| dc.description.abstract | The social credit system is a governing device which has been criticized for being oppressive and
dystopian by nature. In this paper, it is argued that this criticism is unfair towards social credit systems
as a phenomenon. The goal of this paper is to answer the question: “Are social credit systems
compatible with libertarian paternalism?”. This is done by first determining what the shared values are
of social credit systems. Social credit systems are centralized reputation systems wherein every social
encounter can be regarded as a transaction. Social credit systems are compatible with libertarian
paternalism to an extend. Binding a reputation to a user, and making this reputation public, is a perfect
example of Nudge Theory in practice as users will alter their behavior based on the reputation of other
users. However, in the decision-making process of creating a social credit system there could be bound
consequences to the system by the governing party, diverting social credit systems from libertarian
paternalism. Social credit system can also fall prey to autonomy gaps. However, not all variants of social
credit systems will suffer from autonomy gaps equally, as not every system presupposes the same
capabilities of the users. Lastly, as the transparency and normativity of social credit systems are different
from system to system, it is unfair to compare social credit systems, as a phenomenon, to dystopian
models. The opposite holds true: social credit systems may provide a libertarian paternalistic answer to
governing in the age of technology. | |
