| dc.rights.license | CC-BY-NC-ND | |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Fernandez, R. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Pierik, N. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-09-10T17:00:28Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2016-09-10T17:00:28Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2016 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://studenttheses.uu.nl/handle/20.500.12932/24224 | |
| dc.description.abstract | In this thesis, we consider a gametheoretical model of income taxation. We take a closer
look at the strategy of the central authority with respect to the audit probability of
tax returns, given the fact that taxpayers may underdeclare their income. Different
cut-off rules are compared to investigate which one optimizes the net tax revenue of the
central authority. We conclude by giving the optimal strategy, depending on specific
conditions, and apply this result to the Ukrainian and Dutch taxation systems. | |
| dc.description.sponsorship | Utrecht University | |
| dc.format.extent | 322972 | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.title | The strategy of a central authority with respect to income tax evasion | |
| dc.type.content | Bachelor Thesis | |
| dc.rights.accessrights | Open Access | |
| dc.subject.keywords | tax, taxation system, tax return, audit probability, underdeclaring, tax evasion, strategy | |
| dc.subject.courseuu | Wiskunde | |
