| dc.description.abstract | The conflict in Ukraine (2014-present) has been a subject of intense scrutiny, yet the influence
of Western strategic objectives on this conflict from a Russian perspective remains insufficiently
examined. This thesis addresses this gap by examining Russia’s perceived security concerns and
the strategic motivations driving its responses. For this reasons, primary sources from Russia, the
US, and Ukraine are utilized. This multilingual study has granted some innovative results. The
research reveals that Russia has valid reasons to views NATO, particularly the US, as a direct
threat to its status as a great power, a view intensified by Western involvement in the Orange and
the Maidan Revolution. The study demonstrates that Russia's response of annexing Crimea was
a rational decision within the realist theoretical framework. Initially, under Kuchma, Ukraine's
balancing act between Russia and the West preserved Russian influence. However, as Ukraine's
pro-Western orientation grew, particularly under Yushchenko, Russia’s insecurity deepened. This
was intensified by Western support for opposition during the Maidan protests, which Russia,
based on the research, had valid reasons to believe that it was Western supported, aimed at
weakening Russia’s strategic position that they had under Yanukovych’s leadership. It argues that
Russia’s actions were a rational response to security fears, challenging non-realist perspectives
that often dismiss Russia’s security concerns as perceived. The research calls for further
investigation into Russian and US’s archives and decision-making processes to fully understand
the complex dynamics at play. Overall, this thesis stresses the significance of considering great
power insecurities and strategic interests in the framework of international conflicts, specifically
when assessing the rationale behind Russia’s annexation of Crimea, marking the beginning of
Russo-Ukrainian war. | |
