The Politics of Terror: Securitization and Counter-securitization Through the Waves of Terrorism.

Abstract

This thesis explores how the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Fatah have strategically engaged in securitization and counter-securitization within the framework of David C. Rapoport’s waves of terrorism. By examining the actions of these organisations through the waves, this study aims to explain the adaptive strategies employed to maintain relevance and legitimacy in evolving political and social contexts. During the anti-colonial wave, the IRA and Fatah leveraged anti-colonial struggles to gain popular support for counter-securitization efforts. The IRA utilised martyrdom and popular resistance against the British, while Fatah emerged from an anti-colonial struggle following the Suez Crisis. In the new left wave, the IRA adapted to the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland, using state violence and internment policies to gather support and counter British narratives. Concurrently, Fatah solidified its image as a legitimate military force through the Battle of Karameh, countering Israeli securitization attempts and gaining widespread support. The religious wave saw both organisations shift towards political engagement, something not necessarily in line with Rapoport’s fourth wave of terrorism. The IRA used the Good Friday Agreement to securitize political legitimacy and reframe its struggle in terms of democratic rights and governance. Similarly, Fatah engaged in the political process through the Oslo Accords but had to simultaneously counter Israeli actors who attempted to securitize the peace process by critiquing perceived flaws. Ultimately, this thesis argues that the IRA’s effective counter-securitization strategies have helped maintain its relevance and support base. Fatah has also adapted its strategies to resonate with broader regional and international dynamics, emphasising legitimacy and self-determination. Despite this, both wave-transcending organisations eventually embraced politics over violence, which does not align with Rapoport’s assumption that organisations adopt a new wave’s characteristics. The adaptability of both organisations underscores the dynamic nature of securitization and counter-securitization in long-term political conflicts, providing valuable insights into the mechanisms through which insurgent groups navigate shifting political landscapes.