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dc.rights.licenseCC-BY-NC-ND
dc.contributor.advisorDe, M.
dc.contributor.authorLee, H.S. van
dc.date.accessioned2013-08-06T17:01:28Z
dc.date.available2013-08-06
dc.date.available2013-08-06T17:01:28Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.urihttps://studenttheses.uu.nl/handle/20.500.12932/13743
dc.description.abstractThere is an ongoing debate about a paradox introduced by Stephen Yablo. Yablo originally introduced his paradox to challenge the belief that self-reference is essential to liar-like paradoxes. After looking closely at the specification of the paradox, I conclude that Yablo did not succeed in challenging this claim. His paradox is, just like the Liar paradox, self-referential. This means that the Yablo paradox is less helpful to finding solutions to logical paradoxes than Yablo hoped. His paradox is just another self-referential semantic paradox.
dc.description.sponsorshipUtrecht University
dc.format.extent286234 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.titleRelevance of the Yablo paradox
dc.type.contentBachelor Thesis
dc.rights.accessrightsOpen Access
dc.subject.keywordsYablo, paradox, logic, self-reference, omega-inconsistency, liar
dc.subject.courseuuLiberal Arts and Sciences


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