The Philosophy of Animal Activism: Exploring the Relationship Between Moral Theory and Animal Advocacy

Abstract

Within the realm of animal advocacy, many normative assertions are made with the intention of facilitating behavioral change. These assertions contain bits and pieces of philosophical language, but never use normative frameworks in full. This raises the question – to what extent, if any, is normative theory necessary in order to perform animal advocacy? To address this question, I will be looking at the language of different advocacy organizations and identifying the three moral theories that are most present in their language. There is agreement amongst the three moral theories on the most egregious issues of animal use, but disagreement arises when looking at more complex cases. I argue that we should adopt a morally pluralist conception, not claiming that any single theory be the bearer of moral truth, and that these theories are still valid despite disagreement. Then I will be discussing the necessity of these frameworks to the practice of advocacy, and conclude that theory exists necessarily for activism to function, but activists themselves need not use or understand the entirety of the theory and its arguments. Then I propose that the principle of least harm can be used as a mid-level principle to help advocates bridge the gap between multiple moral theories and practice in order to effectively make use of these theories in a real-world setting. Finally, look at the distribution of responsibility between philosophers and activists and make recommendations for both in order to better facilitate understanding between the two specialized fields.