Wants and needs in the context of climate change

Abstract

The distinction between wants and needs is significant for the debate about climate change, distinguished theoretically using sufficientarianism, it demonstrates the moral relevance of securing enough of some goods (needs) but not of others (wants). Satisfying more than is needed at the expense of others is unjust, certainly when others fall below the threshold. In the context of climate change this notion has intergenerational implications. The sufficiency threshold as specified by Nussbaum’s list of capabilities, aimed at human development, promotes freedom to choose between different achievements of capabilities, but requires limitations on the manner and degree of achieving capabilities. Gewirth’s account of basic human rights demands rights for all agents. Prioritizing the more necessary goods and rights, conflicts between rights should be resolved with consideration for justice. His account proves to be well suited to specify a sustainable sufficiency threshold in the context of climate change. Needs are essential to the human life, wants are not. A more sustainable way of satisfying both needs to be adopted and the fulfilment of wants may be limited or prohibited for the sake of future generations and intergenerational justice.