The occupational gradient in public sector corruption: Explaining bribery and favouritism in the European Union

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to investigate if occupational status is a determinant of individual level petty corruption, focusing specifically on the engagement in bribery and favouritism in the public sector. Another contribution is made by comparing national levels of corruption and their influence on this relationship. This research theorises that individual corrupt behaviour is rooted in rational choices people make by weighing the potential costs and benefits of corrupt actions. It is expected that the economic and social capital that come with occupational status influences this balance and leads to a greater likelihood of engaging in bribery and favouritism. It then adds context to this model by arguing that an individuals’ decision to engage in corruption is also driven by national corruption, which is expected to weaken the positive relation. A fixed effects binary logistic regression is utilised to test these mechanisms, using cross-sectional survey data from the Global Corruption Barometer and the Corruption Perceptions Index. Over 16,000 individuals from all 27 European Member States are included in the analysis. Findings show that people with a higher occupational status are indeed more likely to engage in bribery, but this effect is absent for favouritism. National corruption does not weaken the effects. This study suggests that occupational status increases the likelihood to bribe, though it remains unclear whether the reason is a greater willingness, ability, or exposure to bribery. The role of social capital on favouritism remains blurred and requires more research. Monitoring and speak up procedures may increase the costs of bribery. E-governments may prevent in-person bribery and favouritism.