Going it Alone - U.S. Perspectives on the NATO Alliance prior to the Iraq War, 2002-2003

Abstract

This thesis explores which long-term ideological considerations can be considered to have shaped the critical U.S. position regarding NATO during the George W. Bush administration in 2002-2003. The thesis examines the fundamental view of George W. Bush and his principal foreign policy officials on America's role in the world and its relationship with Europe in the crucial post-9/11 years. It explores the mental maps that defined the way foreign policy officials in the U.S. perceived the relationship to Europe and the influence of these mental maps on the U.S. position regarding NATO. Themes such as neoconservatism, anti-Europeanism and unilateralism will be discussed, as they are structures into which the ideas of the Bush administration's principal foreign policy officials can be placed. The thesis analyzes whether the ideas underlying policy regarding NATO in 2002-2003 were a continuation of ideas that originated much earlier, or whether the decisions made in these years mark a clear breaking point with the way NATO was perceived before.