The Moral Content of the Concept of Privacy

Abstract

In this thesis I investigate the moral contents of the concept of privacy, moral contents interpreted broadly as those elements that directly concern value or a moral obligation or right, as well as those that concern the preconditions for a moral framework, and the concept of privacy understood, wherever it cannot be understood in the abstract, as it is used (in all its variety) in contemporary liberal societies. I adopt the view that the concept of privacy is better understood in terms of family resemblance than in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, as well as that privacy’s value is instrumental rather than intrinsic. This also leads me to the view that the moral content of privacy does not include moral obligations or rights. The moral content of privacy, I argue, is to be found in the existing moral frameworks that presume it. I choose to investigate two particular moral frameworks, those of Kant and Mill, and link their thought with the different existing types of privacy. For both frameworks, I argue, the most fruitful path is that of investigating the moral legitimation of state authority, and Kant’s and Mill’s positions can be seen as converging on at least one point, namely that they are able to show that certain specific privacy violations are wrong, not because they are themselves wrong, but because the violator is the state operating outside of its moral authority. In chapter four, I show that this applies to at least several existing privacy violations. I consider what this means for the legal protection of privacy in general, and make one specific proposal for a better protection of privacy in respect to these new insights.