From globalisation to techno-nationalism: the European Union's collective securitisation of the chip ecosystem

Abstract

How did the European Union’s chip policy shift from an approach based on liberal values aimed at globalisation, to a stance based on techno-nationalism? This thesis has aimed this shift in policy through Sperling and Webber’s model of collective securitisation. It has found that, after the Cold War, the EU embraced globalised, borderless supply chains, particularly in the chip industry. However, the high costs and R&D demands led to concentrated hubs, with TSMC and Samsung dominating manufacturing and the US leading in design, while China and Russia controlled key raw materials. The COVID-19 pandemic starkly exposed the vulnerabilities in this ecosystem, which were further amplified by geopolitical tensions and techno-nationalist policies. The unprecedented surge in chip demand underscored the EU's need for strategic autonomy during the "digital decade." The Russo-Ukrainian war heightened concerns about the sovereignty of the chip supply chain. In response, the EU initiated a series of security measures from 2020 to 2022, culminating in the EU Chips Act proposal on February 8, 2022, and its passage on September 21, 2023. This act, despite internal disagreements on more ambitious legislation, marked a unified response to these threats, shifting the EU's strategy from liberal globalization to techno-nationalism. This evolution reflects a broader policy shift: from neglecting the chip ecosystem (post-Cold War to 2013), to focusing on industrial competitiveness (2013-2018), to recognizing chips as critical to national and European security (2018-2023). The EU now views chip security as vital to its strategic autonomy, driven by recent geopolitical events and trends.