dc.rights.license | CC-BY-NC-ND | |
dc.contributor.advisor | Stafleu, Frans | |
dc.contributor.author | Amstel, L. van | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-08-04T18:00:34Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-08-04T18:00:34Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://studenttheses.uu.nl/handle/20.500.12932/36540 | |
dc.description.abstract | The following thesis discusses the current debate on the moral status of human beings. The aim of this thesis, is to defend an account of moral status that´s inclusive to severely intellectually disabled people. Contrary to thinkers who try to base moral status on the possession or lack of psychological attributes, I will argue that the unique form of dependency that´s inherent to human relationships, and the meaning we derive from this relationships should be central in assessing moral status. In light of these considerations, Nussbaum´s capability approach, and Rawls’ conception on moral powers will be examined. In doing so I will argue that there´s an understanding of human nature that´s inherent to their ideas. This understanding of humans - as independent autonomous beings - should be revised, if we are to create a society that´s inclusive to intellectually disabled people. | |
dc.description.sponsorship | Utrecht University | |
dc.format.extent | 102504 | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.title | Moral Status and Intellectual Disability
A Defence for an Inclusive Account of Moral Status | |
dc.type.content | Master Thesis | |
dc.rights.accessrights | Open Access | |
dc.subject.keywords | Moral Status, Intellectual disability, Moral power, Capabilities, Autonomy | |
dc.subject.courseuu | Applied Ethics | |