| dc.description.abstract | In this thesis, I investigate the ethical dimensions of animal disenhancement. I do this in particular by employing a being-affecting view, as a modification of the person-affecting view, exploring its implications for the moral evaluation of animal disenhancement. A being-affecting view offers valuable insights here, because animal disenhancement will impact animal identity in a way that our intuitive moral judgement is ill-equipped to address. A secondary objective is to assess how a being-affecting view sees the moral permissibility of animal consumption, not only in the particular context of animal disenhancement, but also in general. My argument is twofold. Addressing the first point, leveraging the being-affecting view, I argue that animal disenhancement, despite its controversies, should not be conflated with the broader industry of animal agriculture of which it is a part, as is often done by many critics of the practice, because animal disenhancement mostly does not harm existing animals. Regarding the second objective, I argue that under certain conditions, a being-affecting view supports the moral commendability of consuming animals, contingent upon their overall wellbeing and the acknowledgement that their existence is determined by human consumption. | |
