Can Agents be Causes? A Critique of Timothy O'Connor's Theory of Free Action.

Abstract

In this thesis, I critically asses Timothy O’Connor’s theory of free action. O’Connor argues that agents have the power to cause action-triggering intentions, which in turn cause the occurrence of action. The agent is free because she controls the action through her agent-causal powers. I discuss the coherence of O’Connor’s theory, his account of freedom and reasons for actions and whether his theory fits with empirical data. I conclude that the theory is coherent and intelligible, but that some of its explanations concerning human action are not satisfactory. O’Connor’s account of the relation between reasons and action is the weakest part of his overall theory. Where some of his other explanations were merely unsatisfactory, his theory of reasons and actions is, as it stands, completely inadequate. Overall, it would be a mistake to dismiss O’Connor’s theory lightly since it generally is a coherent theory that can give us an explanation concerning free will. But, given the fact that a number of O’Connor’s explanations are unsatisfactory, I suggest looking for alternative theories that can provide us with better results.