| dc.description.abstract | In this Honours thesis I conduct a comparison between two episodes of counterinsurgency warfare, the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) and the Vietnam War (1960-1975) in an attempt to see how these two seemingly similar conflicts could result in such radically different outcomes. The British in Malaya were more successful than the Americans in Vietnam despite fighting in similar conditions and against ideologically similar opponents. The dominant explanation in the historiography of the two conflicts offers a structural explanation for the divergence in conflict outcomes, namely that the American army as an institution was, when compared to the British army, unable to adopt a more effective counterinsurgency approach due to its failure as a ‘’learning institution.’’ Missing from this explanation is the role of the individual commander and in order to fill this gap in the historiography I carry out a comparison between the most influential generals in each respective conflict, General Templer in Malaya and General Westmoreland in Vietnam. In doing so I ask the question why were the leadership and approach of General Templer in Malaya more effective in conducting counterinsurgency warfare than the leadership and approach of the American general in Vietnam, Westmoreland?
I argue that these men and the decisions they made helped to determine the outcome of each conflict. Thereby restoring the element of agency as a means of historical explanation for the divergent outcomes in these counterinsurgency conflicts, rather than the purely structural explanation posited by other scholars. Rather than discarding with this insight I attempt, in restoring agency, to reconcile the agency of the commander with the wider structure and institution that they occupy showing that commanders and their decisions were enabled and constrained by their respective military institutions. Through a systematic comparison between the two commanders in the realms of military strategy, political approaches and their leadership as well as their relationship to their respective institutions, I conclude by arguing that the leadership and approach adopted by General Templer in Malaya was more effective than that of Westmoreland because he implemented a superior military strategy, tackled the political issues plaguing his conflict and was a better leader than Westmoreland. Thereby explaining as to why the British in Malaya were more successful than the Americans in Vietnam. | |
