Judith Butler’s Notion of Gender Performativity

Abstract

The idea that gender is socially constructed has been accepted as common knowledge for a long time. This raises the question how does the construction of gender work. Judith Butler proposed that gender is performative. What does Butler (1999, 2004, 2011) mean when she uses the term gender performativity and to what extent does her view of gender being performative leave room for gender as a stable identity? In this thesis I argue that Butler’s notion of gender performativity implies that that gender identity is unstable. However, since Butler responds to criticism with the explanation that gender performativity does not oppose all identity claims and all gender assignments, there could be some room for gender as a stable identity. It is commonly accepted that gender and sex are different, however Butler criticises this distinction. Therefore I start with explaining the commonly accepted differences between sex and gender and then I give Butler’s critique on this distinction. Butler’s states that gender and sex would be the same if sex, just as gender, is socially constructed. Moreover, Butler sees sex reassignment surgeries as an example of how people are trying to change their sex to fit the norm, which in her view makes sex socially constructed. Therefore we can conclude that to Butler sex and gender are the same. I assume that Butler’s suggestion that sex and gender could be the same is an attempt to deconstruct the terms gender and sex. I illustrate the idea that gender is socially constructed and use it to introduce Butler’s notion that gender is performative. She claims that an act which is being done repetitively is performative if it produces a series of effects. Butler emphasises that the key is in the repetitiveness of the gendered acts. This way of constructing gender brings us to Butler’s belief that gender identity cannot exist prior to gendered acts, because gendered acts and gender identity exist at the same time. Since gender identity is continuously formed by gendered acts, we should not view gender as a stable identity. However, if gender identity is unstable it poses a problem for people with trans-identities, as is explained by Prosser (1998). Butler uses examples of transgender people and people doing drag to support the claim that gender is performative. Prosser and Namaste (2000) explain that these examples are problematic because they are missing context and are misrepresenting the people in these examples. Even though Butler has read and responded to criticism on these points, it did not convince her to change her view that gender is performative and that her examples were wrong. However in her response on the stability of gender identity she explains that it cannot be concluded that gender performativity does not by definition oppose all identity claims and all gender assignments. Therefore it seems possible that there is some space for gender to be experienced as a stable identity.