The Buck-passing Account of Value: An examination of Scanlon’s buck-passing account of value and competing views on the value-reasons relation

Abstract

This thesis examines Scanlon's buck-passing account of value. The buck-passing account is an explanation of value in terms of reasons to account for value’s apparent normative force. The primary, and most convincing argument in favor of Scanlon’s buck-passing account is that it would be redundant to refer to value—rather than referring solely to reason-giving properties—in explaining what reasons someone has in favor of something. Reason-giving properties seem to come first in the order of explanation. Crisp shows that there are certain problems with the buck-passing account that can be solved with a revised buck-passing account. The revised buck-passing account is rejected by Crisp also, but I have shown how the analogy on which this rejection is based, does not work and actually favors a buck-passing account when accurately constructed.