Does Polarization Harm Public Debate? Public Reason and the Effects of Polarizing Discourse on Democratic Decision-Making

Abstract

Does polarization in the public debate harm decision-making liberal democracies? In this thesis, I argue that it does if it is used with non-deliberative intentions. Although the inclusion of some forms of polarizing discourse is essential to democratic functioning, polarization strategies can violate norms of democratic decision-making. I provide a normative basis for these claims by assessing polarizing discourse with Habermas’s conception of public reason. I understand polarization as a discourse that propagates an antagonism, as this can adequately explain how polarization can be intentionally used. Using Habermas’s account institutionalized deliberative democracy, I argue that decisions can only be legitimate if they result from fair deliberation that ensures non-coercion and self-government. I hold that polarizing discourse in the informal public sphere cannot harm democratic decision-making. In deliberative decision-making however, communication must comply to the justification principle, which ensures the intentions to develop a shared understanding. Although the perceived fallibility and simplicity of polarizing discourse complicate this development, I argue that its inclusion is essential if it is adduced with deliberative intentions. As intentional polarizing discourse abuses the presupposition of equality and sincerity in the public sphere, it imposes private interests and violates the justification principle. I therefore argue that intentional polarizing discourse conflicts with the ideal of public reason and thus harms the legitimacy of democratic decision-making.