On Continuity in Russian Security Policy towards the Former Soviet Union

Abstract

This thesis shows that, in contrast of what is commonly assumed after Vladimir Putin's presidency, the principles, conduct and executionof Russian security policy towards the FSU in the last two decades has hardly changed. In this accessible, erudite and eloquent piece, the author states that, while we must not forget that it is rather common, even natural for a state to pursue its national interest in security cooperation, it is the degree of aggression and the lack of consent in the pursuit of national interest through security policy that continues to set Russia apart.

Russian security policy has been driven by a threefold undercurrent of national interest strongly influenced by its post-imperial complex. Firstly, security policy was used as a tool to generate electoral support and to handle domestic oppositional forces either through appeasement or elimination. Secondly, it served to restore Great Power status through establishing Russia’s ‘natural’ position as the primus inter pares of the FSU. Thirdly, security policy towards the FSU had to fight off threats to Russian national security. In fighting these threats, sovereignty and consent of the relevant states were of significantly lesser importance than safeguarding Russian security. Under Yeltsin’s presidency as well as under Putin’s, threats to Russian national security originating from the FSU have been stressed as being one step away from destroying Russia in order to justify and generate support at home and in the international community for Russian interventions.