Individual differences in social dilemmas: the effect of trust on costly punishment in a public goods game

Abstract

The establishment of cooperation in social dilemmas is important to real life problem solving and improving the environment, for example in a neighbourhood. Cooperation is promoted when subjects believe the interdependent others are able to punish. Individual characteristics of persons can be of influence on cooperation and punishment behaviour. This study focuses on individual differences in trust and investigates the effect of trust on cooperation and punishing behaviour in a linear public good game with peer punishment opportunities. The research question is: ‘What is the effect of individual differences in trust on the likelihood of punishing non-cooperative behaviour of fellow players in public good games with punishing possibilities?’. Experimental data of 148 participants is used to research their punishment behaviour. Following the social reciprocity theory, expected is that more trust leads to more negative feelings if others have non cooperative behaviour of, and therefore to more punishment. Multilevel regression is used to analyse the data. The results demonstrate a positive effect of trust on cooperation, yet the data contains no effect of trust on punishment. This suggests that punishment is possibly motivated by the contribution of other players rather than by trust, or that trust leads for some persons to more punishment and for others to less punishment. The role of trust in punishing behaviour remains uncertain, and future research can react to this by focussing on individual motivations and emotions during choice making in a social dilemma with punishment opportunities.