| dc.description.abstract | This thesis starts with an uncomfortable truth: the European Union does not respond to democratic breakdowns in a consistent way. Even when legal tools exist, decisions are shaped by political interests, strategic calculations and postcolonial relationships.
The central case is Mozambique in 2024. What happened was not a minor irregularity. It was a collapse of legal order. There were assassinations of legal and political actors, arbitrary arrests, violence against journalists and activists and the dismantling of oversight institutions. Civil society and international observers documented these abuses clearly. Even so, the EU did not activate any legal instruments. It limited itself to mild statements and diplomatic language.
The contrast with Venezuela is striking. In 2017 and again in 2024, similar violations took place, yet the EU acted quickly. It used its restrictive measures through Council Decision CFSP 2017/2074 and Regulation EU 2017/2063. The obvious question follows: why did one situation lead to sanctions and the other to silence?
The thesis argues that this is not about gaps in the law or lack of evidence. It is about structured discretion, meaning the EU has space within its legal framework to act or not act without formally breaking its own rules. That discretion is used when enforcement could affect political alliances, economic ties or the legacy of colonial relationships.
Silence is not neutral. When the EU frames a crisis as developmental or diplomatic instead of legal, it is making a choice. That choice protects strategic comfort rather than legal obligation.
By comparing Mozambique and Venezuela, the thesis shows that inaction is not the absence of law. It is a legal and political act shaped by institutional design and collective interest. The EU does not only speak through sanctions. It also speaks through silence, and that silence is deliberate. | |
