| dc.description.abstract | A new approach in the philosophy of science, the mechanism approach, which sees descriptions of mechanisms as explanation (most notably discussed in Machamer, Darden and Craver 'Thinking about mechanisms' (2000)), has not gotten much attention from philosophers of science, which is awkward since the mechanism approach is also being applied to the neurosciences, a field very important for the philosophy of mind.
The leading question in this thesis is if the philosophy of mind is justified in neglecting the mechanism approach. In other words, this thesis looks for fruitful possibilities of interaction between the mechanism approach and the philosophy of mind.
This is done by (1) giving an overview of the relevant terminology in the mechanism approach, then (2) the mechanism approach is applied to two article in the philosophy of mind, N. Block's 'Troubles with functionalism' (1978), and J.R. Searle's 'Minds, brains, and programs' (1980). In both cases, the mechanism approach is applied to the analyses provided in said articles, after which it is shown that the application of the mechanism approach pertains, in the case of Block (1978), to methodological issues in the study of animal awareness, and, in the case of Searle (1980), to questions of computer consciousness. In the last case, the application of the mechanism approach to Searle's discussion of isomorphism, is used to propose the Principle of Double Isomorphism (PDI). It is then argued that the PDI can be used as a benchmark for testing computer consciousness.
Thus, cross fertilization between the mechanism approach and the philosophy of mind is possible as well as fruitful. The conclusion ends with a short list of further avenues for research. | |
