Can animals think?

Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate by means of empirical research results that Davidson’s claim that animals cannot have thoughts is mistaken and that we are justified to ascribe some beliefs to animals. First, I describe Davidson’s three arguments against animal thought and summarize them schematically. Second, I investigate what the conditions of thought are. I argue, by using empirical research results, that Davidson’s conditions of thought are mistaken. Language and the concepts of belief, truth and falsity are not needed for thought. Third, I argue that Davidson’s main argument’s conclusion and his denial of animal thought are mistaken by describing examples of animals solving puzzles in one try. Thus, our only explanation of the behaviour of animals solving puzzles must involve the attribution of thoughts to the animals in question. Fourth, I argue that the conclusion of Davidson’s argument from holism, that we are not justified to ascribe de re beliefs to animals, is mistaken by discussing several examples of animal behaviour in which our best explanation involves ascribing a theory of mind to the animals in question and therefore we are justified to ascribe them de re beliefs. To do so, I argue that animals can have a system of beliefs. But even if we do not want to ascribe an entire system of beliefs to animals, I argue that animals can have concepts or proto-concepts without having an entire system of beliefs. Fifth, I argue that the conclusion of Davidson’s intensionality test, that we are not justified to ascribe de dicto beliefs to animals, is right. However, I argue that this does not imply that we are not justified to ascribe no beliefs at all to animals. Therefore, I can finally conclude that animals have thoughts and we are justified in our ascription of de re beliefs to animals.