The Metaphysics of Race: Basic Racial Realism to the Rescue?

Abstract

The metaphysics of race is concerned with the question what human races are, and if they even exist at all. The current debate is primarily shaped by three dominant positions: biological racial realism, social constructionism and racial anti-realism. Biological racial realism is the view that races exist and that there is a biological basis for them. Constructionism also argues for the reality of human races, but then as being social kinds. They argue that race is the product of social classification practices. Anti-realists contend that race does not exist at all. This paper explores Glasgow and Woodward’s (2015) basic racial realism as a compelling alternative to these three positions. To clarify and address potential misunderstandings, I first elaborate on their main line of argumentation. By prioritizing physical features in their account of race they risk being misunderstood as denying its social reality and endorsing another form of biological racial realism – two things I want to emphasize they do not. Then, I will focus on Griffith’s (2021) critique on basic racial realism from a constructionist point of view. I will critically analyze his defense of constructionism and show that his insightful concerns do not manage to undermine basic racial realism. Both my independent evaluation of the view and the examination of Griffith’s defense support the conclusion that basic racial realism deserves serious consideration as a viable metaphysical account of race and can even be considered the most fruitful position within the debate.