The development of India and Pakistan’s nuclear strategy

Abstract

This thesis seeks to answer the question: How has India and Pakistan’s nuclear strategy development changed the security environment in South Asia? By applying a constructivist approach to this problem, this thesis challenges the dominant neorealist discourse on nuclear deterrence. By researching the nuclear command-and-control structure of India and Pakistan, instead of nuclear doctrine, this thesis has produced the following conclusions. Pakistan’s nuclear posture continues to inhibit India’s ability to compel Pakistan, raising the risk of nuclear escalation. India and Pakistan are horizontally developing their nuclear forces, raising the cost of nuclear escalation. India and Pakistan’s nuclear command-and control measures are respectively trending more towards positive control, or are already positive control-oriented, increasing the risk of unwanted nuclear use. India and Pakistan are vertically developing their nuclear forces as well, expanding their capabilities to include tactical nuclear weapons and sea-based missiles, thus lowering the threshold for nuclear use. This thesis finds that the development of India and Pakistan’s nuclear posture has opened up new avenues for a crisis to escalate to the nuclear level, and increased the number of nuclear missiles that would be involved.