Abortion and Ambivalence in America: Is the Moral Theory behind Personhood Justified?

Abstract

Currently in America there is a movement to legally consider fetuses as persons in order to ban not only abortion, but also certain contraceptives and in-vitro fertilization, in order to prohibit the destruction of zygotes and fetuses. Proponents of “fetal personhood” use a moral theory that always renders abortion morally impermissible. Their theory uses one principle: it is absolutely immoral to kill an innocent human being. This is how they morally justify banning abortion. The objective of this thesis is to show that the moral theory used by anti-abortionists is not justified or adequate to the task of judging abortion for many Americans. In order to do this I will draw heavily from Margaret Little. In the first chapter I will argue that the two main arguments for fetal personhood: intrinsic value and numerical continuity between fetuses and persons are disputable. More importantly, I will argue that personhood does not confer moral status the way proponents believe it does. Additionally, since personhood proponents are trying to affect policy I will highlight America’s ambivalence on the issue to show that the moral theory used by anti-abortionists does not reflect how many Americans judge or view abortion. The second chapter will be concerned with how abortion’s permissibility varies and how information affects ethical judgments of abortion. Personhood proponents’ use of a deontological moral theory will be critiqued in order to show that it is not sensible or ethically justified. Due to the inadequacies of the anti-abortionist moral framework and the ambivalence of most Americans, I agree with Margaret Little that a moral framework is needed that takes seriously “fetal geography.” In the third chapter I will discuss and analyze Margaret Little’s relationship framework for abortion to show its appeal and why it is better suited to the task of judging the morality of abortion.