The Problem of Error in Absolute Idealism
| dc.rights.license | CC-BY-NC-ND | |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Mulder, Jesse | |
| dc.contributor.author | Mantov, Jordan | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-08-04T23:01:07Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2025-08-04T23:01:07Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2025 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://studenttheses.uu.nl/handle/20.500.12932/49530 | |
| dc.description.sponsorship | Utrecht University | |
| dc.language.iso | EN | |
| dc.subject | The thesis desribes and evaluates the so-called 'problem of error' insofar as it relates to absolute idealist philosophy. Simply stated, the problem is that if there is no firm barrier between thinking and being, then error as an epistemic possibility appears to be null. In the thesis I argue that Absolute Idealism is capable of making sense of error and truth alike. | |
| dc.title | The Problem of Error in Absolute Idealism | |
| dc.type.content | Master Thesis | |
| dc.rights.accessrights | Open Access | |
| dc.subject.courseuu | Philosophy | |
| dc.thesis.id | 36053 |
