Interest Representation in the European Union: Determinants of Access to Commission’s Expert Groups

Abstract

European associations provide a unique type of access goods to European Union (EU) decisionmaking institutions. However, not all European associations gain the same level of access to the European Commission and little is known about the underlying reasons behind this variation. In this vein, this research poses the following question: why are some European associations more likely to gain (a stronger degree of) access to Commission’s expert groups than others? This study focuses on the governance structure and the representativeness of European associations, two critical factors that affect the type of information they can offer to the Commission and, as a result, their level of access. The analyses draw on a new dataset of 248 European associations based in Brussels. On the one hand, it is shown how the decision-making system as well as the functional differentiation are significantly related with the likelihood to gain (a stronger degree of) access to Commission’s expert groups. On the other hand, the analyses confirm that representativeness is important to provide the European encompassing interests that facilitate access to the Commission.