Akrasia in a causal world. Understanding Akrasia within the Causal Theory of Action.

Abstract

The phenomenon of Akrasia – free and intentional action against one’s own better judgment – is one of the most difficult phenomena to explain for the Causal Theory of Action. Critics have argued that the Causal Theory of Action is unable to explain why Akratic actions exist. The aim of this paper is to develop an understanding of Akrasia that enables reconciling it with the Causal Theory of Action. First, the common model of action of the Causal Theory of Action is revised in order to enable understanding of Akratic action. Subsequently, the concept of ‘Desire for Continence’ is developed to explain Akrasia from the perspective of the actor. The revised model of action and ‘Desire for Continence’ are then combined to show how the phenomenon of Akrasia can be understood within the Causal Theory of Action.