Who benefits from the Russia sanctions? – Trade diversion and destruction since 2014
Summary
This paper hypothesizes that Western sanctions and Russian countersanctions in the aftermath of the
crisis in Ukraine starting in 2013 exert a negative effect on aggregated trade flows between senders
and target country. Moreover, the paper hypothesizes a general Russian trade diversion due to the
Russian political and economic disintegration with the West and the resulting Russian reorientation
toward Asia and particularly China. While such economic sanctions as well as other trade barriers serve
as explanatory variables for bilateral trade in a high number of studies, the effect on third parties is
often overlooked. Hence, the present paper ties in with prior literature on the effectiveness of
sanctions as well as the trade effect of sanctions and focuses on a potential third-party effect. In line
with vast parts of the literature on the trade destruction effect of sanctions, the direct trade effect of
sanctions as well as the countersanctions was found to be negative. In contrast, evidence on trade
diversion could not be observed by means of a gravity model approach with some results even
indicating further trade destruction, i. e. a negative trade effect on bystanders. The main policy
implication for the effectiveness of sanctions and thus the EU CSDP is that economic adjustment in the
sense of trade diversion to other countries appears neither to bust sanctions nor serve as a viable
method for evasion.