The Binding of Abraham: Kierkegaard and the absolute duty to God

Abstract

In Fear and Trembling (1843), Kierkegaard states that there must be an absolute duty to God. Based on Fear and Trembling, as well as other works by Kierkegaard, this has been understood as the claim that divine commands generate an absolute duty to follow these commands. In this paper, I will show that this view is incorrect. It causes problems with Kierkegaard’s existentialist philosophy, his ethics, and the fact that for Kierkegaard actions of faith are unintelligible. I will introduce and defend a new interpretation of this absolute duty. In this new interpretation, the absolute duty to God is generated by a commitment to follow God’s will, and not by the divine commands themselves. I will show that this new interpretation solves the problems of the dominant interpretation, and I will refute some objections that could be raised.